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Abstract 
 
The present thesis consists of four chapters: the introduction (Chapter 1), and three 
econometrics-based research papers (Chapters 2 through 4). The introduction sets out 
the research questions explored in the subsequent chapters and previews the results.  
Chapter 2 uses Monte Carlo studies to investigate a pre-test bias problem potentially 
associated with using Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values to determine whether the 
instrumental variables in the model are strong or weak. A solution is proposed based on 
Angrist and Krueger’s (1995) Split-Sample IV estimator.  
Chapter 3 tests the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis using a new dataset, and with a focus 
on oil-producing countries. A relationship between oil rents, which represent 
productivity measure in the tradable sector of oil exporters, and the real exchange rates 
are examined using unique data constructed from Wood Mackenzie’s Global Economic 
Model. The results provide evidence in favour of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in most 
countries in the sample, apart from OPEC countries.  
Chapter 4 investigates the long-run relationship between GDP per capita, energy 
consumption and energy prices in a set of 28 OECD countries using newer econometric 
techniques than have been prevalent in the prior literature. The results of the analysis 
suggest that the long-run bi-directional relationship exists, but is likely to be 
heterogeneous across countries. Also, the bi-directionality is not symmetric: energy 
consumption was found to be more strongly affected by economic growth than vice 
versa. 
In a narrative sense, the three research papers reflect the progression of my interests 
over the past several years: from a work focused on econometric theory (‘how should 
we do IV pre-testing?’), to a work of applied econometrics testing a piece of economic 
theory (‘does the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis account for real exchange rate 
movements in oil exporters?’), and finally to a work of applied econometrics which is 
oriented more towards answering policy-relevant questions (‘if we cut our energy usage 
to meet climate targets, will we choke off economic growth?’).  
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“A good sketch is better than a long speech.”    
– Napoleon Bonaparte 
 
Taking a cue from the French Emperor, this introduction takes a graphical view of the 
whole thesis and shows that, chapter by chapter, the results have an important thing in 
common – they can all be illustrated with a few relatively simple charts. So in the 
course of the next few pages, I attempt to convince the reader that: (i) pre-testing for 
weak instruments will often introduce bias (but using split-sample techniques can solve 
this problem), (ii) the relationship between the real exchange rate and the productivity 
of the oil sector in the world’s biggest oil exporters – which you would expect to be 
strongly positive on the basis of the Balassa-Samuelson effect – is actually pretty weak, 
and (iii) within the G7 countries, there is a relatively consistent causal relationship from 
GDP to energy usage, but not from energy usage to GDP (the picture for non-G7 OECD 
countries is more mixed).  
 
Second Chapter: Should we pre-test instrumental variables? A Monte Carlo study 
 
Weak instruments are a pervasive issue in the microeconometric literature, and pre-tests 
such as those based on Stock and Yogo’s (2005) first stage F-statistic critical values 
have been widely used to assess whether an instrument is too weak or if it is strong 
enough. But there is a problem – if the instruments are weak (i.e. weakly correlated with 
the endogenous regressors in the model), then the sampling distribution of the Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator doesn’t follow the normal distribution, and any 
subsequent inference is unreliable. It is this problem of unreliable inference which is the 
subject of this chapter.  
Stock and Yogo (2005) suggested that strength of the instrument should be viewed in 
terms of the maximal relative bias of the IV estimator and the maximal size of the Wald 
test when performing hypothesis testing on the parameter of interest. I set up an 
experiment based on Hall et al.’s (1996) simulation and investigate how Stock and 
Yogo’s critical values perform in practice. I look at the simulated samples when the first 
stage F-statistic exceeds the critical value and compare the observed Wald test size 
distortions to those predicted by the critical values. You can get an idea of these results 
in Figure 1.1, which shows the size distortions to the Wald test as a function of the 
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strength of the instrument (the correlation between an endogenous regressor, x, and an 
instrument, z, – increasing from 0 to 0.3 across the clusters of bars), and as a function of 
the degree of endogeneity (the correlation between x and u – increasing from 0.1 to 0.9 
within each cluster of bars). The size of the distortions (the actual size of the test with 
the nominal size of 5%) for all samples are shown in red, while the size distortions for 
those values which exceed Stock and Yogo’s critical values are shown in blue. Three 
things stand out in the picture: (i) the distortions are larger when the instrument is 
weaker (as in the leftmost clusters), (ii) the distortions are larger when the degree of 
endogeneity is greater (as is the case in the rightmost values within each cluster), and 
(iii) the distortions are much larger for those samples where the F-statistic exceeded 
Stock and Yogo’s critical values than for the whole sample.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Wald Test Size Distortions. The larger numbers at the base ranging from 0 
to 0.3 represent the strength of the instrument (the correlation between x and z), while 
the small repeated numbers ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 under each set of bars represent the 
degree of endogeneity (the correlation between x and the error term u). The nominal 
size of the test is 5%. 
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Another contribution of this work is to use a median-squared error as a loss function to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the pre-test. The result of taking this view of the data is 
shown in Figure 1.2. Two things stand out in this second picture: (i) the distortions are 
larger when the instrument is weaker (as in the leftmost clusters), and (ii) the distortions 
are larger when the degree of endogeneity is greater (as is the case in the rightmost 
values within each cluster), but only for the samples with the largest F-statistics.  
 
Taking both views from 1.1 and 1.2 together, using Stock and Yogo’s critical values as 
a pre-test is most problematic when the the degree of endogeneity is high (i.e. when 
instruments are most necessary) and when the instruments are weak (i.e. much of the 
time). 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Median-squared error. The larger numbers at the base ranging from 0 to 
0.3 represent the strength of the instrument (the correlation between x and z), while the 
small repeated numbers ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 under each set of bars represent the 
degree of endogeneity (the correlation between x and u).  
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So instrument selection based on the instrument “passing” the pre-test is associated with 
a potential pre-test bias. At the same time, I find that when the degree of endogeneity of 
the regressor is low, choosing an instrument which is associated with a higher first stage 
F-statistic could improve the precision of estimation of the parameter of interest. You 
can see this in Figure 1.2 by noting that the “high F-statistic” samples on the left within 
each cluster have lower median-squared error than the sample as a whole.  
 
So what practical steps can a researcher take when they are dealing with weak 
instruments? I suggest a solution to the pre-test bias problem based on Angrist and 
Krueger’s (1995) Split-Sample IV estimator (SSIV). As the name suggests, the basic 
idea is to split the sample into two parts: one part to test the strength of the instruments, 
and the other part to estimate the coefficients of interest. As you can see by contrasting 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 (both graphs focus on “high F-statistic” samples), the use of this 
procedure largely eliminates the pre-test bias problem. The size distortions are still 
increasing in the degree of endogeneity in Figure 1.4, but much less so than in Figure 
1.3, which uses the standard 2SLS procedure. The use of SSIV also means that median-
squared error is not increasing in the degree of endogeneity (in contrast to the results 
under 2SLS). However, the accuracy of estimation of the parameter of interest suffers 
notably, which suggests that the approach can only be justified when the sample size is 
large. 
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Figure 1.3 A Simulation of the Standard Two-Stage Least Squares Approach with Stock 
and Yogo’s critical values. The larger numbers at the base ranging from 0 to 0.3 
represent the strength of the instrument (the correlation between x and z), while the 
small repeated numbers ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 under each set of bars represent the 
degree of endogeneity (the correlation between x and u).  
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Figure 1.4 A Simulation of the Split-Sample Instrumental Variables Approach. The 
larger numbers at the base ranging from 0 to 0.42 represent the strength of the 
instrument (the correlation between x and z), while the small repeated numbers ranging 
from 0.1 to 0.9 under each set of bars represent the degree of endogeneity (the 
correlation between x and u). The sample is split evenly into two halves. 
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Third Chapter1: Oil Rents and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
 
Figure 1.5 The Penn Effect. The price level (measured relative to the United States), 
shown on the vertical axis, tends to be higher the higher is GDP per capita. The 
relationship holds both in OPEC and non-OPEC countries. The data cover 42 countries 
over the period 1965-2009. Source: Penn World Table (PWT 7.1) 
 
The Penn Effect is an empirical regularity – price levels tend to be higher in wealthier 
countries. You can see this clearly in figure 1.5. The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is 
an explanation for this regularity: when country’s tradable sector becomes more 
productive and experiences wage growth, country’s non-tradable sector will experience 
wage growth as well, as long as workers can freely move between sectors. The increase 
in wages in both non-tradable and tradable sectors will drive the price level up, which in 
turn will lead to the real exchange rate appreciation and higher real price levels. 
 
In this chapter, we exploit the proprietary data, obtained from Wood Mackenzie’s (WM) 
Global Economic Model (GEM), which allowed us to construct oil production costs and 
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revenues for a number of oil-exporting countries. Based on these costs and revenues, oil 
rents (i.e. profits) are calculated. As oil rents represent productivity in the oil sector, we 
use them to test for evidence of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis in oil-exporting 
countries. We specifically focus on testing whether the increase in the productivity of 
the oil sector leads to real exchange rate appreciation of the oil exporters. 
 
Figure 1.6 Testing Balassa-Samuelson. The price level (measured relative to the United 
States), shown on the vertical axis, tends to be higher the higher is productivity in the 
oil sector (measured as rents per capita). Surprisingly, however, this relationship does 
not seem to hold in OPEC countries (shown in red). . The data cover 42 countries over 
the period 1965-2009. Source: Penn World Table (PWT 7.1), Wood Mackenzie’s (WM) 
Global Economic Model (GEM) 
The results we obtained were unexpected – they suggested that while for most countries 
in our sample of 42, the Balassa-Samuelson mechanism does hold, there was no 
evidence for the hypothesis in OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries). In OPEC, neither the nominal exchange rate nor the price level were 
affected by an increase in oil sector productivity. We attribute the failure of the 
mechanism to the fact that at least one of the assumptions of the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis – free movement of labour between tradable and non-tradable sectors – is 
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likely to be violated. For the rest of the sample, we find that the effect of oil 
productivity, while significant, is very small - about 8 times smaller than the effect of 
the oil price movements.  
11 
 
Fourth Chapter: How Costly is Conservation? The International Energy-GDP 
Relationship Re-examined 
 
Figure 1.7 GDP per capita and energy consumption. Comparing total energy 
consumption (measured in tons-of-oil-equivalent) to PPP GDP per capita, we can see 
that there is a positive relationship. In this graph, each point represents one year of 
data for one country, and country is its own colour (the full set of countries is listed in 
the chapter). 
There is a positive correlation between economic growth and energy consumption, and 
we can see that clearly in Figure 1.7 (note: in the picture each country and year pair is a 
single dot, and each country has its own colour).  But what is the causal relationship? 
Does economic growth cause increased energy consumption? Does increased energy 
usage lead to economic expansion? Both? Neither? This question matters as we look 
forward to a future where energy use may end up being distinctly lower in order for us 
to meet climate change goals.  So this chapter reviews the long-run relationship between 
economic growth, energy consumption and energy prices for 28 OECD (Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development) nations and for the subset of G7 countries. 
Despite decades of research in this area, there has been no agreement on whether 
economic growth drives energy consumption or the other way around; the other two 
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possibilities are that causality is bidirectional or the two are independent. The earlier 
studies used country-level data and time series estimators to analyse the relationship 
(Masih and Masih, 1997; Stern, 2000) . Newer studies (for example Belke et al., 2011; 
Damette and Seghir, 2013). take advantage of available panel datasets and panel 
estimators, which offer efficiency gains compared to individual country-level analysis.  
Throughout the chapter I employ most up-to-date econometrics techniques to first test 
the order of integration of the variables (Bai and Ng, 2004, 2010), then to test if the 
long-run relationship exists (Westerlund’s 2007 cointegration test) and lastly to estimate 
parameters of the long-run relationship using panel Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares 
estimator by Mark and Sul (2003), Mean Group (Pesaran and Smith, 1995), Pooled 
Mean Group (Pesaran et al., 1999) and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group 
(Pesaran, 2006) estimators. I compare the results of the Mean Group estimations with 
the results produced by other panel estimators, and I show that the relationship between 
energy consumption and GDP per capita is most likely heterogeneous across countries. I 
argue that panel estimators have to be chosen carefully to allow for this heterogeneity. I 
use Pesaran’s (2015) test to show that cross-sectional dependence is likely to be an issue 
and I re-estimate the relationship using CCEMG which is consistent in its presence. 
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Figure 1.8 Estimated effects of TFC (Total Final energy Consumption, toe) per capita 
on GDP per capita (blue) and of GDP per capita on TFC (red). In each case, the effect 
is measured as an elasticity. Notice that while the GDP -> TFC elasticities are 
relatively stable, plausibly sized and almost all have the expected sign, the TFC -> 
GDP elasticities are unstable, often implausibly large, and frequently negative.  
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The details of the estimation are explained fully in the chapter, but again the basic 
results can be summarised in a graph, in this case Figure 1.8. Although the main results 
were estimated as a panel (which increases statistical power), this figure depicts the 
country-by-country estimates of elasticities for the two causal channels – from energy 
consumption to GDP (in blue) and from GDP to energy consumption (in red). We can 
see right away that the blue, energy-to-GDP estimates are unstable and frequently 
implausibly large or implausibly negative. The red, GDP-to-energy elasticity estimates, 
in contrast, are both more stable across countries and more realistic in magnitude. So 
while these country-by-country estimates were not the basis for inference in the main 
chapter, they do reflect the main finding, which is that the causality is essentially one-
directional: economic growth leads to increased energy consumption. This one-
directional effect is significant and relatively similar across countries. There is some 
weak evidence for causality running from energy consumption to GDP and the 
relationship appears to be heterogeneous across countries. Moreover, there was no 
causal effect found in the G7 countries. These results suggest that modest energy 
conservation policies are not likely to have a serious negative effect on economic 
growth in the long run.  
 
To summarise, the three core chapters reflect the progression of my interests over the 
past several years: from a work focused on econometric theory (‘how should we do IV 
pre-testing?’), to a work of applied econometrics testing a piece of economic theory 
(‘does the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis account for real exchange rate movements in 
oil exporters?’), and finally to a work of applied econometrics which is oriented more 
towards answering policy-relevant questions (‘if we cut our energy usage to meet 
climate targets, will we choke off economic growth?’).  
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Chapter 2. Should we pre-test instrumental variables? A Monte Carlo study. 
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2.1 Introduction.  
 
Instrumental variables techniques are widely used in applied research, particularly 
because they allow economists to distinguish and evaluate causal relationships in the 
absence of controlled experiments or to estimate equations where the regressor is 
unobservable or measured with error. In order to proceed with an instrumental variables 
(IV) estimation, the researcher has to find appropriate instruments, which is often quite 
difficult. Once some instruments are found which satisfy the necessary conditions, i.e. 
instrument exogeneity and instrument relevance, they may still compromise the 
reliability of inferences on the parameters of interest if the instruments are not 
sufficiently correlated with the endogenous regressors. The question of whether the 
instruments at hand are strong enough to provide reliable test statistics is not easy to 
answer. Stock and Yogo (2005) derived critical values for the first stage F-statistic in 
the IV regression that enable researchers to determine whether the instruments used are 
strong or weak; the strength of the instruments is defined in terms of the maximal bias 
of the IV estimator relative to the OLS estimator and the maximal size distortions of the 
Wald test while testing hypotheses on the coefficient of the endogenous regressors.  
Stock and Yogo’s critical values are routinely reported by Stata’s ivreg2 command 
(Baum et al., 2007) and widely used in applied work (see for example Amiti and 
Konings (2007), or Kilian (2008)), because they seem to have provided a solution to a 
serious problem that researchers face - how to determine whether the estimation results 
based on IV methods are trustworthy or not. In this paper, I draw attention to a potential 
problem associated with the use of Stock and Yogo’s critical values as a pre-test to 
determine whether the instruments are strong or weak. The problem is that choosing the 
instruments based on a pre-test and then estimating the main equation using preselected 
instruments introduces problems associated with sequential testing. Depending on how 
the pre-test is carried out a bias might be introduced, something that researchers should 
be cautious about.  
Another innovative contribution of my paper is in using median-squared error as a loss 
function in place of more traditional mean-squared error, which can not be applied if the 
model is exactly identified. On the basis of the the loss function, the effectiveness of the 
pre-test is evaluated.  
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I also suggest a solution to the problem associated with the pre-test bias, which is based 
on Angrist and Krueger’s (1995) Split-Sample IV estimator (SSIV). I provide the results 
of Monte Carlo simulations that support both claims I will make in this paper – (i) that 
we should be cautious when using pre-tests and (ii) that SSIV might be a useful 
alternative to Two-Stage Least Squares estimator (2SLS) in the context of weak IV 
detection, instrument selection, and estimation of the main equation of interest.  
The chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 outlines the model and its assumptions; 
section 2.3 considers the consequences of having weak instruments in the IV regression; 
section 2.4 discusses detection of the weak IV problem, in particular the test suggested 
by Stock and Yogo (2005) which is based on the critical values for the first stage F-
statistic; section 2.5 considers the potential problem that comes from pre-testing is 
reviewed; section 2.6 describes the design of the Monte Carlo simulations; section 2.7 
investigates the performance of the critical values based on the results of the 
simulations; sections 2.8 and 2.9 point out caveats with which the critical values should 
be used in applied work and explore an alternative way of using the critical values in 
order to overcome the problem of sequential testing; section 2.10 concludes the 
analysis. 
 
2.2 Model and assumptions. 
 
Consider the linear IV model with one endogenous regressor and no exogenous 
regressors: 
                                                          𝑌 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀                                                      (2.1) 
where 𝑌 is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, 𝑋 is an 𝑁 × 1 
vector of observations on the endogenous regressor, 𝜀 is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of the iid error 
term distributed normally N(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) and 𝛽 is a scalar parameter of interest. This equation 
is referred to as the structural equation. 
In row notation: 
                                                         𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖                                                     (2.2) 
18 
 
The reduced form equation for 𝑋:  
                                                          𝑋 = 𝑍Π + 𝑣                                                       (2.3) 
 
where 𝑍 is an 𝑁 × 𝐿 matrix of instruments, 𝑣 is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of the iid error term 
distributed N(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) and Π is a 𝐿 × 1 vector of unknown coefficients; corr(𝜀𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) = 𝜌. 
In row notation 
                                                        𝑥𝑖 = 𝒛𝑖𝜋 + 𝑣𝑖                                                       (2.4) 
The instruments are assumed to be correlated with the endogenous regressor 𝑋, 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝒛𝒊′𝑥𝑖) ≠ 0 and uncorrelated with the error term 𝜀, 𝐸(𝑧𝑖𝜀𝑖) ≠ 0. The former is 
referred to as the rank conditions and says that instruments should be relevant, i.e., 
correlated with the endogenous regressors; the latter says that instruments should be 
weakly exogenous. 
The most commonly used IV method in applied work is the Two-Stage Least Square 
estimator (2SLS): 
                                                  𝛽2𝑆𝐿𝑆 = (𝑋
′𝑃𝑧𝑋)
−1(𝑋′𝑃𝑧𝑌)                                       (2.5) 
where 𝑃𝑧 =  𝑍(𝑍
′𝑍)−1𝑍′ is a projection matrix. 
The 2SLS estimator is usually thought of as a two-step estimator, where the first step is 
based on the reduced form equation, and the second step is based on the structural 
equation, but instead of regressing y on x, y is regressed on ?̂?, where ?̂? is a predicted 
value from the first step regression. 
In order to determine whether the instruments are satisfying the non-zero rank 
condition, the researcher needs to perform an underidentification test – a test of the rank 
of the П matrix. The model considered in this paper only has one endogenous regressor, 
so П is a vector, and, as noted in Baum et al. (2003), the underidentification test is 
equivalent to testing whether the instruments are jointly significant at explaining x. If 
the F-statistics from the first stage regression exceeds the critical value, then the Ho of 
П=0 is rejected at the corresponding significance level.  
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Testing weak exogeneity can prove to be a harder task – in order to perform it the 
researcher would need to have several instruments at hand and would have to have prior 
beliefs or theories on which instruments are more reliable and informative. This paper 
will not focus directly on the issues related to the failure of the weak exogeneity 
condition for the instruments. 
Weak exogeneity and the non-zero rank condition are crucial for the validity of the IV 
regression: they ensure that the IV estimator is identified and consistent. However, even 
if these two conditions are satisfied, this doesn’t necessarily imply reliable inference – 
when the instruments are correlated only weakly with the endogenous regressors, there 
can be a large bias in the IV estimator and size distortions of the test of the parameter of 
interest in the structural equation. 
2.3 Sample size vs. weak IV problem. 
 
When the rank condition and weak exogeneity are satisfied, the IV estimator is 
consistent, but still biased on the way to infinity. When 𝑁 is not sufficiently large, 
sampling distribution of the 2SLS is not well approximated by the normal distribution, 
the confidence intervals produced are incorrect and the inference is unreliable. 
However, Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) showed that in the presence of weak 
instruments even when the sample size is large, IV estimator still suffers from all the 
aforementioned problems and the weaker the correlation between Z and X is the more 
severe are the distortions of the sampling distributions of the statistics.  
Nelson and Startz (1990b) analyzed the small sample distribution of the IV estimator in 
the case with one endogenous regressor and one instrument by deriving its pdf and cdf 
and investigating their behavior for different values of the parameters. They concluded 
that the distribution is very different from its asymptotic approximation. In fact, they 
found that the distribution is bimodal and the center of it is closer to the probability 
limit of the OLS estimator and not the true value of zero. They noted that the 
approximation was particularly poor when the sample size was small or the instrument 
was weak. 
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Why do weak instruments and small samples seem to have similar effect on the 
distribution of the IV estimator? The answer to this question can be found in 
Rothenberg (1984), where he discusses the so-called concentration parameter 𝜇2:  
 
                                                  𝜇2 =
Π′Z′ZΠ
𝜎𝑣
2                                              (2.6) 
He expressed the 2SLS estimator in terms of the standardized normal variables and 𝜇, 
which allowed him to show that the sample size affects the distribution of 2SLS 
estimator only through the concentration parameter and when 𝜇2 is large, the 
standardized 2SLS estimator is distributed as 𝑁(0,1). The concentration parameter will 
usually be large when the sample size is large, but it can also be large if 𝜎𝑣
2 is small. 
Conversely, even if the sample size is large, the concentration parameter can be small if 
the 𝜎𝑣
2 is also large, which would be the case if significant proportion of the variation in 
X stays unexplained by the instruments, or in other words instruments are weakly 
correlated with the endogenous regressor. Rothenberg (1984) also suggests that it would 
be more useful to scale the distribution of the estimator in terms of 
1
𝜇
 rather than 
1
√𝑛
 in 
the context of asymptotic analysis. 
Stock et al. (2002) provide graphical illustration of the relationship between 𝜇2 and the 
probability density function (pdf) of the 2SLS estimator and its t-statistic, which is 
based on the model used by Nelson and Startz (1990b). According to Stock’s et al. 
(2002) Monte Carlo simulations for the one instrument case with the correlation 
between the error terms in the first stage regression and the structural equation at 𝜌 =
0.99, the distribution of the 2SLS estimator is centered around the same wrong value as 
the OLS estimator when 
𝜇2
𝐿
= 0, when 
𝜇2
𝐿
 is larger than zero but small, the distribution is 
bimodal, and finally (only) when 
𝜇2
𝐿
> 10, will the distribution approach its asymptotic 
approximation. The graphs also show the pdfs of the corresponding t-statistics; when 𝜇2 
is small, the distributions are heavily skewed to the right, which would cause large 
distortions to the size of the t-test. 
In their earlier research, Staiger and Stock (1997) introduced an alternative approach to 
approximating distributions in the presence of weak instruments. Unlike the traditional 
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approach that assumed fixed, nonzero coefficients in the first stage of the IV regression, 
Staiger and Stock (1997) suggested fixing the first stage F-statistic by lowering the 
value of the first stage coefficients as the sample size increases. Contrary to 
conventional asymptotics, the F-statistic under the the alternative approach does not 
tend to infinity as the number of observations goes up. The new approach enabled the 
authors to derive asymptotic representations of multiple test statistics, which was not 
possible using the traditional approach. 
One example of the sort of practical problems that can be created by weak instruments 
can be seen in Angrist and Krueger’s (1991) well-known returns to education analysis. 
Angrist and Krueger investigate returns to schooling in the US using census data from 
1960, 1970 and 1980. The authors set out to estimate the effect of an extra year of 
schooling on subsequent earnings, but this cannot be done with OLS due to the bias 
potentially introduced by an omitted variable – innate ability – that is thought to 
positively affect both years spent in education and the earnings. So instead of OLS, 
Angrist and Krueger used the individual’s quarter of birth to instrument out for 
exogenous variation in schooling which cannot be attributed to the variation in 
individual intelligence. Due to contemporary legislation that varied by state, students 
were not allowed to leave school until they reach certain age (16, 17 or 18 years), so 
some of the variation in the time spent at school was truly exogenous and only 
explained by the quarter of birth, which was assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
student’s ability. Angrist and Krueger had over 300 000 observations and they used the 
quarter of birth, year of birth and state dummies, as well as their interactions – 
altogether more than 170 dummies - for the IV regression. 
The coefficients on the quarter of birth dummies in the first stage regression were found 
to be jointly significantly different from zero at the 1% level, so it was decided that the 
quarter of birth was a valid instrument. In the second stage the 2SLS estimates were also 
significant, but insignificantly different from the significant OLS coefficients, which 
Angrist and Krueger explained by the downward bias in the OLS due to the 
measurement error or omitted variables. However, another and arguably more likely 
explanation would be that it was the IV estimator that was biased (towards the OLS 
estimator) due to the weak IV problem. Angrist and Krueger (1991) is a very important 
example of the weak IV problem – something that the authors didn’t consider when they 
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wrote it, because weak instruments at that time were deemed to be problematic only in 
small samples. 
Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) critically assessed the Angrist and Krueger (1991) 
paper and suggested that the instrument was indeed weak and also potentially not 
exogenous with respect to wage, which biased the IV results towards the OLS estimates. 
They managed to reproduce all the coefficients from the original paper and added the 
first stage F-statistics to different specification and regarded them as being very low. 
They also conducted a Monte Carlo study, where they used randomly generated 
numbers instead of the actual quarter of birth variable and surprisingly got very similar 
IV results to the Angrist and Krueger (1991) paper. Even the standard errors were very 
similar and low – it was a common belief that the standard errors would be large if the 
instruments were weak. And in general, this is true -  as the instrument becomes weaker, 
the standard errors get larger. However, when the instruments are sufficiently weak, 
larger standard errors do not compensate sufficiently for the bias of the IV estimates, so 
the inference is not properly sized; it's not just that the estimates get imprecise, but they 
are also badly biased. However, Bound et al. noted that the first stage F-statistic for the 
regressions with the randomly generated instruments were very low, almost equal to 1, 
which suggests that the instruments are not correlated with schooling. 
This can be reviewed in terms of the concentration parameter – Stock et al. (2002) 
discuss the link between the concentration parameter and the F-statistics from testing 
the hypothesis that Π = 0 and they show that when the sample size is large: 
                                                            𝐸(𝐹) ≅
𝜇2
𝐿
+ 1                                                (2.7) 
This means that 
𝜇2
𝐿
 can be estimated by F-1, which essentially means that the F-stat 
close to 1 corresponds to the concentration parameter that is close to zero, which as 
discussed earlier, would cause the pdf of the IV estimator to be centered around the 
same wrong value as the OLS estimator. In light of their findings, Bound et al (1995) 
emphasized the importance of reporting the diagnostic tests from the first stage IV 
regression, such as the F-stat and the partial R-squared of the exogenous instruments. 
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2.4 Detecting weak instruments. 
 
What is a weak instrument? It is difficult to give a general definition because the answer 
varies by context. It is always true that the more weakly correlated the instruments are 
with the regressors, the worse are the asymptotic approximations of the distributions of 
the IV estimator and other related statistics. But what matters is the magnitude of the 
distortions that could be invoked. Stock and Yogo (2005) suggested measuring these 
distortions in terms of the maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to the OLS 
estimator and the maximal size distortions of the Wald test for testing hypotheses on β 
that a researcher is willing to tolerate. 
For example, if the maximal relative bias (of IV compared to OLS) that a researcher is 
willing to accept is 15% and a maximal size of the Wald test (when the nominal size is 
5%) is 20%, then the instrument that generates a larger bias or distorts the size more 
should be deemed weak.  
We established earlier that the value of the concentration parameter is related to the 
quality of asymptotic approximation, so the question can be reinterpreted as how small 
should the value of the concentration parameter be for the researcher to conclude that 
his instruments are weak?  
Stock and Yogo (2005) considered a test based on the Cragg-Donald (1993) test statistic 
𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛, which was originally meant for testing the rank of the П matrix to rule out 
underidentification, where 𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝐺𝑛) and 𝐺𝑛 is a matrix analog of the first–
stage F-statistic for the general case with several endogenous regressors and included 
insruments. Note, that I will also refer to the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic as the first 
stage F-statistic from testing the joint significance of the instruments in the reduced 
form equation as in my model with one endogenous regressor the two are equivalent.  
Using the results from Staiger and Stock (1997) Stock and Yogo (2005) show that under 
weak asymptotics, 𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 converges in distribution to 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙(
𝜈
𝐿
), where 𝜈 has non-
central Wishart distribution with non-centrality parameter equal to the weak instrument 
limit of the concentration matrix (matrix version of the concentration parameter for a 
more general IV model). The minimum eigenvalues of the concentration matrix are next 
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used to describe weak instrument sets and derive the critical values associated with a 
certain maximal bias and maximal test size distortion.   
Stock and Yogo (2005) haven’t modified the Cragg-Donald statistic, but derived critical 
values that correspond to a certain relative bias or the test size distortion. The critical 
values are different depending on which estimator is used (2SLS, LIML, fuller-k etc.), 
the number of endogenous regressors and the number of instruments. Stata ivreg2 
command (Baum et al., 2007) routinely reports the critical values for the first stage F-
statistics, when they exist.  
It’s worth noting that the critical values were derived for the case when 𝜀 and 𝑣 are 
assumed to be iid. It is likely to be the case that the critical values would be different in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, even if the robust version of the 
Cragg-Donald statistic – Kliebergen-Paap rk LM statistic, proposed by Kleibergen and 
Paap (2006) - is used. Olea and Pflueger (2013) proposed a scaled version of the usual 
F-statistic to test for weak instruments, which is robust to heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. In the exactly identified case with a single endogenous regressor their test 
statistic is identical to the robust first stage F-statistic, however, in case of 
overidentification, the test statistic is different. 
Before Stock and Yogo (2005) derived the critical values and suggested their version of 
a weak IV test, it used to be much more common to simply test for underidentification, 
i.e. test whether the rank condition holds. Other alternatives included looking at some 
form of the R-squared from the first stage regression, for example, Hall at el. (1996) 
suggested to use Anderson’s (1951) canonical correlations test in the context of weak 
IV, which in principle is a test of underidentification.2 As for the tests that specifically 
check for the presence of weak instruments - there have been very few. A closely-
related (but inferior) test to the one proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005), was proposed 
by Staiger and Stock (1997). They advised using a rule of thumb when working with the 
models with one endogenous regressor, which stated that if the first stage F-statistic is 
larger than 10, then the instruments should not be considered weak. Another test, 
proposed by Hahn and Hausman (2002), has an null hypothesis of strong instruments, 
                                                 
2 Shea’s (1997) partial R-squared can be used in the case of multiple endogenous regressors 
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so rejecting it would suggest that instruments are weak or irrelevant, but the test had 
very low power, so it hasn’t been popular in applied work. 
 
2.5 Potential problem with the pre-test. 
 
In the previous section I described the test suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) for 
detecting weak instruments based on the critical values for the first stage F-statistic. The 
paper has been very influential and has received 3148 citations3, which indicates that the 
method is widely used.  
How does the test work? The basic idea is that the researcher decides on the maximal 
size distortion he is willing to accept – for instance: 15% – obtains the first stage F-stat, 
compares it to the corresponding critical value – for the case with one endogenous 
regressor and one instrument it would be 8.96 – and if the F-statistic exceeds the critical 
value, then the instrument is regarded as not being weak and the researcher can proceed 
with the IV estimation of the main equation. However, if the F-statistic is below the 
critical value, the instrument is considered to be weak, so the researcher is better off 
finding other instruments or undertaking some form of the weak IV robust inference, 
such as using an Anderson and Rubin (AR) (1949) approach, or a more powerful 
Kleibergen’s (2002) Lagrange Multiplier statistic, or Moreira’s (2003) conditional 
likelihood ratio tests, the distributions of which do not depend on the value of the 
concentration parameter. There has been extensive research on various modifications of 
these tests, however, this is not the focus of this paper, an accessible overview can be 
found in Mikusheva (2013). 
Both Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005) tests seem easy to implement 
and very informative, so what can go wrong? 
Hall et al. (1996) suggested that using a pre-test can be detrimental for the IV estimation 
and can compromise the results even more than a weak IV problem. They consider a 
likelihood ratio test based on the canonical correlations between the endogenous 
regressor and the instruments. In the case with one endogenous regressor and one 
instrument the test statistic is Φ = −n ∗ log(1 − 𝑟2), where 𝑟2 is a square of the 
                                                 
3 According to Google Scholar, as of 30.07.16 
26 
 
correlation between the instrument and the regressor. Under the null hypothesis of the 
instruments being uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor Φ is distributed as chi-
square with one degree of freedom. Hall et al. (1996) test is closely related to the 𝑛𝑅2 
test proposed by Nelson and Startz (1990a), where they suggest that 𝑛𝑅2 larger than 2 
corresponds to strong instruments. Hall et al. (1996) point out that when the correlation 
is low, Φ and 𝑛𝑅2 are approximately equal to each other. 
Hall et al (1996) consider the proposed test in the context of a hypothetical situation in 
which the researcher has access to lists of potential instruments and wants to choose a 
list that would produce the most reliable inference in the second stage of the IV 
regression based on the results of the canonical correlation test. He obtains the R-
squared from the first stage regression, calculates test-statistic, compares it to the 
appropriate critical value and if the test statistic doesn’t exceed the critical value, the 
instruments are thrown away. The researcher continues testing the instruments until he 
can reject the null hypothesis of irrelevant instruments and then those instruments are 
kept to estimate the structural equation. 
They conducted a Monte Carlo study for a simple case with one endogenous regressor 
and one instrument using 100 observations and 10 000 simulations. The data generated 
varied in the degree of correlation between the instrument and the regressor from 0 to 
0.4 and the degree of endogeneity from 0 to 0.9. One of the points of the experiment 
was to check how well their Φ-statistic performs as a pre-estimation screening 
procedure, so they calculated the size for the test of the hypothesis 𝛽 = 0 for all the 
samples, and then for the samples where Φ exceeded the 10% and 1% critical value. 
The results were worrying – it looked like the samples with a higher Φ-statistic and not 
very strong correlation between the instrument and the regressor consistently had worse 
distortions to the test size, and the distortions increased steadily as the degree of 
endogeneity was getting stronger. Their conclusion was that the researcher seems to be 
better off using a random instrument rather than an instrument that passes the pre-test. 
The explanation they provided is straightforward – by using a pre-test, the researcher 
introduces a pre-test bias into the IV estimation. 
In the next section I describe an experiment I conducted based on the Hall et al. (1996) 
design and Stock and Yogo’s critical values to test whether Stock and Yogo’s (2005) 
weak instrument test and critical values suffer from the pre-test bias in a similar way to 
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the Hall’s Φ-statistic and test for underidentification. I expect to find analogous results 
due to the fact that it can be easily shown that for the case with one endogenous 
regressor for the fixed 𝑛 and fixed 𝑙 there is a one-to-one relationship between the F-
statistic and the 𝑅2 from the first stage regression: 
                                                 𝐹 =
𝑅2/(𝑙−1)
(1−𝑅2)/(𝑛−𝑙)
                                        (2.8) 
 
2.6 Design of the Monte Carlo simulations and the content of the experiment. 
 
For the experiment I will use the model described earlier in section 2.2,               
                                                           𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖,                                                    (2.9) 
                                                            𝑥𝑖 = 𝒛𝑖𝜋 + 𝑣𝑖,                                                (2.10) 
 All variables are randomly drawn from the normal distribution with zero mean and 
variance-covariance matrix 𝑉, true 𝛽 is set to 0.  For all the simulations I use 10 000 
repetitions.  
𝑉 = (
𝜎2𝑥 𝜎𝑥𝑧 𝜎𝑥𝜀
− 𝜎2𝑧 𝜎𝑧𝜀
− − 𝜎2𝜀
) 
𝜎2𝑥=𝜎
2
𝑧=𝜎
2
𝜀=1, 𝜎𝑧𝜀=0 
I will consider three cases: 
Case 1: 1 endogenous regressor, 1 excluded instrument, 𝑛 = 100, 𝜎𝑥𝑧varies from 0 to 
0.4, 𝜎𝑥𝜀 varies from 0 to 0.9 
Case 2: 1 endogenous regressor, 2 excluded instruments, 𝑛 = 100, 𝜎2𝑧1 = 𝜎
2
𝑧2, 𝜎𝑧1𝜀 =
𝜎𝑧2𝜀 = 0, 𝜎𝑥𝑧1 = 𝜎𝑥𝑧2 = 𝜎𝑥𝑧 and vary from 0 to 0.4, 𝜎𝑥𝜀 varies from 0 to 0.9 
Case 3: 1 endogenous regressor, 1 excluded instrument, 𝑛 = 1600, 𝜎𝑥𝑧varies from 0 to 
0.1, 𝜎𝑥𝜀 varies from 0 to 0.9 
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In each round of the simulations the reduced form equation is estimated first, the F-
statistics is collected, then the structural equation is estimated, H0: β = 0 tested by 
means of Wald test with the 5% nominal size and the p-value recorded.  
The main purpose of the experiment is to test whether the samples with the first stage F-
statistic above Stock and Yogo’s critical values will produce lower Wald test size 
distortions, specifically if the actual size in the finite samples will match the “predicted” 
size, when compared to randomly selected samples. 
The aggregated results are presented in tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 that correspond to the 
cases described above. I have also calculated the median-squared error, which is used as 
a loss function, for all the samples and the samples conditional on the first stage F-
statistic exceeding the critical value. The median-squared error is used instead of more 
traditional mean-squared error since in the exactly identified case the IV estimator does 
not have any finite moments - the moments of the IV estimator only exist up to the 
degree of overidentification (see Mariano (1972)).4  
All the tables are structured in the same way: 
Column (1) defines the strength of the correlation between the endogenous regressor 
and the instrument, column (2) show the degree of endogeneity of x, columns (3)-(5) 
report the values for the estimated 5%, 50% and 95% fractiles for the obtained 
distribution of β̂, column (6) reports size of the Wald test for all samples, column (7) – 
median F-statistic for all samples, columns (8)-(17) report the fractions of all samples 
that exceed the conventional 5% critical value, the F-statistic above 10 (Staiger and 
Stock’s rule of thumb) and then F-statistics of 5.53, 8.96 and 16.38, which are the Stock 
and Yogo’s critical values for 25%, 15% and 20% maximal Wald test size and the 
actual test sizes observed in these sample (the critical values are different for the case 
with two instruments). Columns (18)-(20) report the median-squared error for all the 
samples and for samples conditional on passing Stock and Yogo’s weak IV test. Each 
table contains five panels (A-E) and each panel corresponds to different strength of the 
relationship between 𝑥 and 𝑧, from completely unrelated to strongly correlated.  
 
                                                 
4 However, similar results were obtained using the mean-squared error as a loss function 
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2.7 Discussion of the results (2SLS). 
 
Panel A and panel B of table 2.1 correspond to no correlation between x and z and very 
low correlation with 𝜎𝑥𝑧=0.1, which is supported by very low median F-statistics for all 
samples – the maximum value it reaches is 1.14, which is far below the 5% critical 
value of 3.94. Panels C, D and E produce median F-statistics with values just above the 
5% critical values when 𝜎𝑥𝑧 = 0.2 and the F-stat of almost 20 when 𝜎𝑥𝑧=0.4. 
Another thing to notice is that within panels A and B as the correlation between x and 𝜀 
goes up, the median of the observed distribution of β also goes up, so it is clear that the 
2SLS estimator is biased towards the OLS and when the instrument is irrelevant or 
weak the 2SLS bias gets closer to the OLS bias as the degree of endogeneity increases. 
We can still observe this pattern in panel C, however the bias is notably smaller and for 
the samples with 𝜎𝑥𝑧 ≥ 0.3 the bias basically disappears for any degree of endogeneity. 
Also, as the strength of the instrument increases, the observed distributions of ?̂? get 
narrower around the true value of β. The distributions also seem fairly symmetric in 
panels A and B, but become left-skewed in Panles C, D and E, even despite the fact that 
for those samples the median of the distribution is close to the true value of zero. This 
suggests that there were more extreme negative than positive ?̂?s estimated. 
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Table 2.1. Case 1: 2SLS, n=100, 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument. 
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0.0 0.0 -6.411 -0.004 5.750 0.000 0.458 0.053 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.022 0.009 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.990 0.058 
 0.0 0.1 -6.277 0.112 6.363 0.000 0.458 0.050 0.002 0.002 0.043 0.019 0.005 0.003 0.031 0.000  0.000 0.998 0.032 
 0.0 0.2 -6.337 0.199 5.963 0.001 0.463 0.050 0.016 0.002 0.105 0.021 0.033 0.003 0.065 0.000 0.333 0.985 0.044 
 0.0 0.3 -5.593 0.305 6.509 0.002 0.465 0.052 0.035 0.002 0.143 0.020 0.070 0.003 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.998 0.148 
 0.0 0.4 -5.372 0.410 5.995 0.005 0.458 0.049 0.084 0.002 0.278 0.018 0.133 0.003 0.206 0.000  0.000 0.986 0.234 
 0.0 0.5 -5.364 0.500 5.735 0.016 0.476 0.050 0.223 0.001 0.250 0.020 0.288 0.002 0.304 0.000 0.333 0.964 0.198 0.094 
0.0 0.6 -4.489 0.599 5.681 0.031 0.457 0.051 0.371 0.002 0.650 0.021 0.483 0.004 0.657 0.000 1.000 1.002 0.376 0.115 
0.0 0.7 -3.520 0.718 5.448 0.066 0.461 0.053 0.561 0.002 0.765 0.022 0.653 0.003 0.720 0.000 1.000 1.022 0.413 0.316 
0.0 0.8 -2.803 0.789 4.326 0.129 0.464 0.049 0.816 0.002 0.889 0.019 0.880 0.004 0.947 0.000  0.000  1.014 0.631 0.944 
0.0 0.9 -1.740 0.914 3.551 0.262 0.459 0.049 0.969 0.002 1.000 0.019 0.989 0.004 1.000 0.000  0.000  0.992 0.785 0.695 
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Table 2.1. Case 1: 2SLS, n=100, 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument (continued). 
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0.1 0.0 -3.922 -0.001 3.871 0.001 1.103 0.173 0.003 0.018 0.022 0.094 0.006 0.027 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.424 0.040 0.018 
0.1 0.1 -3.919 0.022 4.021 0.002 1.116 0.172 0.009 0.019 0.046 0.094 0.016 0.028 0.043 0.002 0.043 0.433 0.039 0.039 
0.1 0.2 -3.750 0.084 3.957 0.003 1.089 0.171 0.018 0.019 0.063 0.097 0.025 0.026 0.060 0.002 0.048 0.434 0.059 0.015 
0.1 0.3 -4.277 0.119 4.025 0.006 1.109 0.163 0.036 0.015 0.125 0.086 0.054 0.024 0.106 0.002 0.200 0.424 0.069 0.024 
0.1 0.4 -3.778 0.150 3.723 0.013 1.142 0.169 0.069 0.017 0.178 0.096 0.094 0.025 0.165 0.002 0.190 0.418 0.086 0.198 
0.1 0.5 -3.757 0.222 4.107 0.028 1.106 0.171 0.144 0.018 0.249 0.095 0.178 0.027 0.259 0.002 0.381 0.444 0.110 0.109 
0.1 0.6 -3.679 0.229 4.029 0.040 1.118 0.171 0.194 0.015 0.379 0.094 0.240 0.026 0.320 0.001 0.667 0.419 0.147 0.227 
0.1 0.7 -3.693 0.273 4.132 0.076 1.133 0.174 0.319 0.020 0.594 0.101 0.406 0.030 0.547 0.002 0.688 0.390 0.218 0.353 
0.1 0.8 -3.808 0.298 4.259 0.112 1.143 0.170 0.410 0.018 0.737 0.094 0.511 0.025 0.723 0.002 0.950 0.359 0.317 0.320 
0.1 0.9 -4.394 0.291 4.712 0.163 1.109 0.167 0.617 0.017 0.971 0.094 0.774 0.025 0.952 0.002 1.000 0.328 0.397 0.437 
P
an
el
 C
 
0.2 0.0 -1.312 0.007 1.356 0.004 4.123 0.516 0.008 0.139 0.018 0.375 0.011 0.176 0.016 0.030 0.010 0.124 0.043 0.019 
0.2 0.1 -1.398 0.008 1.205 0.006 4.097 0.515 0.011 0.137 0.024 0.376 0.015 0.176 0.023 0.029 0.055 0.121 0.039 0.033 
0.2 0.2 -1.459 0.003 1.105 0.010 4.124 0.516 0.020 0.134 0.047 0.378 0.026 0.170 0.042 0.026 0.080 0.125 0.039 0.028 
0.2 0.3 -1.551 0.025 1.045 0.017 4.215 0.523 0.032 0.136 0.065 0.383 0.039 0.176 0.056 0.029 0.103 0.122 0.042 0.043 
0.2 0.4 -1.635 0.025 0.948 0.025 4.213 0.528 0.048 0.138 0.101 0.388 0.060 0.177 0.093 0.027 0.179 0.114 0.045 0.038 
0.2 0.5 -1.751 0.016 0.839 0.041 4.175 0.522 0.075 0.140 0.155 0.383 0.096 0.182 0.138 0.026 0.277 0.119 0.059 0.075 
0.2 0.6 -2.015 0.017 0.743 0.055 4.185 0.524 0.101 0.141 0.216 0.386 0.124 0.177 0.198 0.029 0.358 0.114 0.073 0.099 
0.2 0.7 -2.132 0.032 0.680 0.073 4.248 0.531 0.134 0.143 0.288 0.387 0.166 0.182 0.257 0.029 0.502 0.112 0.083 0.131 
0.2 0.8 -2.275 0.027 0.596 0.088 4.134 0.519 0.163 0.136 0.400 0.379 0.211 0.174 0.358 0.026 0.629 0.109 0.111 0.172 
0.2 0.9 -2.592 0.025 0.536 0.096 4.155 0.522 0.182 0.137 0.525 0.376 0.248 0.175 0.453 0.027 0.882 0.106 0.141 0.227 
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Table 2.1. Case 1: 2SLS, n=100, 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument (continued). 
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0.3 0.0 -0.653 0.001 0.652 0.015 9.867 0.869 0.017 0.493 0.027 0.774 0.020 0.555 0.025 0.198 0.035 0.051 0.032 0.022 
0.3 0.1 -0.702 -0.000 0.598 0.015 9.794 0.867 0.018 0.488 0.026 0.776 0.020 0.552 0.024 0.195 0.037 0.052 0.033 0.026 
0.3 0.2 -0.734 0.001 0.560 0.018 9.937 0.873 0.021 0.496 0.029 0.781 0.023 0.560 0.027 0.198 0.039 0.051 0.033 0.024 
0.3 0.3 -0.774 -0.004 0.546 0.024 9.837 0.868 0.028 0.490 0.041 0.775 0.031 0.551 0.039 0.191 0.054 0.053 0.035 0.027 
0.3 0.4 -0.821 -0.002 0.501 0.035 9.843 0.868 0.040 0.490 0.062 0.779 0.044 0.557 0.057 0.202 0.094 0.053 0.035 0.027 
0.3 0.5 -0.910 -0.006 0.465 0.039 9.903 0.867 0.045 0.493 0.071 0.775 0.050 0.559 0.065 0.199 0.116 0.051 0.034 0.035 
0.3 0.6 -0.923 0.002 0.447 0.056 9.908 0.872 0.064 0.495 0.102 0.778 0.071 0.562 0.094 0.198 0.172 0.048 0.033 0.038 
0.3 0.7 -1.000 0.001 0.423 0.065 9.985 0.867 0.075 0.499 0.124 0.780 0.083 0.564 0.112 0.205 0.225 0.050 0.033 0.053 
0.3 0.8 -1.033 0.001 0.396 0.075 10.020 0.872 0.086 0.501 0.147 0.778 0.097 0.561 0.133 0.203 0.299 0.049 0.031 0.060 
0.3 0.9 -1.140 -0.006 0.372 0.079 9.803 0.867 0.092 0.488 0.162 0.773 0.103 0.554 0.143 0.196 0.374 0.048 0.032 0.083 
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0.4 0.0 -0.455 -0.003 0.440 0.023 19.152 0.989 0.023 0.875 0.025 0.971 0.023 0.907 0.025 0.616 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.021 
0.4 0.1 -0.466 0.003 0.419 0.027 19.197 0.989 0.027 0.867 0.030 0.970 0.028 0.898 0.029 0.617 0.034 0.028 0.026 0.022 
0.4 0.2 -0.491 0.004 0.415 0.030 19.044 0.986 0.031 0.869 0.034 0.970 0.031 0.900 0.033 0.615 0.040 0.029 0.026 0.022 
0.4 0.3 -0.511 0.009 0.400 0.033 19.115 0.987 0.033 0.870 0.037 0.970 0.034 0.900 0.036 0.615 0.046 0.028 0.025 0.021 
0.4 0.4 -0.524 0.003 0.377 0.038 19.025 0.987 0.038 0.875 0.043 0.969 0.039 0.903 0.041 0.616 0.054 0.028 0.025 0.020 
0.4 0.5 -0.536 0.002 0.361 0.045 19.102 0.989 0.046 0.871 0.052 0.971 0.047 0.902 0.050 0.618 0.068 0.028 0.024 0.021 
0.4 0.6 -0.579 0.001 0.348 0.055 18.985 0.989 0.056 0.866 0.064 0.973 0.057 0.897 0.061 0.613 0.087 0.027 0.024 0.021 
0.4 0.7 -0.604 0.003 0.332 0.060 18.915 0.986 0.061 0.866 0.069 0.969 0.062 0.896 0.067 0.615 0.097 0.028 0.023 0.020 
0.4 0.8 -0.605 0.002 0.311 0.063 19.129 0.990 0.064 0.877 0.072 0.975 0.065 0.904 0.070 0.625 0.100 0.029 0.023 0.021 
0.4 0.9 -0.657 -0.003 0.299 0.066 18.812 0.989 0.067 0.869 0.076 0.971 0.068 0.902 0.073 0.609 0.109 0.027 0.021 0.017 
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Table 2.2. Case 2: 2SLS, n=100, 1 endogenous regressor, 2 instruments. 
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 A
 
0.0 0 -2.123 -0.001 2.010 0.001 0.715 0.055 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.337 
  0.0 0.1 -1.981 0.096 2.119 0.001 0.711 0.047 0.013 0.000 
 
0.001 0.111 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.340 
  
0.0 0.2 -1.824 0.213 2.257 0.004 0.693 0.052 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.154 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.356 
  0.0 0.3 -1.711 0.301 2.252 0.007 0.694 0.045 0.099 0.000 
 
0.001 0.375 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.380 
  0.0 0.4 -1.473 0.413 2.258 0.019 0.705 0.048 0.203 0.000 
 
0.002 0.250 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.418 
  0.0 0.5 -1.287 0.491 2.330 0.045 0.686 0.047 0.406 0.000 1.000 0.001 0.750 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.453 
  0.0 0.6 -1.071 0.599 2.319 0.086 0.678 0.048 0.554 0.000 1.000 0.001 0.750 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.516 
  0.0 0.7 -0.752 0.698 2.221 0.160 0.696 0.048 0.723 0.000 
 
0.001 1.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.597 
  0.0 0.8 -0.479 0.798 2.039 0.298 0.705 0.047 0.934 0.000 1.000 0.001 1.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.702 
  0.0 0.9 0.003 0.903 1.815 0.514 0.710 0.049 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.001 1.000 0.000   0.000   0.837     
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Table 2.2. Case 2: 2SLS, n=100, 1 endogenous regressor, 2 instruments (continued). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
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1
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P
an
el
 B
 
0.1 0 -1.312 -0.005 1.273 0.003 1.597 0.229 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.034 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
0.157 0.024 
 0.1 0.1 -1.320 0.047 1.354 0.004 1.547 0.222 0.015 0.003 0.061 0.018 0.040 0.001 0.091 0.000  0.164 0.025  
0.1 0.2 -1.330 0.086 1.328 0.009 1.555 0.222 0.037 0.004 0.050 0.020 0.085 0.002 0.105 0.000  0.167 0.047  
0.1 0.3 -1.159 0.144 1.383 0.018 1.567 0.225 0.067 0.004 0.143 0.020 0.127 0.001 0.077 0.000  0.165 0.030  
0.1 0.4 -1.195 0.186 1.406 0.034 1.570 0.224 0.122 0.003 0.312 0.017 0.224 0.002 0.333 0.000  0.175 0.096  
0.1 0.5 -1.105 0.228 1.433 0.061 1.606 0.225 0.182 0.003 0.424 0.020 0.332 0.001 0.455 0.000  0.177 0.125  
0.1 0.6 -1.066 0.266 1.344 0.095 1.577 0.225 0.261 0.004 0.703 0.019 0.511 0.001 0.800 0.000  0.182 0.213  
0.1 0.7 -1.001 0.308 1.369 0.147 1.568 0.223 0.369 0.003 0.926 0.019 0.718 0.001 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.193 0.232 0.199 
0.1 0.8 -0.949 0.350 1.374 0.213 1.575 0.221 0.522 0.004 0.946 0.018 0.844 0.001 1.000 0.000  0.207 0.408  
0.1 0.9 -0.783 0.380 1.411 0.291 1.599 0.224 0.688 0.004 1.000 0.019 0.979 0.002 1.000 0.000   0.205 0.417   
P
an
el
 C
 
0.2 0 -0.643 -0.005 0.642 0.012 4.874 0.736 0.017 0.094 0.028 0.252 0.025 0.054 0.035 0.002 0.105 0.053 0.021 0.006 
0.2 0.1 -0.658 0.013 0.637 0.015 4.872 0.727 0.021 0.102 0.031 0.254 0.032 0.055 0.027 0.001 0.071 0.054 0.020 0.006 
0.2 0.2 -0.681 0.030 0.614 0.023 4.905 0.740 0.031 0.102 0.062 0.254 0.052 0.056 0.072 0.003 0.133 0.052 0.026 0.019 
0.2 0.3 -0.673 0.040 0.594 0.035 4.855 0.739 0.046 0.105 0.094 0.255 0.080 0.058 0.119 0.002 0.062 0.056 0.031 0.009 
0.2 0.4 -0.677 0.052 0.562 0.046 4.885 0.737 0.061 0.100 0.143 0.256 0.105 0.055 0.161 0.002 0.158 0.051 0.039 0.027 
0.2 0.5 -0.708 0.062 0.554 0.060 4.782 0.729 0.078 0.098 0.196 0.250 0.141 0.056 0.219 0.002 0.417 0.055 0.053 0.072 
0.2 0.6 -0.744 0.076 0.529 0.082 4.895 0.737 0.108 0.106 0.293 0.259 0.201 0.057 0.351 0.002 0.812 0.055 0.076 0.136 
0.2 0.7 -0.723 0.090 0.499 0.101 4.908 0.741 0.132 0.095 0.405 0.250 0.279 0.054 0.489 0.001 0.786 0.054 0.100 0.118 
0.2 0.8 -0.711 0.104 0.488 0.121 4.866 0.733 0.160 0.094 0.535 0.248 0.345 0.051 0.619 0.002 0.944 0.054 0.123 0.223 
0.2 0.9 -0.741 0.116 0.452 0.137 4.831 0.736 0.183 0.096 0.752 0.252 0.456 0.055 0.868 0.002 1.000 0.053 0.168 0.219 
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Table 2.2. Case 2: 2SLS, n=100, 1 endogenous regressor, 2 instruments (continued). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
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D
 
0.3 0 -0.398 0.000 0.406 0.030 11.594 0.987 0.030 0.627 0.034 0.826 0.033 0.500 0.035 0.092 0.045 0.025 0.018 0.013 
0.3 0.1 -0.418 0.002 0.395 0.032 11.610 0.987 0.032 0.621 0.036 0.820 0.035 0.501 0.039 0.090 0.048 0.024 0.018 0.013 
0.3 0.2 -0.407 0.011 0.383 0.032 11.531 0.986 0.032 0.622 0.040 0.822 0.035 0.495 0.045 0.096 0.063 0.024 0.018 0.014 
0.3 0.3 -0.433 0.015 0.378 0.040 11.549 0.987 0.040 0.625 0.053 0.826 0.046 0.497 0.058 0.093 0.088 0.025 0.019 0.018 
0.3 0.4 -0.438 0.018 0.365 0.045 11.550 0.987 0.046 0.618 0.064 0.818 0.053 0.497 0.070 0.089 0.126 0.025 0.019 0.021 
0.3 0.5 -0.442 0.028 0.360 0.053 11.457 0.986 0.054 0.610 0.080 0.819 0.063 0.488 0.093 0.088 0.205 0.024 0.020 0.029 
0.3 0.6 -0.474 0.031 0.348 0.066 11.566 0.985 0.067 0.620 0.101 0.820 0.080 0.498 0.118 0.092 0.276 0.025 0.022 0.039 
0.3 0.7 -0.466 0.035 0.335 0.072 11.521 0.986 0.073 0.610 0.115 0.819 0.087 0.495 0.137 0.088 0.358 0.024 0.023 0.050 
0.3 0.8 -0.471 0.049 0.337 0.090 11.502 0.988 0.092 0.614 0.145 0.815 0.111 0.494 0.178 0.093 0.492 0.026 0.028 0.067 
0.3 0.9 -0.486 0.050 0.317 0.095 11.467 0.985 0.097 0.611 0.156 0.813 0.117 0.492 0.193 0.091 0.648 0.025 0.031 0.081 
P
an
el
 E
 
0.4 0 -0.298 0.000 0.298 0.041 23.878 1.000 0.041 0.985 0.042 0.997 0.041 0.966 0.042 0.690 0.041 0.014 0.014 0.012 
0.4 0.1 -0.301 0.001 0.290 0.040 24.133 1.000 0.040 0.984 0.040 0.997 0.040 0.968 0.040 0.700 0.043 0.014 0.014 0.012 
0.4 0.2 -0.301 0.007 0.291 0.043 24.065 1.000 0.043 0.987 0.043 0.997 0.043 0.971 0.043 0.702 0.047 0.014 0.014 0.012 
0.4 0.3 -0.316 0.012 0.282 0.046 24.152 1.000 0.046 0.984 0.046 0.996 0.046 0.967 0.046 0.705 0.052 0.014 0.013 0.012 
0.4 0.4 -0.317 0.009 0.273 0.047 23.870 1.000 0.047 0.984 0.047 0.997 0.047 0.965 0.047 0.697 0.059 0.014 0.014 0.012 
0.4 0.5 -0.324 0.016 0.269 0.051 24.036 1.000 0.051 0.984 0.051 0.997 0.051 0.966 0.052 0.703 0.068 0.014 0.014 0.012 
0.4 0.6 -0.335 0.016 0.265 0.056 23.874 1.000 0.056 0.982 0.057 0.998 0.056 0.963 0.058 0.693 0.078 0.014 0.013 0.012 
0.4 0.7 -0.322 0.023 0.260 0.064 24.075 1.000 0.064 0.985 0.064 0.997 0.064 0.968 0.065 0.702 0.090 0.014 0.014 0.012 
0.4 0.8 -0.341 0.023 0.255 0.069 24.107 1.000 0.069 0.985 0.070 0.998 0.069 0.969 0.071 0.699 0.098 0.014 0.013 0.011 
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Table 2.3. Case 3: 2SLS, n=1600, 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
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 A
 
0.0 0.0 -5.832 -0.009 6.745 0.000 0.447 0.048 0.002 0.019 0.005 0.001 0.083 0.002 0.050 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.069 0.139 
0.0 0.1 -6.278 0.113 6.777 0.000 0.446 0.054 0.007 0.018 0.022 0.002 0.059 0.003 0.094 0.000 1.000 0.997 0.084 0.235 
0.0 0.2 -5.725 0.187 6.364 0.001 0.455 0.049 0.012 0.021 0.029 0.001 0.091 0.002 0.045 0.000  
 
0.943 0.035 
 0.0 0.3 -5.732 0.308 6.741 0.003 0.467 0.046 0.065 0.016 0.110 0.001 0.214 0.003 0.179 0.000 0.000 1.046 0.138 0.107 
0.0 0.4 -5.954 0.399 6.187 0.008 0.444 0.049 0.147 0.019 0.245 0.002 0.381 0.003 0.313 0.000 0.000 0.957 0.139 0.006 
0.0 0.5 -5.569 0.483 5.933 0.014 0.438 0.050 0.218 0.019 0.301 0.002 0.412 0.003 0.400 0.000  
 
1.038 0.194 
 0.0 0.6 -4.306 0.592 5.385 0.030 0.467 0.049 0.382 0.017 0.434 0.001 0.667 0.002 0.529 0.000  
 
0.987 0.261 
 0.0 0.7 -3.886 0.702 5.444 0.064 0.464 0.049 0.600 0.019 0.661 0.001 0.769 0.002 0.652 0.000  
 
1.008 0.396 
 0.0 0.8 -2.934 0.799 4.443 0.135 0.472 0.052 0.813 0.021 0.917 0.002 1.000 0.003 0.969 0.000  
 
0.992 0.670 
 0.0 0.9 -1.907 0.897 3.689 0.265 0.458 0.052 0.981 0.020 1.000 0.001 1.000 0.003 1.000 0.000    0.992 0.812   
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Table 2.3. Case 3: 2SLS, n=1600, 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument (continued). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
σxz σxu 
Estimated fractiles of ?̂? 
S
iz
e 
o
f 
st
at
(β
 ̂)
 
(a
ll
 s
am
p
le
s)
 
M
ed
ia
n
 F
-s
ta
t Fstat significant 
at 5% level  
Fstat>10 Fstat>5.53 Fstat>8.96 Fstat>16.38 
Median-squared error, for 
the samples with  
0.05 0.50 0.95 
F
ra
ct
io
n
 
o
f 
al
l 
sa
m
p
le
s 
S
iz
e 
o
f 
ts
ta
t(
β
) 
F
ra
ct
io
n
 
o
f 
al
l 
sa
m
p
le
s 
S
iz
e 
o
f 
ts
ta
t(
β
 ̂)
 
F
ra
ct
io
n
 
o
f 
al
l 
sa
m
p
le
s 
S
iz
e 
o
f 
ts
ta
t(
β
 ̂)
 
F
ra
ct
io
n
 
o
f 
al
l 
sa
m
p
le
s 
S
iz
e 
o
f 
ts
ta
t(
β
 ̂)
 
F
ra
ct
io
n
 
o
f 
al
l 
sa
m
p
le
s 
S
iz
e 
o
f 
ts
ta
t(
β
 ̂)
 
A
ll
 
sa
m
p
le
s 
F
st
at
>
 
8
.9
6
 
F
st
at
>
 
1
6
.3
8
 
P
an
el
 B
 
0.025 0.0 -3.888 0.011 3.988 0.001 1.063 0.172 0.004 0.092 0.008 0.015 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.001 0.000 0.459 0.046 0.007 
0.025 0.1 -4.154 0.045 3.741 0.001 1.098 0.166 0.006 0.090 0.009 0.017 0.035 0.026 0.026 0.001 0.000 0.452 0.034 0.016 
0.025 0.2 -3.848 0.081 3.883 0.002 1.138 0.169 0.013 0.090 0.022 0.016 0.051 0.024 0.054 0.001 0.100 0.439 0.040 0.050 
0.025 0.3 -3.890 0.112 4.075 0.005 1.082 0.172 0.031 0.090 0.051 0.017 0.106 0.025 0.081 0.001 0.167 0.434 0.068 0.105 
0.025 0.4 -3.812 0.171 4.103 0.011 1.082 0.168 0.066 0.085 0.107 0.015 0.141 0.024 0.127 0.001 0.182 0.445 0.086 0.085 
0.025 0.5 -3.940 0.192 3.718 0.022 1.099 0.167 0.122 0.088 0.164 0.015 0.240 0.023 0.228 0.001 0.200 0.415 0.117 0.095 
0.025 0.6 -3.762 0.247 4.233 0.039 1.102 0.169 0.192 0.088 0.271 0.014 0.403 0.022 0.403 0.001 0.500 0.408 0.155 0.140 
0.025 0.7 -3.963 0.271 4.142 0.067 1.082 0.167 0.288 0.085 0.394 0.015 0.626 0.021 0.561 0.001 0.636 0.375 0.233 0.254 
0.025 0.8 -4.010 0.289 4.093 0.112 1.093 0.173 0.421 0.090 0.525 0.016 0.831 0.023 0.794 0.002 1.000 0.368 0.327 0.381 
0.025 0.9 -3.807 0.298 4.678 0.153 1.105 0.165 0.595 0.086 0.756 0.017 0.959 0.023 0.939 0.001 1.000 0.327 0.410 0.487 
P
an
el
 C
 
0.05 0.0 -1.262 0.001 1.303 0.004 4.068 0.523 0.007 0.370 0.009 0.124 0.019 0.166 0.016 0.021 0.034 0.131 0.039 0.025 
0.05 0.1 -1.335 0.016 1.189 0.004 4.081 0.525 0.008 0.367 0.012 0.125 0.024 0.166 0.022 0.022 0.032 0.123 0.040 0.031 
0.05 0.2 -1.482 0.017 1.102 0.009 4.078 0.523 0.016 0.371 0.022 0.124 0.042 0.163 0.037 0.021 0.038 0.127 0.038 0.025 
0.05 0.3 -1.541 0.008 0.989 0.016 4.005 0.516 0.031 0.363 0.042 0.125 0.072 0.158 0.067 0.021 0.121 0.124 0.042 0.051 
0.05 0.4 -1.708 0.021 0.956 0.025 4.044 0.518 0.048 0.367 0.064 0.122 0.102 0.159 0.092 0.018 0.141 0.123 0.050 0.055 
0.05 0.5 -1.814 0.019 0.876 0.036 3.919 0.507 0.070 0.356 0.093 0.127 0.153 0.163 0.132 0.020 0.255 0.117 0.055 0.070 
0.05 0.6 -2.005 0.014 0.758 0.055 4.001 0.517 0.102 0.360 0.133 0.126 0.228 0.161 0.209 0.021 0.405 0.118 0.074 0.113 
0.05 0.7 -2.189 0.022 0.677 0.068 3.980 0.513 0.125 0.364 0.162 0.126 0.305 0.163 0.264 0.020 0.562 0.107 0.090 0.145 
0.05 0.8 -2.185 0.020 0.598 0.087 3.993 0.515 0.166 0.362 0.221 0.121 0.435 0.159 0.378 0.021 0.756 0.108 0.118 0.186 
0.05 0.9 -2.672 0.015 0.544 0.100 3.907 0.506 0.195 0.360 0.270 0.120 0.590 0.159 0.511 0.020 0.951 0.105 0.150 0.251 
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Table 2.3. Case 3: 2SLS, n=1600, 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument (continued). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
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0.075 0.0 -0.661 -0.005 0.651 0.012 9.059 0.847 0.014 0.742 0.016 0.443 0.023 0.507 0.021 0.149 0.037 0.054 0.032 0.020 
0.075 0.1 -0.707 -0.005 0.593 0.011 9.033 0.856 0.013 0.746 0.015 0.435 0.023 0.504 0.021 0.150 0.025 0.050 0.030 0.020 
0.075 0.2 -0.754 0.003 0.591 0.018 8.912 0.838 0.021 0.733 0.024 0.433 0.034 0.497 0.031 0.151 0.046 0.052 0.032 0.023 
0.075 0.3 -0.771 0.008 0.552 0.029 9.070 0.855 0.033 0.748 0.037 0.437 0.053 0.509 0.049 0.150 0.078 0.052 0.033 0.026 
0.075 0.4 -0.835 -0.000 0.522 0.034 9.026 0.852 0.039 0.748 0.044 0.437 0.064 0.504 0.059 0.148 0.099 0.053 0.034 0.032 
0.075 0.5 -0.903 0.006 0.487 0.047 8.998 0.851 0.055 0.737 0.063 0.435 0.092 0.503 0.084 0.149 0.150 0.053 0.034 0.035 
0.075 0.6 -0.924 0.003 0.447 0.051 9.174 0.852 0.060 0.747 0.068 0.444 0.102 0.516 0.092 0.147 0.184 0.051 0.033 0.042 
0.075 0.7 -0.999 0.002 0.421 0.063 9.006 0.850 0.074 0.743 0.084 0.434 0.136 0.502 0.120 0.148 0.270 0.047 0.032 0.058 
0.075 0.8 -1.062 -0.003 0.396 0.072 9.135 0.852 0.084 0.745 0.096 0.444 0.155 0.511 0.137 0.152 0.345 0.047 0.032 0.074 
0.075 0.9 -1.122 -0.006 0.373 0.077 8.915 0.850 0.090 0.738 0.104 0.430 0.178 0.498 0.154 0.149 0.434 0.048 0.033 0.089 
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0.1 0.0 -0.454 -0.004 0.459 0.022 16.062 0.981 0.023 0.955 0.023 0.805 0.026 0.852 0.025 0.484 0.029 0.030 0.026 0.021 
0.1 0.1 -0.476 0.005 0.430 0.025 16.206 0.980 0.025 0.954 0.026 0.803 0.029 0.847 0.028 0.492 0.036 0.030 0.026 0.021 
0.1 0.2 -0.496 -0.001 0.415 0.026 16.092 0.978 0.026 0.949 0.027 0.799 0.031 0.843 0.030 0.486 0.038 0.029 0.025 0.020 
0.1 0.3 -0.512 -0.001 0.392 0.031 16.162 0.981 0.031 0.953 0.032 0.806 0.037 0.847 0.036 0.490 0.050 0.028 0.024 0.020 
0.1 0.4 -0.539 0.001 0.378 0.035 16.258 0.980 0.036 0.953 0.037 0.799 0.043 0.844 0.041 0.494 0.059 0.029 0.024 0.021 
0.1 0.5 -0.565 0.002 0.356 0.041 16.275 0.981 0.042 0.950 0.044 0.804 0.051 0.849 0.049 0.495 0.074 0.029 0.024 0.021 
0.1 0.6 -0.574 0.002 0.349 0.050 16.196 0.981 0.051 0.954 0.052 0.805 0.062 0.848 0.059 0.490 0.095 0.029 0.024 0.022 
0.1 0.7 -0.620 -0.001 0.334 0.059 16.265 0.980 0.061 0.949 0.062 0.803 0.074 0.846 0.070 0.494 0.115 0.028 0.021 0.019 
0.1 0.8 -0.656 -0.004 0.310 0.056 16.312 0.979 0.057 0.950 0.058 0.802 0.069 0.844 0.066 0.497 0.111 0.027 0.019 0.019 
0.1 0.9 -0.673 -0.009 0.303 0.067 15.897 0.981 0.068 0.954 0.070 0.802 0.084 0.844 0.079 0.476 0.141 0.027 0.019 0.021 
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The size of the Wald test for all the samples, that is without conditioning on the F-
statistic exceeding any critical value at all, doesn’t seem too badly distorted – the worst 
actual size observed predictably corresponds to the case with the strongest simulated 
degree of endogeneity of x and the instrument that is uncorrelated with the highly 
endogenous x. In this case in the 26% of all the samples’ Wald tests rejected the null 
hypothesis that β is equal to its true value of zero. However, it’s worth noting that for 
the vast majority of cases even when the instrument is uncorrelated with the endogenous 
regressor, the actual size of the test doesn’t exceed its nominal size and in most cases 
the test is actually undersized. Does this mean that no matter how weak the instrument 
is the inference based on the Wald test is reliable? This question is ambiguous; on one 
hand it looks like the correct null hypothesis will not be rejected most of the time, but at 
the same time the distribution of ?̂? is centered around the wrong value and the spread is 
so large, which suggests that the power of the test would be very low and the test will 
not be able to reject a large range of hypothesized wrong βs.  
What happens when we start restricting the samples to the samples with the F-stat above 
the critical values? If we look at panel A columns (12) and (13), which report the 
fraction of the samples with the F-stat above 5.53 (the critical value for the 25% 
maximal size of the Wald test), we can see that the actual size for the samples with 
𝜎𝑥𝑢 = 0.9 is 99%, which means that 99% of the time the true β will be rejected. And as 
we keep raising the cut-off for the first stage F-stat, the size properties keep getting 
worse and converge to rejecting the true β 100% of the time for the F-stat above 9. 
However, the fraction of the samples with a high F-stat is very small, so it’s quite 
unlikely that a researcher will find a first stage F-stat above the critical value when the 
instrument is irrelevant. 
The situation becomes more problematic in panel B, where about 10% of the samples 
have F-statistics above 5.53 and it can be seen from column 13 that as the correlation 
between x and the error term increases the size of the test gets more and more distorted. 
For the samples with 𝜎𝑥𝜀 = 0.9 the rejection rate of the true β is about 77%, which 
contradicts Stock and Yogo’s prediction of the 25% maximal size. The distortions get 
worse as the cut-off F-stat increases as well and the actual size converges to 100% for 
the 10% maximal bias critical value – an F-stat of 16.38. 
As true correlation between the instrument and the regressor rises, in panels C and D the 
actual size of the conditional samples doesn’t get as extreme as in panles A and B. 
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Nevertheless, the pattern persists – samples with highly endogenous x and high F-
statistics consistently have poorer size properties. It can be seen in panel D, when the 
degree of endogeneity is low, the rejection rate for all the samples is very similar to that 
of the samples with higher F-statistic, but when the correlation between x and the error 
term goes up, conditional samples show large test size distortions. For example, when 
the correlation 𝜎𝑥𝜖 = 0.8 the rejection of the true β for all the samples is about 8%. If 
we restrict the samples to only those that pass Stock and Yogo’s 10% maximal size 
critical value (F-stat>16.38), the actual size of the test goes up to about 30%. For the 
𝜎𝑥𝜖 = 0.9, the rejection rate is above 35%, which seems huge compared to 8% for all 
the samples. It’s worth noting that the fraction of the samples that pass the test is non-
trivial –about one fifth of all the samples. 
The correlation of 0.3 between the instrument and the regressor is fairly high, so why is 
the actual size of the test so different from the nominal size? One plausible explanation 
was presented by Hall et al. (1996); they suggested that when the correlation between 
the regressor and the error term is high and the instrument is strongly relevant, z 
inevitably explains some part of the variation in x that is endogenous, which basically 
means that the instrument is also endogenous. It seems reasonable to assume that as the 
correlation between x and z rises, the degree of endogeneity of z would also go up. 
Columns 18-20 describe the behaviour of the median-squared error for all the samples 
and for the “conditional” samples, which at high levels of endogeneity of x seems 
consistent with what we saw earlier with the test size behaviour. The median squared 
error, which reflects the accuracy of prediction by the 2SLS estimator, is lower for the 
samples with high F-stats when the degree of endogeneity of x is low, but as the 
correlation between x and 𝜀 increases, the accuracy of prediction for the sample with 
higher F-stat deteriorates and we can see, for example, in panel D when 𝜎𝑥𝜖 = 0.8, the 
median-squared error for the samples with F-statistics above 16.38 is double of that in 
the samples with the F-statistics above 8.96. 
The results of these simulations may at first seem puzzling. It seems to be the case that 
the researcher is strictly worse off if he decides to winnow out instruments based on the 
pre-test suggested by Stock and Yogo as opposed to just using a random instrument 
without conducting a pre-test. The answer to this question can be yes or no, depending 
on how the researcher thinks about the pre-test. Consider the case when the researcher 
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has an instrument that yields a first stage F-stat of about 5.5 (which corresponds to the 
critical value for the 25% maximal bias). What does this say about the correlation 
between the endogenous regressor and the instrument? From table 2.1 we can see that 
median F-stat for 𝜎𝑥𝑧 = 0.2 is around 4 and the median F-stat for 𝜎𝑥𝑧 = 0.3 is about 9; 
this suggests that the true correlation between x and z in the case where the F-statistic of 
5.5 is obtained is likely to be somewhere between 0.2 and 0.3, which is fairly high and 
we can see in panel C, that the test size doesn’t exceed “predicted” by Stock and Yogo 
size of 25% if we restrict the sample to those with the F-statistic above 5.53. This 
suggests that the pre-test “works” if the F-statistic the researcher obtained is not an 
unlikely realization for the true correlation of x and z.  
How does the researcher know whether the F-stat obtained is somehow representative of 
the inherent relationship between the regressor and the instrument or just an “accident” 
from the extreme right tail of the F-distribution? In this case other information such as a 
previously conducted test or strong theoretical justification becomes relevant and can 
make a big difference. This pre-test should not be taken as a rule; it should certainly be 
used but with caution and with a fair share of skepticism. If the researcher suspects that 
the instrument at hand is a weak instrument, then the fact that the high F-statistic is 
obtained shouldn’t trick him into thinking that his 2SLS results will be reliable, if 
anything, he should be more suspicious of his results if the F-stat was unexpectedly 
high. In this case, some form of the weak IV robust inference will be a better choice. 
However, if the researcher believes that his x is endogenous, but the degree of 
endogeneity is low, it seems that conditioning the choice of the instrument on the high 
value of the F-stat might be beneficial – the size distortions of the conditioned samples 
are similar to the non-conditioned samples, but there are definite gains in terms of 
accuracy of the estimates  - the median-squared error is notably lower in the conditioned 
samples when the degree of endogeneity is not high.  
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 support the conclusions drawn from table 2.1 – there seem to be no 
test size improvements from conditioning the choice of the instruments on higher values 
of the first stage F-statistic, but at lower levels of endogeneity of x, the median-squared 
error is significantly lower in the conditioned samples. For example, see table 2.3, panel 
B, 𝜎𝑥𝜖 = 0.1 - the median-squared error for all the sample is 13 times larger than in the 
samples with F-statistics above 8.96 and 26 times larger than in the samples with the F-
statistic above 16.38. 
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2.8 A possible solution to the pre-test bias.  
 
Is there anything that can be done to avoid the pre-test bias? One possible solution to 
this problem, as noted by Hall et al. (1996) and Shea (1997) can be found in the Angrist 
and Krueger (1995) paper, where they critically assessed Angrist and Krueger (1991) 
results and suggested an estimator that unlike the 2SLS estimator would not be biased 
towards the OLS estimator. They suggested randomly splitting the sample into two 
subsamples, using one subsample to estimate the parameters of the reduced form 
equation and the second subsample to estimate the structural equation, but deploying the 
parameters from the first subsample. They called the estimator a split-sample IV 
estimator (SSIV) and showed that unlike the 2SLS estimator, which is biased towards 
OLS, it is biased towards zero, regardless of the strength of the correlation between the 
errors in the structural and in the reduced form equations. In the same paper, Angrist 
and Krueger also derive a USSIV – a split sample estimator that is asymptotically 
unbiased, where the bias is corrected by regressing the endogenous regressor on the 
predicted values from the first stage IV regression.  
Angrist and Krueger (1995) replicated Angrist and Krueger (1991) using the SSIV and 
USSIV and obtained estimates similar to those obtained from using 2SLS and OLS 
estimators. They also showed that SSIV and USSIV when used to reproduce Bound et 
al (1995) experiment with randomly generated quarter of birth instruments unlike 2SLS 
do not spuriously produce estimates similar to the ones obtain using the real data. 
The next section describes tests to discover whether problems associated with the pre-
test bias can be eliminated by using the SSIV estimator – the idea is that if one half of 
the sample is used for the pre-test and the other for the estimation, the pre-test is 
conducted based on “extra” information, not the same information that will be used later 
for the estimation, so there is no sequential inference problem.  
Design of the Monte Carlo simulations is very similar to the one described in the earlier 
experiment, the differences include the following: 
Case 4: As in the previous experiment (case 1) 100 observations are generated, but now 
only the first 50 observations are used to estimate the first stage regression coefficients 
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П, which are recorded along with the first stage F-statistics. The estimated Π𝑠 are then 
used to construct the fitted values for x for the next 50 observation and those fitted 
values are used as instruments in the second stage regression to estimate βs.  
In order to keep the F-statistic comparable across the experiment with the 2SLS and 
SSIV when the number of observations in the first stage regression in decreased by a 
half, the correlation 𝜎𝑥𝑧 is set to vary from 0 to 0.56 as opposed to from 0 to 0.4, that is 
the range of correlations is scaled up by a factor of √2. For the results table, the samples 
are conditioned on the F-stat that was obtained from the first stage regression using only 
half of the sample and then the size statistics are produced from the second stage 
regressions that only deploy the second half of the observations. 
Case 5: This estimation is carried out in the same manner as the case 4 estimation - half 
of the sample is used for estimating the first stage parameters and the second half for 
estimating the structural equation, but using Π obtained from the first half of the sample. 
However, the correlation 𝜎𝑥𝑧 is kept in the same range as in the earlier experiment with 
the 2SLS estimator (case 1). The idea here is to try to answer a more realistic question – 
for a given strength of the relationship between the instrument and the endogenous 
regressor, is it worth sacrificing a part of the sample in the estimation of the structural 
equation to avoid the pre-test bias that comes from sequential inference?  
Dufour and Jasiak (2001) used a split-sample technique in the context of the AR-type 
inference and experimented with splitting the sample in different proportions. They 
concluded that the tests that used a smaller fraction for the first stage regression and 
most of the observations to estimate the structural equation were more powerful – their 
preferred split was a 1 to 9 ratio.  
Case 6: This experiment is similar to case 5 experiment, however, the split of the 
observations analogously to Dufour and Jasiak (2001) is changed to 10 and 90, 10 
observations are used for the first stage regression and 90 for the estimation of the 
parameters of the structural equation. The correlation in parallel to case 5 is unchanged 
(the same as in case 1 with the 2SLS estimator). 
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2.9  Discussion of the results (SSIV). 
 
Let’s consider table 2.4. At first glance the results look very similar to the table 2.1 
results: in panels A, B and C the median F-statistics (column 7) are almost the same as 
in the 2SLS experiment, but they get slightly larger in panels D and E. As the 
correlation between the instrument and the regressor rises, the median of the distribution 
of estimated 𝛽s (column 4) is approaching the true value for any degree of endogeneity. 
Also, the fractions of the samples that fall in the corresponding intervals that are 
conditioned on passing a certain critical value for the F-statistic (columns 
8,10,12,14,16) are almost identical. 
What about the size properties? The actual size of the Wald test (with the 5% nominal 
size) for all the samples (column 6) behaves very similarly to that in the 2SLS 
estimation – the maximum size observed is 25.5% and it corresponds to the samples 
with 𝜎𝑥𝑧 = 0 and 𝜎𝑥𝜀 = 0.9 (the maximum size in table 2.1 corresponds to the same 
values for 𝜎𝑥𝑧 and 𝜎𝑥𝜀 and amounts to 26.2%). Also, similarly to table 2.1, as the 
correlation between x and z increases, the maximum size converges to about 6%.  
However, when we start conditioning the samples the situation is drastically different. 
Column 9 reports the size of the Wald test for the samples that have significant at 5% F-
statistics. The maximum size in those samples in panel A is 27%, while the maximum 
size in table 2.1 in the corresponding panel was 97%. 
About 2% of the samples in both table 2.1 and table 2.4 have an F-stat above 5.53, a 
critical value for the 25% maximal size of the Wald test. In both table 2.1 and table 2.4 
the maximal size (column 13) corresponds to 𝜎𝑥𝑧 = 0 and 𝜎𝑥𝜀 = 0.9 and reaches 99% 
in Table 1 and only 23% in table 2.4.  
In table 2.1 we consistently observed larger distortions to the Wald test sizes when the 
samples were conditioned on different values of the F-stats. And the distortions were 
getting worse with the increase in the critical values, which was true for any correlation 
between z and x and any degree of endogeneity. The SSIV produces very different 
results – size distortions are much smaller (the size never exceeds 27% as opposed to 
100% for the 2SLS) and the size mainly decreases when the F-statistic increases. 
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Table 2.4. Case 4: SSIV, n=100 (50/50), 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument. 
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0.0 0 -6.561 0.010 6.100 0.000 0.465 0.048 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.998 1.474 1.557 
0.0 0.1 -6.215 0.069 6.183 0.000 0.445 0.050 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.024 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.966 0.683 1.837 
0.0 0.2 -6.039 0.203 6.259 0.001 0.454 0.049 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
 
1.001 0.714 
 0.0 0.3 -5.636 0.296 6.490 0.003 0.457 0.049 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.982 0.758 0.230 
0.0 0.4 -5.160 0.381 5.904 0.005 0.451 0.049 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.021 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.997 0.874 458.8 
0.0 0.5 -4.806 0.515 5.564 0.014 0.446 0.050 0.016 0.002 0.000 0.023 0.004 0.004 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.977 0.928 0.065 
0.0 0.6 -4.337 0.614 5.839 0.031 0.469 0.049 0.034 0.003 0.037 0.022 0.045 0.004 0.045 0.000 0.000 1.053 0.843 94.40 
0.0 0.7 -3.819 0.694 4.904 0.061 0.469 0.050 0.071 0.003 0.040 0.022 0.077 0.004 0.054 0.000 
 
0.992 0.580 
 0.0 0.8 -3.180 0.790 4.628 0.124 0.461 0.048 0.160 0.003 0.120 0.021 0.136 0.004 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.999 1.019 0.759 
0.0 0.9 -1.860 0.901 3.655 0.255 0.462 0.050 0.272 0.002 0.217 0.021 0.228 0.005 0.224 0.000   1.008 1.077   
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Table 2.4. Case 4: SSIV, n=100 (50/50), 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument (continued). 
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0.14 0 -3.682 -0.003 3.663 0.001 1.095 0.160 0.003 0.021 0.005 0.091 0.002 0.030 0.003 0.003 0.040 0.431 0.376 0.293 
0.14 0.1 -3.878 0.043 3.744 0.001 1.118 0.165 0.001 0.021 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.451 0.576 0.458 
0.14 0.2 -3.762 0.086 3.886 0.003 1.075 0.164 0.002 0.021 0.000 0.098 0.003 0.029 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.423 0.413 0.226 
0.14 0.3 -3.866 0.116 3.885 0.007 1.100 0.163 0.010 0.016 0.012 0.094 0.010 0.026 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.423 0.424 0.329 
0.14 0.4 -3.698 0.150 3.880 0.013 1.120 0.166 0.010 0.021 0.014 0.096 0.009 0.030 0.013 0.003 0.040 0.418 0.443 0.446 
0.14 0.5 -3.779 0.208 3.846 0.024 1.088 0.164 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.097 0.025 0.031 0.022 0.003 0.000 0.427 0.339 0.286 
0.14 0.6 -3.885 0.228 3.861 0.046 1.092 0.156 0.046 0.020 0.060 0.089 0.047 0.027 0.051 0.003 0.071 0.414 0.427 0.642 
0.14 0.7 -3.889 0.280 4.086 0.073 1.059 0.156 0.072 0.020 0.089 0.092 0.076 0.030 0.103 0.002 0.045 0.408 0.403 0.934 
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0.28 0 -1.262 0.002 1.195 0.006 4.203 0.515 0.006 0.151 0.007 0.384 0.007 0.192 0.008 0.035 0.008 0.123 0.123 0.119 
0.28 0.1 -1.302 0.010 1.125 0.008 4.193 0.514 0.007 0.150 0.009 0.387 0.007 0.188 0.008 0.035 0.011 0.129 0.120 0.104 
0.28 0.2 -1.511 0.004 1.074 0.010 4.180 0.511 0.010 0.153 0.007 0.382 0.009 0.191 0.006 0.035 0.014 0.125 0.124 0.114 
0.28 0.3 -1.620 0.006 1.031 0.016 4.253 0.518 0.015 0.155 0.014 0.393 0.017 0.197 0.014 0.038 0.008 0.122 0.121 0.124 
0.28 0.4 -1.649 0.020 0.896 0.027 4.213 0.519 0.025 0.151 0.023 0.387 0.026 0.190 0.025 0.037 0.033 0.125 0.128 0.133 
0.28 0.5 -1.913 0.015 0.838 0.039 4.181 0.512 0.039 0.148 0.041 0.384 0.041 0.189 0.043 0.034 0.032 0.125 0.127 0.121 
0.28 0.6 -2.024 0.041 0.756 0.057 4.145 0.508 0.059 0.142 0.055 0.379 0.059 0.179 0.058 0.032 0.063 0.112 0.110 0.108 
0.28 0.7 -2.119 0.032 0.666 0.071 4.039 0.500 0.070 0.141 0.065 0.377 0.067 0.177 0.067 0.033 0.055 0.109 0.109 0.112 
0.28 0.8 -2.326 0.033 0.592 0.090 4.234 0.517 0.089 0.157 0.085 0.389 0.087 0.195 0.083 0.035 0.078 0.107 0.111 0.123 
0.28 0.9 -2.389 0.026 0.536 0.100 4.091 0.504 0.098 0.148 0.101 0.380 0.100 0.186 0.099 0.032 0.089 0.102 0.098 0.084 
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Table 2.4. Case 4: SSIV, n=100 (50/50), 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument (continued). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
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0.42 0 -0.649 0.003 0.633 0.016 10.556 0.873 0.016 0.530 0.018 0.795 0.017 0.589 0.018 0.242 0.021 0.053 0.054 0.054 
0.42 0.1 -0.702 -0.007 0.596 0.018 10.606 0.871 0.018 0.533 0.017 0.794 0.018 0.593 0.017 0.238 0.015 0.053 0.053 0.053 
0.42 0.2 -0.734 -0.004 0.568 0.022 10.559 0.872 0.022 0.531 0.022 0.800 0.022 0.591 0.023 0.242 0.020 0.054 0.055 0.056 
0.42 0.3 -0.770 0.005 0.532 0.032 10.242 0.868 0.032 0.514 0.030 0.782 0.031 0.578 0.031 0.232 0.030 0.054 0.054 0.057 
0.42 0.4 -0.833 0.003 0.512 0.038 10.520 0.872 0.037 0.529 0.038 0.795 0.038 0.584 0.038 0.240 0.038 0.053 0.055 0.054 
0.42 0.5 -0.866 -0.009 0.475 0.046 10.572 0.872 0.046 0.534 0.046 0.800 0.047 0.592 0.046 0.249 0.045 0.051 0.052 0.055 
0.42 0.6 -0.949 -0.003 0.444 0.056 10.405 0.875 0.055 0.523 0.056 0.795 0.056 0.582 0.055 0.246 0.048 0.053 0.051 0.054 
0.42 0.7 -0.984 -0.004 0.424 0.067 10.488 0.874 0.067 0.528 0.063 0.796 0.068 0.585 0.066 0.239 0.059 0.051 0.050 0.050 
0.42 0.8 -1.053 -0.002 0.394 0.076 10.571 0.874 0.079 0.529 0.078 0.795 0.078 0.592 0.079 0.243 0.078 0.050 0.049 0.048 
0.42 0.9 -1.146 -0.004 0.371 0.080 10.712 0.875 0.080 0.539 0.081 0.794 0.080 0.599 0.080 0.239 0.075 0.047 0.048 0.045 
P
an
el
 E
 
0.56 0 -0.448 0.006 0.455 0.032 22.744 0.991 0.032 0.911 0.032 0.981 0.032 0.931 0.032 0.724 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.029 
0.56 0.1 -0.464 0.001 0.419 0.030 22.191 0.993 0.030 0.913 0.031 0.981 0.030 0.934 0.031 0.721 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.029 
0.56 0.2 -0.495 -0.001 0.410 0.033 22.384 0.991 0.033 0.916 0.032 0.981 0.032 0.938 0.033 0.723 0.032 0.028 0.028 0.028 
0.56 0.3 -0.528 -0.002 0.389 0.038 22.227 0.992 0.039 0.913 0.039 0.982 0.039 0.935 0.039 0.714 0.041 0.029 0.030 0.030 
0.56 0.4 -0.536 -0.001 0.370 0.043 22.706 0.992 0.043 0.912 0.043 0.981 0.043 0.935 0.043 0.722 0.041 0.028 0.028 0.028 
0.56 0.5 -0.549 0.000 0.359 0.049 22.770 0.993 0.048 0.915 0.048 0.985 0.048 0.940 0.048 0.725 0.048 0.029 0.028 0.029 
0.56 0.6 -0.575 0.002 0.345 0.053 22.419 0.992 0.053 0.911 0.053 0.981 0.053 0.935 0.053 0.719 0.053 0.028 0.028 0.028 
0.56 0.7 -0.596 0.001 0.333 0.059 22.958 0.993 0.059 0.919 0.059 0.983 0.059 0.940 0.058 0.732 0.058 0.029 0.030 0.030 
0.56 0.8 -0.641 0.003 0.313 0.063 22.579 0.994 0.063 0.916 0.063 0.984 0.063 0.936 0.063 0.721 0.061 0.028 0.028 0.027 
0.56 0 -0.448 0.006 0.455 0.032 22.744 0.991 0.032 0.911 0.032 0.981 0.032 0.931 0.032 0.724 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.029 
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Table 2.5. Case 5: SSIV, n=100 (50/50), 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument. 
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0.0 0 -6.561 0.010 6.100 0.000 0.465 0.048 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.998 1.474 1.557 
0.0 0.1 -6.215 0.069 6.183 0.000 0.445 0.050 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.024 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.966 0.683 1.837 
0.0 0.2 -6.039 0.203 6.259 0.001 0.454 0.049 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
 
1.001 0.714 0.000 
0.0 0.3 -5.636 0.296 6.490 0.003 0.457 0.049 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.982 0.758 0.230 
0.0 0.4 -5.160 0.381 5.904 0.005 0.451 0.049 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.021 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.997 0.874 458.8 
0.0 0.5 -4.806 0.515 5.564 0.014 0.446 0.050 0.016 0.002 0.000 0.023 0.004 0.004 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.977 0.928 0.065 
0.0 0.6 -4.337 0.614 5.839 0.031 0.469 0.049 0.034 0.003 0.037 0.022 0.045 0.004 0.045 0.000 0.000 1.053 0.843 94.39 
0.0 0.7 -3.819 0.694 4.904 0.061 0.469 0.050 0.071 0.003 0.040 0.022 0.077 0.004 0.054 0.000 
 
0.992 0.580 0.000 
0.0 0.8 -3.180 0.790 4.628 0.124 0.461 0.048 0.160 0.003 0.120 0.021 0.136 0.004 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.999 1.019 0.759 
0.0 0.9 -1.860 0.901 3.655 0.255 0.462 0.050 0.272 0.002 0.217 0.021 0.228 0.005 0.224 0.000   1.008 1.077 0.000 
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Table 2.5. Case 5: SSIV, n=100 (50/50), 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
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0.1 0 -4.549 0.002 4.771 0.001 0.730 0.103 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.055 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.622 0.671 1.601 
0.1 0.1 -5.210 0.072 4.892 0.001 0.751 0.107 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.639 0.558 0.382 
0.1 0.2 -4.552 0.143 5.106 0.002 0.724 0.107 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.056 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.625 0.889 0.110 
0.1 0.3 -4.731 0.174 4.914 0.005 0.760 0.105 0.009 0.008 0.024 0.054 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.615 1.361 0.092 
0.1 0.4 -4.563 0.227 4.773 0.010 0.765 0.107 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.061 0.008 0.016 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.614 0.645 0.255 
0.1 0.5 -4.661 0.311 4.879 0.020 0.731 0.107 0.021 0.011 0.000 0.059 0.020 0.015 0.020 0.001 0.000 0.626 0.611 1.602 
0.1 0.6 -4.610 0.341 4.743 0.039 0.723 0.101 0.032 0.010 0.038 0.052 0.035 0.015 0.046 0.001 0.000 0.621 0.699 1.247 
0.1 0.7 -4.113 0.430 4.826 0.070 0.713 0.102 0.071 0.009 0.077 0.058 0.081 0.015 0.075 0.001 0.000 0.603 0.701 1.829 
0.1 0.8 -3.602 0.471 4.576 0.121 0.750 0.106 0.102 0.011 0.109 0.059 0.096 0.016 0.119 0.001 0.167 0.584 0.596 0.303 
0.1 0.9 -3.376 0.495 4.602 0.202 0.770 0.107 0.206 0.010 0.158 0.057 0.215 0.015 0.192 0.001 0.167 0.513 0.488 0.271 
P
an
el
 C
 
0.2 0 -2.335 0.009 2.403 0.003 2.084 0.290 0.002 0.053 0.004 0.193 0.003 0.073 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.241 0.225 0.180 
0.2 0.1 -2.532 0.027 2.283 0.003 2.079 0.290 0.003 0.053 0.004 0.190 0.004 0.073 0.004 0.009 0.000 0.252 0.220 0.146 
0.2 0.2 -2.512 0.040 2.323 0.005 2.070 0.285 0.005 0.049 0.006 0.190 0.004 0.066 0.005 0.009 0.022 0.246 0.239 0.159 
0.2 0.3 -2.566 0.047 2.181 0.010 2.110 0.297 0.008 0.055 0.005 0.198 0.006 0.074 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.235 0.234 0.213 
0.2 0.4 -2.841 0.076 2.117 0.020 2.109 0.292 0.019 0.054 0.020 0.191 0.021 0.074 0.022 0.007 0.028 0.241 0.239 0.419 
0.2 0.5 -2.712 0.085 2.197 0.030 2.072 0.292 0.031 0.051 0.029 0.190 0.034 0.069 0.030 0.008 0.013 0.241 0.225 0.202 
0.2 0.6 -2.850 0.121 2.417 0.054 2.018 0.280 0.057 0.048 0.048 0.179 0.051 0.066 0.045 0.008 0.062 0.215 0.186 0.129 
0.2 0.7 -3.263 0.115 2.185 0.074 1.963 0.279 0.071 0.049 0.062 0.177 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.007 0.042 0.210 0.218 0.224 
0.2 0.8 -3.042 0.130 2.767 0.106 2.123 0.294 0.105 0.052 0.092 0.197 0.106 0.073 0.099 0.007 0.081 0.198 0.180 0.163 
0.2 0.9 -3.443 0.121 3.345 0.127 2.009 0.286 0.125 0.051 0.131 0.190 0.132 0.068 0.137 0.008 0.143 0.186 0.176 0.137 
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Table 2.5. Case 5: SSIV, n=100 (50/50), 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
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0.3 0 -1.124 0.008 1.109 0.005 4.870 0.572 0.006 0.190 0.007 0.445 0.006 0.236 0.007 0.049 0.012 0.109 0.110 0.124 
0.3 0.1 -1.167 -0.005 1.011 0.008 4.928 0.578 0.008 0.185 0.005 0.450 0.009 0.233 0.007 0.048 0.008 0.109 0.113 0.110 
0.3 0.2 -1.275 0.001 0.949 0.012 4.902 0.578 0.013 0.196 0.009 0.445 0.012 0.235 0.010 0.048 0.006 0.111 0.105 0.088 
0.3 0.3 -1.430 0.015 0.859 0.022 4.707 0.561 0.019 0.182 0.020 0.435 0.019 0.226 0.018 0.046 0.017 0.109 0.114 0.135 
0.3 0.4 -1.504 0.021 0.828 0.029 4.837 0.571 0.028 0.188 0.030 0.441 0.028 0.231 0.029 0.048 0.034 0.107 0.110 0.115 
0.3 0.5 -1.590 -0.001 0.726 0.041 4.926 0.580 0.042 0.194 0.042 0.450 0.041 0.239 0.043 0.053 0.040 0.103 0.107 0.101 
0.3 0.6 -1.790 0.018 0.658 0.057 4.809 0.572 0.055 0.195 0.047 0.444 0.054 0.236 0.052 0.049 0.039 0.102 0.102 0.108 
0.3 0.7 -1.923 0.008 0.606 0.076 4.816 0.572 0.074 0.188 0.069 0.441 0.072 0.233 0.070 0.048 0.065 0.098 0.093 0.105 
0.3 0.8 -2.131 0.017 0.546 0.088 4.867 0.572 0.089 0.189 0.089 0.445 0.086 0.233 0.089 0.050 0.070 0.095 0.091 0.073 
0.3 0.9 -2.142 0.010 0.496 0.095 4.966 0.581 0.092 0.189 0.084 0.452 0.094 0.233 0.090 0.048 0.092 0.090 0.094 0.088 
P
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el
 E
 
0.4 0 -0.697 0.007 0.705 0.016 9.523 0.834 0.015 0.473 0.014 0.748 0.015 0.535 0.014 0.195 0.017 0.059 0.058 0.058 
0.4 0.1 -0.733 0.001 0.636 0.016 9.266 0.835 0.017 0.455 0.015 0.743 0.016 0.520 0.016 0.183 0.016 0.059 0.056 0.059 
0.4 0.2 -0.796 0.000 0.611 0.019 9.333 0.843 0.019 0.461 0.020 0.748 0.019 0.523 0.018 0.196 0.017 0.058 0.056 0.058 
0.4 0.3 -0.858 0.003 0.571 0.028 9.252 0.838 0.029 0.458 0.033 0.743 0.030 0.519 0.031 0.187 0.038 0.059 0.060 0.058 
0.4 0.4 -0.912 0.000 0.535 0.037 9.463 0.836 0.037 0.472 0.036 0.743 0.036 0.530 0.036 0.192 0.036 0.056 0.055 0.056 
0.4 0.5 -0.977 0.000 0.495 0.049 9.478 0.840 0.048 0.467 0.046 0.747 0.047 0.531 0.048 0.197 0.043 0.057 0.056 0.051 
0.4 0.6 -1.000 0.007 0.475 0.056 9.317 0.836 0.057 0.459 0.059 0.744 0.056 0.524 0.058 0.187 0.061 0.054 0.055 0.059 
0.4 0.7 -1.084 0.008 0.440 0.067 9.639 0.846 0.066 0.477 0.066 0.759 0.066 0.534 0.067 0.194 0.068 0.057 0.056 0.054 
0.4 0.8 -1.165 0.005 0.406 0.073 9.615 0.842 0.072 0.475 0.070 0.748 0.071 0.538 0.070 0.199 0.065 0.054 0.055 0.055 
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Table 2.6. Case 6: SSIV, n=100 (10/90), 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument. 
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0 0 -6.828 0.019 6.802 0.000 0.488 0.049 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.000 1.009 1.464 0.407 
0 0.1 -5.823 0.095 6.427 0.000 0.500 0.051 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.000 1.008 0.812 1.125 
0 0.2 -6.280 0.193 6.339 0.001 0.502 0.049 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.042 0.002 0.014 0.007 0.002 0.000 1.038 1.050 0.996 
0 0.3 -6.227 0.307 6.169 0.002 0.470 0.048 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.042 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.003 0.000 1.022 1.468 2.368 
0 0.4 -5.233 0.378 5.598 0.007 0.483 0.046 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.040 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.003 0.031 1.025 1.007 1.773 
0 0.5 -4.824 0.504 6.152 0.016 0.480 0.046 0.017 0.011 0.000 0.039 0.010 0.015 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.993 0.700 0.649 
0 0.6 -4.216 0.611 5.561 0.033 0.478 0.050 0.036 0.011 0.037 0.042 0.038 0.014 0.036 0.003 0.040 0.987 1.290 2.083 
0 0.7 -3.865 0.701 4.986 0.066 0.501 0.047 0.063 0.011 0.053 0.041 0.061 0.014 0.064 0.002 0.042 0.996 0.732 0.538 
0 0.8 -2.802 0.815 4.781 0.130 0.492 0.052 0.149 0.012 0.154 0.045 0.147 0.016 0.155 0.003 0.100 1.009 0.829 1.028 
0 0.9 -1.622 0.911 3.642 0.257 0.488 0.052 0.263 0.011 0.196 0.044 0.262 0.016 0.214 0.003 0.214 1.001 1.170 0.840 
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Table 2.6. Case 6: SSIV, n=100 (10/90), 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument (continued). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
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0.1 0 -4.258 -0.001 3.905 0.001 0.580 0.060 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.463 0.410 0.124 
0.1 0.1 -4.026 0.042 3.840 0.001 0.549 0.062 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.474 0.565 0.468 
0.1 0.2 -4.089 0.095 4.369 0.003 0.553 0.063 0.003 0.016 0.006 0.054 0.002 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.509 0.409 0.368 
0.1 0.3 -3.996 0.135 3.953 0.006 0.525 0.061 0.003 0.017 0.000 0.053 0.004 0.022 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.472 0.560 0.604 
0.1 0.4 -3.918 0.175 4.192 0.014 0.515 0.055 0.022 0.014 0.036 0.047 0.023 0.017 0.029 0.004 0.071 0.456 0.376 0.374 
0.1 0.5 -3.959 0.236 4.628 0.024 0.545 0.058 0.026 0.015 0.026 0.051 0.026 0.019 0.026 0.004 0.056 0.467 0.483 0.714 
0.1 0.6 -3.786 0.263 4.152 0.041 0.535 0.059 0.043 0.015 0.060 0.050 0.048 0.019 0.056 0.004 0.073 0.435 0.354 0.216 
0.1 0.7 -3.934 0.295 4.151 0.075 0.536 0.059 0.061 0.014 0.086 0.052 0.065 0.019 0.070 0.003 0.000 0.427 0.466 0.445 
0.1 0.8 -4.085 0.325 4.574 0.114 0.585 0.059 0.103 0.015 0.112 0.052 0.105 0.020 0.117 0.005 0.174 0.404 0.408 0.433 
0.1 0.9 -3.724 0.328 4.945 0.167 0.559 0.058 0.166 0.015 0.170 0.050 0.163 0.018 0.168 0.004 0.154 0.349 0.373 0.466 
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0.2 0 -1.350 0.003 1.494 0.003 0.755 0.093 0.001 0.023 0.000 0.080 0.001 0.031 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.142 0.129 0.138 
0.2 0.1 -1.462 0.005 1.307 0.005 0.753 0.094 0.006 0.029 0.007 0.083 0.006 0.035 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.133 0.129 0.119 
0.2 0.2 -1.581 0.012 1.219 0.009 0.720 0.087 0.007 0.025 0.008 0.077 0.008 0.032 0.009 0.007 0.000 0.138 0.159 0.173 
0.2 0.3 -1.770 0.030 1.139 0.015 0.707 0.088 0.012 0.025 0.012 0.080 0.011 0.033 0.012 0.006 0.031 0.136 0.154 0.152 
0.2 0.4 -1.776 0.026 1.016 0.025 0.695 0.090 0.020 0.027 0.018 0.078 0.019 0.034 0.018 0.009 0.022 0.133 0.154 0.146 
0.2 0.5 -2.010 0.033 0.946 0.040 0.753 0.088 0.042 0.026 0.027 0.078 0.042 0.033 0.040 0.007 0.014 0.136 0.128 0.115 
0.2 0.6 -2.152 0.031 0.822 0.056 0.774 0.091 0.050 0.024 0.050 0.081 0.050 0.031 0.045 0.006 0.079 0.127 0.116 0.132 
0.2 0.7 -2.238 0.032 0.766 0.071 0.696 0.088 0.068 0.023 0.064 0.079 0.070 0.029 0.078 0.007 0.074 0.128 0.141 0.121 
0.2 0.8 -2.551 0.033 0.647 0.085 0.714 0.088 0.095 0.025 0.112 0.078 0.098 0.031 0.124 0.008 0.141 0.116 0.141 0.147 
0.2 0.9 -2.929 0.046 0.589 0.111 0.708 0.090 0.094 0.025 0.115 0.078 0.100 0.032 0.104 0.007 0.100 0.115 0.106 0.122 
53 
 
Table 2.6. Case 6: SSIV, n=100 (10/90), 1 endogenous regressor, 1 instrument (continued). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
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0.3 0 -0.710 0.003 0.697 0.011 1.120 0.139 0.010 0.042 0.010 0.123 0.010 0.053 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.058 0.056 0.057 
0.3 0.1 -0.750 0.008 0.662 0.017 1.147 0.145 0.015 0.044 0.011 0.131 0.016 0.058 0.021 0.013 0.008 0.061 0.059 0.042 
0.3 0.2 -0.785 0.006 0.622 0.019 1.134 0.139 0.020 0.043 0.023 0.124 0.020 0.055 0.025 0.013 0.015 0.057 0.074 0.062 
0.3 0.3 -0.854 0.006 0.579 0.026 1.203 0.144 0.023 0.047 0.021 0.132 0.023 0.060 0.023 0.015 0.033 0.059 0.061 0.063 
0.3 0.4 -0.916 -0.005 0.534 0.033 1.133 0.147 0.037 0.046 0.048 0.129 0.036 0.056 0.043 0.015 0.052 0.059 0.060 0.063 
0.3 0.5 -0.966 -0.001 0.505 0.045 1.133 0.147 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.133 0.048 0.059 0.044 0.015 0.048 0.057 0.066 0.076 
0.3 0.6 -1.036 0.008 0.464 0.053 1.182 0.149 0.055 0.046 0.058 0.134 0.055 0.057 0.053 0.013 0.052 0.055 0.042 0.038 
0.3 0.7 -1.149 -0.001 0.441 0.065 1.148 0.144 0.060 0.048 0.061 0.130 0.059 0.058 0.057 0.014 0.050 0.057 0.050 0.051 
0.3 0.8 -1.177 0.006 0.419 0.080 1.196 0.144 0.074 0.046 0.076 0.129 0.074 0.058 0.078 0.014 0.057 0.055 0.059 0.049 
0.3 0.9 -1.290 0.000 0.391 0.083 1.153 0.148 0.072 0.047 0.088 0.133 0.073 0.059 0.078 0.013 0.107 0.053 0.052 0.055 
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0.4 0 -0.472 0.000 0.463 0.021 1.902 0.231 0.026 0.085 0.025 0.211 0.025 0.102 0.023 0.030 0.023 0.033 0.033 0.032 
0.4 0.1 -0.503 -0.002 0.455 0.026 1.985 0.238 0.024 0.085 0.021 0.218 0.023 0.102 0.021 0.031 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.041 
0.4 0.2 -0.540 0.004 0.439 0.028 1.970 0.236 0.029 0.090 0.029 0.219 0.028 0.110 0.029 0.030 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.034 
0.4 0.3 -0.553 0.003 0.406 0.030 1.984 0.231 0.027 0.085 0.025 0.214 0.029 0.105 0.027 0.031 0.020 0.033 0.030 0.029 
0.4 0.4 -0.575 0.000 0.402 0.039 1.954 0.235 0.039 0.086 0.046 0.213 0.039 0.104 0.042 0.029 0.045 0.032 0.032 0.031 
0.4 0.5 -0.597 0.001 0.378 0.046 1.934 0.231 0.050 0.084 0.054 0.211 0.052 0.104 0.049 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.035 0.033 
0.4 0.6 -0.628 0.005 0.363 0.055 1.978 0.239 0.054 0.093 0.069 0.221 0.055 0.112 0.064 0.031 0.074 0.033 0.031 0.028 
0.4 0.7 -0.680 0.003 0.341 0.059 1.872 0.231 0.061 0.086 0.056 0.211 0.060 0.105 0.054 0.030 0.072 0.033 0.033 0.036 
0.4 0.8 -0.707 -0.003 0.334 0.071 1.927 0.237 0.068 0.088 0.071 0.218 0.068 0.107 0.068 0.031 0.059 0.032 0.031 0.030 
0.4 0.9 -0.709 -0.002 0.317 0.072 2.046 0.246 0.073 0.091 0.076 0.224 0.074 0.112 0.070 0.034 0.080 0.033 0.032 0.030 
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As noted earlier, Angrist and Krueger (1995) showed that the SSIV, unlike the 2SLS, is 
always biased towards zero. By construction, the true 𝛽 is my experiment is also equal 
to zero, so it was necessary to check if the test size improvements are specific to the 
case where true 𝛽 is zero. As a robustness check a further experiment was conducted 
where the true 𝛽 was set to one. The size of the Wald test when using SSIV behaved in 
the same way as in the experiment with the true 𝛽 of zero, that is, large size distortions 
are not observed in the conditioned samples for any degree of correlation between the 
regressor and the error term regardless of the strength of the instruments. 
It can be seen in table 2.4 that with just a couple of exceptions Stock and Yogo’s (2005) 
critical values accurately predict the extent of the Wald test size distortions in the 
experiment with the SSIV estimator, which is good news. However, the SSIV brings 
another problem – the behavior of the median-squared error has changed and even in the 
samples where the degree of endogeneity is low the conditional samples do not yield 
lower median-square errors. In fact, the outcome is very sporadic – there is no clear 
pattern associated with the median-square error and conditional sampling; sometimes 
it’s higher in the samples with higher F-stat sometimes it’s lower. But mainly it is very 
similar for all the samples and for the conditioned samples and corresponds to the 
median-square error for all the samples in table 2.1, which means that there are no 
obvious gains in accuracy of the estimation of 𝛽 in the samples where the first stage F-
statistic is higher. 
In table 2.5 we can see that the test size distortions are mainly inside the upper bounds 
determined by Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values. This is similar to the results 
obtained in table 2.4, despite the fact that the fraction of the samples that pass different 
critical values in table 2.5 is significantly smaller. Also, unlike the results in table 1 and 
analogously to table 2.4, the median-squared error doesn’t fall when the samples are 
restricted to those with higher corresponding F-statistics. In fact, the median-squared 
error in table 2.5 is about 1.5 - 2 times larger than the median-squared error in all 
samples in both table 2.1 and table 2.4, which suggests that opting for the SSIV 
estimation with the 50-50 split (as opposed to the 2SLS) would lead to a loss in 
accuracy of the prediction of 𝛽. 
In table 2.6, where the 10-90 split is used, we can still see the benefits of the SSIV 
estimator  - the size of the Wald test in the samples with higher F-statistics barely 
exceeds the maximal size derived by Stock and Yogo (2005) despite the fact that the 
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number of observations in the first stage regression is very small and the fraction of the 
samples that pass different critical values is tiny compared to all previous cases. Since 
there are more observations used in the second stage regression, the distribution of the 
2SLS estimates is narrower and the median-squared error is smaller compared to the 
corresponding median-squared errors in table 2.5. However, it is also clear that if the 
sample size is as small as described in this experiment, even when the correlation 
between the endogenous regressor and the instrument is fairly high (for example, see 
panel E), the F-statistics obtained will be very low, which would make the pre-test 
useless, because recognizing a strong instrument would be almost impossible.  
 
2.10. Practitioner’s guide to using Stock and Yogo’s critical values as a pre-test. 
 
In this chapter I have examined how Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values perform as 
a pre-test while evaluating its effectiveness by means of the median-squared error. My 
findings have significant value for applied economisits that work with models that 
require IV estimation. In this section I provide practical advice regarding the use of 
Stock and Yogo’s critical values as a pre-test, and explain how to avoid potential 
complications. The main relevant results of my research can be outlined in the following 
points: 
1. While evaluating the strength of the instrument by comparing the first stage F-
statistic with Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values, researchers should be 
cautious. If the instrument is suspected to be weak and the degree of 
endogeneity is suspected to be high, a high first stage F-statistic obtained is very 
likely to correspond to a large bias in the IV estimation, and significant size 
distortions to the Wald test on the coefficient on the endogenous regressor. 
2. Thus, if the researcher has a strong prior belief that the instrument is only 
weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor and the degree of 
endogeneity is high, weak IV robust statistics, such as AR (1949), Kleibergen’s 
(2002) Lagrange Multiplier statistic, etc., with distributions that do not depend 
on the value of the concentration parameter, provide a better alternative.   
3. If the sample size is large, another alternative is to use SSIV estimation 
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procedure, which eliminates the pre-test bias problem, so Stock and Yogo’s 
(2005) critical values “predict” Wald test size distortions fairly accurately. 
However, if the correlation between the instrument and the regressor is very 
low, the precision of estimation will suffer, so the trade-off should be considered 
carefully. 
4. If the degree of endogeneity of the regressor of interest is expected to be low, 
choosing instruments that “pass” certain critical values is beneficial – the 
accuracy of estimation is notably higher for the samples conditioned on the high 
F-statistic. The test size distortions are also low. 
To summarise, when choosing instruments and prior to resorting to the pre-test, it is 
important to consider the degree of endogeneity and instrument relevance in your model 
based on previous knowledge and theoretical reasoning. Sequential testing is associated 
with the pre-test bias and I have shown that under certain circumstances the cost of that 
bias might be large. I recommend that the information provided in this section is taken 
into account when Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values are used as a pre-test to 
determine whether the instruments are strong or weak. 
 
2.11 Conclusion 
 
Nagar (1959) was the first to point out that the bias of the 2SLS estimator increases as 
the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous regressor decreases, but for 
a long time this was only considered to be a problem in small samples. Later it was 
shown that even large samples could produce biased estimates if the instruments are 
sufficiently weak. There has been a lot of research since the 1990s on how to detect and 
overcome problems that arise in the presence of weak IV. Stock and Yogo (2005) 
suggested using non-conventional critical values for the first stage F-statistic and linked 
them to the maximal relative bias of the IV estimator and the maximal size of the Wald 
test.  
In this chapter I have analyzed the performance of Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical 
values as a pre-test in order to winnow out weak instruments based on Hall et al.’s 
(1996) experiment. The innovative contribution of my paper is in applying median-
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squared error as a loss function to evaluate the effectiveness of the pre-test, and in 
exploring the performance of the pre-test in the context of the SSIV estimator.  
The conclusions that can be drawn from the simulations suggest that: 
1. While using the 2SLS estimator, there are adverse consequences which come from 
choosing instruments based on high F-statistics: the higher the F-statistic, the more the 
Wald test size is likely to be distorted. In particular, if the first stage F-statistic obtained 
is high but the researcher suspects that the underlying relationship between the 
endogenous regressor and the instrument is weak, the second-stage inference is likely to 
be misleading and the maximal Wald test size distortions will not fall within the bounds 
predicted by Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values. In fact, the size distortions are 
likely to be huge – the actual size observed in the simulations reached up to 100%. 
2. When the degree of endogeneity is low, however, the high first stage F-statistics 
correspond to a lower median-squared error. And for these low-endogeneity cases, the 
distortions to the Wald test size are comparatively small. Thus conditioning the choice 
of an instrument on the high value of the F-statistic could actually improve the accuracy 
of the estimation of 𝛽. 
3. When the SSIV estimator is used, the pre-test bias problem is virtually eliminated and 
the test size distortions are mainly within the bounds predicted by Stock and Yogo 
(2005). However, as fewer observations are used for estimating the structural equation, 
the accuracy of the estimation of 𝛽 decreases, so the pre-test in conjunction with the 
SSIV estimator should be used with caution when the sample size is small (or when the 
correlation between the instrument and the endogenous regressor is expected to be very 
low). 
The implications of the pre-test bias when testing for the strength of the instruments can 
be serious and can compromise the reliability of an IV estimation; nevertheless, the test 
suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) is still very useful if used correctly. 
The practical advice that follows is that the researcher should not rely entirely on the 
statistics to select the set of instruments, but also on exogenous information available – 
for example: earlier theoretical or empirical research which indicates that the degree of 
endogeneity is either very low or very high. Kennedy (2003) notes that pre-testing, 
which is also called sequential estimation or data mining, is not well justified in the 
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context of causal inference. In the context of instrument selection, Shea (1997) suggests 
that prior reasoning is very important and all screening tests should just be viewed as an 
additional check. 
Another important point was made by Dufour (1997), who states that in the presence of 
weak instruments, the Wald test has the disadvantage of producing bounded confidence 
sets with probability one instead of producing infinite or close to infinite confidence sets 
when β is unidentifiable or almost unidentifiable. This suggests that the researcher 
should opt for an Anderson and Rubin’s (1959) approach or its analogues if the 
instrument is thought to be weak. More generally, the traditional approach I have 
reviewed in this chapter uses an estimator that requires the rank condition to be 
satisfied. However, if the researcher does not have strong priors that the rank condition 
is satisfied in theory, an alternative approach that drops the rank condition would likely 
be more appropriate.  
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Chapter 3. Oil Rents and the Real Exchange Rate.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Joint work with Erkal Ersoy 
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3.1 Introduction.  
 
Is there a resource curse, and if so how does it work? Could it be that an increase in 
resource wealth leads to a real appreciation that crowds out other exports? Does this 
happen in practice? The topic has been widely studied in an effort to explain the poor 
growth performance of some resource-rich countries since it seems counter-intuitive for 
natural resource abundance to lead to sluggish growth patterns. In addition to making 
the casual observation that most resource-rich countries have relatively low levels of 
GDP, Sachs and Warner (2001) have empirically illustrated that high resource intensity 
is correlated with slow growth. Other post-war growth studies have corroborated this 
finding (c.f. Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997). As discussed in Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003), the case of Nigeria is particularly interesting because real per 
capita oil revenues rose from $33 in 1965 to $325 in 2000 with very little rise in real 
GDP per capita. Counter-examples, such as Norway and Australia, have led to a debate 
about the existence and significance of resource curse leading to the conclusion that 
other factors, such as corruption, account for most of the problems associated with slow 
economic development. In order to shed light on this debate, Sachs and Warner (1997) 
have implemented empirical models that include up to nine control variables—
including corruption—and found that natural resource abundance still plays a key role 
in determining growth rates. In light of this finding, it has been postulated that exchange 
rates affect growth through hindrance of export-led growth. However, the existence of 
the resource curse is still controversial: some authors (Sachs and Warner 1999, 
Atkinson and Hamilton 2003) argue that it exists and is important, while others disagree 
(Mehlum et al. 2006, Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). For a review of evidence in 
favour of the resource curse in oil, see Ross (2012). 
The reason that the resource curse literature is relevant in a study of the relationship 
between resource rents and the real exchange rate is that one of the mechanisms by 
which resources are meant to curse a country is via appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. This phenomenon is known as the Dutch disease, and the key mechanism generally 
thought to underlie it is the Balassa-Samuelson (also called the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson) hypothesis, which suggests that real appreciation is the result of relative 
productivity changes of the tradable vs. the non-tradable sector in resource rich 
economies. The idea is that since the price of tradables is set on international markets 
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(but non-tradables are not), and since labour within a country can move freely between 
both sectors, a rise in the productivity of the tradables sector will suck labour out of the 
non-tradables sector; this will raise employment in the tradable sector (but not the price, 
which is set internationally) and it will also raise the price level within the non-tradable 
sector (wages must rise so that some workers are induced to stay behind rather than 
everybody leaving for the traeable sector at once).  
At the intersection of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, the Dutch disease, and the 
resource curse is the notion that a resource bonanza could cause a real appreciation 
which in turn would make other exports (e.g. manufactured exports) uncompetitive (this 
happened to the Netherlands after the discovery of large gas fields in the country in 
1959, hence the name Dutch disease). If the exports which were crowded out by the real 
appreciation were in industries with large positive externalities (e.g. agglomeration 
economies, economies of scale, knowledge spillovers, etc.), then by crowding them out, 
a country may reduce its long-run growth rate, even though it is following its 
comparative advantage in the short run. And while the presence or absence of a real 
appreciation in response to an increase in resource rents would not conclusively prove 
or disprove the existence of the resource curse, the one or the other finding could 
strengthen the case (if the channel exists) or weaken it (if the channel does not exist, 
which suggests the resource curse must operate through other means such as corruption 
of the political system). So it is worth checking whether the real appreciation channel 
appears to be important in practice. 
The chapter contributes to the general literature on the Balassa-Samuelson effect, but 
specifically focuses on the oil-producing countries. There are three distinctive features 
of the chapter - a new dataset on revenues and costs of the oil exporters that has been 
constructed from Wood Mackenzie’s (WM) Global Economic Model (GEM) and has 
not been used in this context before; a diverse set of oil-exporting countries analysed; 
and the use of the pool mean group estimator by Pesaran et al. (1999), that restricts the 
long-run coefficients for all panels to be the same, but allows the short-run coefficients 
to vary by panel to try to identify whether the Balassa-Samuelson effect exists in the oil-
exporting countries. These new data and techniques available allow us to quantify the 
long-run relationship between movements in real exchange rates that could be attributed 
to the changes in the oil rents per capita.  Two findings are worth noting - the evidence 
in favour of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis was found for most countries in the 
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sample, but the magnitudes of the effect are small. No evidence was found for the 
mechanism in the OPEC countries. 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 3.2 reviews the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) 
hypothesis and its transition mechanism, section 3.3 provides a literature review, section 
3.4 describes the dataset in detail, section 3.5 focuses on the determining stationarity 
properties of the variables, section 3.6 describes the econometrics methods used and 
provides the results of the estimations, section 3.7 concludes the analysis. 
 
3.2 The Balassa-Samuelson effect and the transmission mechanisms 
 
One popular explanation for the resource curse has a crowding-out logic. If activity X 
drives growth and the extraction of natural resources crowds-out this activity, natural 
resources harm growth through the elimination of activity X. This activity could be in a 
manufacturing industry with positive externalities that would lead to improved 
efficiency and international competitiveness. Since natural resource exports dominate, 
however, other industries cannot compete in the global market and productivity-
boosting spillovers are minimal. Therefore, if production and exports of natural 
resources lead to the appreciation of the domestic currency, domestic economic growth 
would be hurt. In addition, positive wealth shocks from the natural resource sector result 
in higher demand for non-traded goods and create excess demand for non-traded 
products driving up their prices. This rise in prices include input costs and wages which 
squeezes profits in traded activities, including manufacturing, that use the non-traded 
products as inputs but sell on the international market at relatively fixed prices. The 
decline in manufacturing then has ramification that slow down the growth process. 
Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) all independently pointed at 
precisely this phenomenon. They noted that countries with more productive labour in 
the tradable sector should have relatively higher prices in their non-tradable sector. This 
would then lead to a higher overall price level in countries with productive tradable 
sectors and indirectly to the appreciation of the currency. For instance, consider oil-
exporting countries A and B. The former is similar to the United Arab Emirates and has 
a highly productive oil sector in which capital and labour input costs are low. The latter 
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is similar to Kazakhstan where productivity in the oil sector is considerably lower and 
input costs are much higher. Exports of oil from both countries represent a high fraction 
of total exports and a large portion of their GDP. Assuming capital is perfectly mobile 
across sectors within and between countries, but labour is mobile only within the 
country and not internationally, we would expect a higher overall price level in country 
A than in B. The external mechanism through which this occurs can be explained as 
follows: 
 
PT = XRAT × PT
∗  
Law of one price holds for tradable goods 
only 
RER =
XRAT
P
  
Rodrik (2008) and MacDonald and Vieira 
(2010) 
WT = PT × MPLT → PT =
WT
MPLT
  
Workers are paid their marginal product 
WN = PN × MPLN → PN =
WN
MPLN
  
WN = WT  Workers can move freely between sectors 
P = PT
α × PN
1−α  
Overall price level composition  
PN
PT
=
1
PT
×
WN
MPLN
=
1
PT
×
WT
MPLN
=
PT
PT
×
MPLT
MPLN
=
MPLT
MPLN
  
MPLT ↑⟹ PN ↑⟹ P ↑⟹ RER ↓  Appreciation of the currency 
 
Table 3.1. The B-S transition mechanism 
 
In table 3.1 PT is price of tradables, PN price of non-tradables, PT
∗ price of tradables 
abroad, XRAT nominal exchange rate, which is defined as the number of units of the 
domestic currency that buy one US dollar, P overall domestic price level, 𝛼 is the share 
of tradables in the overall domestic price level, WT wages in tradable sector, WN wages 
in non-tradable sector, MPLT marginal product of labour in tradable sector, MPLN 
marginal product of labour in non-tradable sector and RER real exchange rate. Using 
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our definition of the exchange rate, increases in the exchange rates mean depreciation of 
the domestic currency. 
Since the marginal product of labour in country A is higher than that in country B, 
MPLT
A > MPLT
B , the price level of non-tradables will be higher leading to a higher 
overall price level in the country. This, in turn, drives the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate.  
In fact, Balassa has made the observation that "the greater are the productivity 
differentials in the production of tradable goods between countries, the larger will be the 
differences in wages and in the prices of services and correspondingly the greater will 
be the gap between purchasing power parity and the equilibrium exchange rate" 
(Balassa, 1964). 
 
3.3 Literature review.  
 
After Balassa (1964) popularised the aforementioned notion, it was adopted not only in 
the exchange rate and resource curse literature, but also led to a new niche of its own. 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001) as well as Atkinson and Hamilton (2003), 
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Mehlum et al. (2006) and Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte (2008) are a few of the significant contributions to the resource curse literature. 
Within the B-S literature, time series and panel analyses largely support the B-S 
hypothesis, whereas initial cross-sectional analyses led to mixed results. 
Balassa (1964) was the first one to attempt to verify the B-S hypothesis empirically by 
regressing PPP as a percentage of exchange rate on per capita GNP– he analysed 12 
OECD countries in 1960 and found a significant relationship, which was interpreted as 
a confirmation for his proposition. His study gave rise to large cross-sectional literature, 
which includes De Vries (1968), Officer (1976), Clague (1986, 1988), etc. Most studies 
use the real exchange rate or PPP as the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables include different productivity measures, such as GDP per capita, ratio of 
productivities, real income etc. and the control variables, such as openness to trade, 
trade balance, money growth and so on. The literature didn’t provide conclusive results 
and different specifications yielded different outcomes. 
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The “second wave” of literature on the productivity bias hypothesis was focused on the 
country level analysis, i.e. time series analysis, which was meant to take into account 
country-specific circumstances that couldn’t have been accounted for in the cross-
sectional studies. These studies include Hseih (1982), Rogoff (1992), Bahmani –
Oskooee and Rhee (1996) and others. Different time series approaches were utilised, 
including Johansen approach, Engle-Granger, Dickey-Fuller tests, ARDL approach etc. 
These studies mainly supported the hypothesis. A comprehensive literature review can 
be found in Bahmani–Oskooee and Nasir (2005). 
The most recent group of studies that analyse the existence of the B-S mechanism are 
predominantly based on panel econometric methods. Nonstationary panel methods are a 
fairly new field in econometrics, and these methods were only adopted in the B-S 
literature late 1990s and early 2000s. Prior to the 1990s, most studies tested individual 
countries for cointegration and proceed with conventional panel methods such as 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) or Fixed Effects (FE) estimations. De 
Gregorio et al. (1994) and Asea and Mendoza (1994) were amongst the first influential 
ones – both papers included the demand side variables in accordance with Rogoff 
(1992), and Asea and Mendoza (1994) also showed that the ratio of sectoral 
productivity per capita should be used in the context of the B-S hypothesis instead of 
level productivity per capita, however, most papers consequently continue to use level 
data as a proxy. 
Many papers questioned the assumptions of the model and the validity of the whole 
model versus parts of the model. For instance, Egert et al. (2003) implemented panel 
cointegration analysis to study nine Central and Eastern European countries using 
quarterly average labour productivity data over the period 1995 to 2000. Although their 
conclusion suggested strong evidence in favour of the B-S effect, the authors noted that 
only part of the phenomenon is being captured. They argued that the increase in price 
level could also be explained by increasing quality of the goods, which was not captured 
by the CPI index. Faria and Leon-Ledesma (2003) tested for evidence of the B-S effect 
in the long run using relative real output per capita levels as a proxy for relative labour 
productivity among four countries—Germany, Japan, the UK, and the USA—for the 
period 1960 to 1996. They implemented models using levels and first differences, but 
neither pointed to a significant long-run relationship between the price level ratios and 
output ratios. However they suggested that the rejection of B-S effect doesn't 
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necessarily mean that PPP hypothesis holds - the investigation of the differenced output 
ratios suggested that causality exists, but that causality goes from price ratios to output 
ratios, which violates the assumptions of PPP.  On the contrary, Choudhri and Khan's 
(2005) analysis of 16 developing countries with different income levels over the period 
1976 to 1994 illustrated the existence of a long-run relationship between the countries' 
productivity differentials and their real exchange rates. However, the strength of the 
relationship is sensitive to variation in income levels and the authors argue that terms of 
trade also have an influence on real exchange rate.  
Garcia-Solanes at el. (2008) extended the work done by Egert et al. (2003) and similarly 
to Asea and Mendoza (1994) found that the internal transmission mechanism (an 
increase in the overall price level in response to the increase in productivity in the 
tradable sector) holds, but that the appreciation of the real exchange rate cannot be fully 
attributed to productivity differentials. Their work involved six new EU countries of 
that year (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic) and 
six other countries from EU-15 (Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) 
using data from 1995 through 2004. They suggested that the reason that external 
transition mechanism is not fulfilled is the fact that PPP in tradable sector doesn't hold. 
However, Garcia-Solanes and Torrejon-Flores (2009), showed that both internal and 
external mechanisms work in their analysis of 16 Latin American countries conversely 
to 16 OECD countries, where only internal mechanism was confirmed. Drine and Rault 
(2002) in their analysis of 6 Asian countries using panel cointegration techniques also 
questioned the assumptions of the B-S hypothesis and provided evidence that two 
assumptions of the model – PPP for tradable goods and the relationship between prices 
of nontradables and the real exchange rate can be violated, which would explain 
rejection of the B-S hypothesis in empirical work.  
Chong et al. (2012) evaluate the adjustment of the real exchange rate to its long-run 
equilibrium for 21 OECD countries and confirm that the B-S effect is not just an 
essential component of the equilibrium, but the size of the B-S effect varies by country 
and influences the speed of adjustment of the real exchange rate to the equilibrium after 
a shock. 
Chinn (2000) estimated a panel error correction model and found some evidence in 
support of the productivity bias hypothesis in five East Asian countries. He also 
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investigated effects of government spending and real oil prices on the real exchange 
rates and found that contrary to Chinn (1997) study of 14 OECD countries government 
spending didn’t exhibit significant effect and the oil price was significant for only three 
countries in his sample, one oil exporter and two oil importers, with the predictable sign 
– appreciation of the currency for oil exporter (Indonesia) and depreciation for the other 
two (Japan and Korea). 
Despite extensive coverage of the B-S hypothesis in the literature, there has not been 
much research that would focus on the oil-producing countries or even developing 
countries – most research concerns OECD countries regardless of the finding that B-S 
effect is more likely to be present in poorer countries. In the last decade transitional 
economies have gained attention, including oil exporters such as Russia and 
Kazakhstan, however manifestation of the productivity bias hypothesis through the oil-
producing sector hasn’t been explored despite its direct relevance – oil producers are 
mainly countries with large shares of primary exports. 
One of the papers that investigates this relationship is Korhonen and Juurikkala (2009). 
They are mainly interested in the effects of the oil price on the real exchange rates of the 
OPEC countries, however they also use GDP per capita as a measure of productivity. 
They reject the B-S hypothesis for their sample, while finding strong and significant 
relationship between the oil price and the real exchange rates of those countries. They 
also emphasize that it would be useful to analyse all oil-exporting countries – members 
and non-members of OPEC - in one panel framework as similar results were found for 
non-OPEC countries, such as Russia (Kalcheva and Oomes (2007)), and OPEC 
Venzuela (Zalduendo (2006)).  
Another paper that included Russia among other countries (South Eastern Europe, 
Ukraine and Turkey) is Egert (2005). He analysed the exchange rate behaviour in the 
transition economies with undervalued currencies (nominal exchange rate below the 
PPP exchange rate) and concluded that the Balassa-Samuelson effect isn’t strong. In 
particular, Egert notes that the assumptions of B-S, such as that an increase in 
productivity causes relative price increases, don’t seem to hold. A particularly 
interesting result of the paper is that oil revenues do not prove to be important for the 
exchange rate fluctuations in Russia. On the contrary, Egert et al. (2006) provide an 
extensive overview of the exchange rate behaviour in the 14 transition economies and 
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despite stating that the movements in the exchange rate should not be attributed to the 
B-S mechanism, they note that Russia and Kazakhstan (both present in our dataset) are 
negatively affected by the Dutch Disease, and that the oil price has a significant effect 
on the real exchange rate movements. At the same time, Egert and Leonard (2011) 
examined the Kazakh economy for the presence of Dutch disease and tested for the B-S 
effect during the years 1996 through 2005 when oil prices had been rising. Their 
conclusion was that the non-oil tradable sector was unaffected by the increase in oil 
revenues and that the appreciation of the currency was mostly due to the change in the 
nominal rate instead of an increase in the price level. 
Amin and El-Sakka (2016) found a long-run relationship between oil prices, GDP and 
real exchange rates of dollar-pegged GCC countries and noted that there is causality 
going from oil prices to the exchange rate, but that the adjustment of the exchange rate 
to the equilibrium is very slow. 
Due to limitations in publicly available data, most studies that analyse oil-exporting 
countries, focus on the effects of changes in the oil price rather than on country-level 
changes in productivity. For example, Habib and Kalamova (2007) found no 
relationship between oil prices and real exchange rates in Norway and Saudi Arabia, but 
established a positive relationship in Russia. Aziz and Abu Bakar (2009), however, 
found no long-run relationship for net oil exporters – Canada, Denmark and Malaysia, 
unlike net oil importers, which in their sample appeared to have negative relationship 
between the oil price and their currency values. More discussions on the relationship 
between the oil price and the real exchange rates in oil-rich countries can be found in 
Rickne (2009) and Frankel (2017). 
Although the literature on B-S hypothesis is extensive and spans several decades and 
econometric approaches, we hope to fill three main gaps: 1) Analysing the effect with 
data on country-level productivity (rather than revenue); 2) Using a more diverse set of 
oil-exporting countries, and 3) Implementing panel estimation methods that require 
large-N and large-T data structure. The previous literature points to the second point as 
a possible extension of current work, and the first and third points are feasible only with 
a dataset like ours. We now continue with a discussion of our dataset and descriptive 
statistics.   
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3.4 Data. 
 
3.4.1 Sources and format 
The main sources of data are Penn World Table version 7.1, Wood Mackenzie’s (WM) 
Global Economic Model (GEM), and BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy. Table 
3.2 below lists all the key variables and their sources.  
Variable Abbreviation Description Source 
Real exchange 
rate 
rer 
Real exchange rate (local currency 
units per I$) 
PWT 7.1 
Oil rents per 
capita 
oilrents_pc 
Total oil rents (constant million 2005 
US$) divided by population 
Wood Mackenzie 
& BP 
Real GDP per 
capita 
rgdpch 
PPP converted GDP per capita chain 
series (2005 I$) 
PWT 7.1 
Brent price brent Brent oil price (2005 US$) 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Openness to trade openc Openness at current prices (%)6 PWT 7.1 
Table 3.1. Key variables and sources 
 
The dataset has a panel format and covers 42 countries over up to 45 years – 1965 
through 2009. However, the panel is unbalanced with partial gaps in most countries’ 
time series. The shortest time series available are for India, Azerbaijan, and China with 
11, 12 and 13 years of data. On average, the dataset has 28 years of data for each of the 
42 countries for a total of 1190 observations of oil rents. Table 3.3 provides summary 
statistics for key variables and their natural logarithms, where appropriate. Table 3.4 
below outlines the number of years available for each country. 
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 1190 1426 3374 -20389 39331 
ln(oil rents per capita) 1190 5.00 3.29 -9.92 10.58 
Real exchange rate 1190 1.75 1.01 0.21 15.00 
ln(real exchange rate) 1190 0.44 0.49 -1.54 2.71 
Real GDP per capita 1190 14270 16465 612 118771 
ln(real GDP per 
capita) 
1190 8.97 1.12 6.42 11.68 
Brent 45 38.43 19.77 15.07 91.12 
ln(brent) 45 3.53 0.48 2.71 4.51 
Openness to trade 1190 73.98 40.07 14.68 354.11 
Table 3.3 Coverage by variable (N + T dimension)  
                                                 
6 Defined as the sum of exports and imports as a fraction of GDP 
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Countries / Variables Country code Number of years OPEC D107 
Algeria DZA 45  
Angola AGO 24  
Argentina ARG 18 - - 
Australia AUS 40 - - 
Azerbaijan AZE 12 - 
Brazil BRA 17 - - 
Brunei BRN 40 - 
Canada CAN 29 - - 
China CHN 13 - - 
Colombia COL 24 - - 
Congo, Republic of COG 36 - 
Denmark DNK 37 - - 
Ecuador ECU 13  
Egypt EGY 45 - 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 18 - 
Gabon GAB 45 - 
India IND 11 - - 
Indonesia IDN 42 - - 
Iraq IRQ 40  
Italy ITA 45 - - 
Kazakhstan KAZ 15 - 
Libya LBY 37  
Malaysia MYS 37 - 
Mexico MEX 16 - - 
Nigeria NGA 36  
Norway NOR 32 - 
Oman OMN 36 - 
Peru PER 30 - - 
Qatar QAT 24  
Romania ROM 21 - - 
Russia RUS 25 - 
Saudi Arabia SAU 40  
Sudan SDN 15 - 
Syria SYR 36 - 
Thailand THA 25 - - 
Trinidad &Tobago TTO 35 - 
Tunisia TUN 43 - - 
United Arab Emirates ARE 24  
United Kingdom GBR 41 - - 
Venezuela VEN 21  
Vietnam VNM 20 - 
Yemen YEM 24 - 
 
Table 3.4 Coverage by country (time dimension) and subsample 
composition 
 
                                                 
7 Countries, in which oil rents exceed 10% of GDP in 2008 
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In addition to the variables that directly measure countries’ productivity levels – oil 
rents per capita and real GDP per capita – we have also included the Brent oil price as 
well as openness to trade at current prices. Both variables have been widely used as 
controls in the Balassa-Samuelson literature. Oil price is included to control for the 
direct impact of its change on the real exchange rate of the oil-exporting countries, 
which has been shown to be the case for oil exporters (see Chinn (2000), Egert et al. 
(2006), and Korhonen and Juurikkala (2009)). Openness to trade has also been shown to 
affect the real exchange rate directly, however, unlike the oil price, which has a negative 
relationship with the real exchange rate, there is some controversy regarding the sign of 
the relationship (see Egert et al. (2006) for discussion). Most studies, however, find that 
trade liberalisation results in currency depreciation (Kim and Korhonen (2005), Njindan 
Iyke (2017)), so the sign of the relationship is expected to be positive.  
 
3.4.2 Construction of oil rents per capita and its natural log 
 
As an intermediate step to calculating total oil rents, we calculate a cost ratio. This 
interim variable is the ratio of total costs and gross revenue from Wood Mackenzie’s 
GEM. The former consists of capital and operating costs, which are summed to get total 
costs. Due to the nature and coverage of GEM data (further explained in section 3.4.3 
below), revenues from Wood Mackenzie are not used directly in our estimations. 
Instead, we calculate oil revenues using BP production figures and Brent price series 
obtained from Datastream. These steps are summarised in table 3.5: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 (𝑊𝑀) + 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥 (𝑊𝑀) 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 (𝑊𝑀)
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 (𝑊𝑀)
 
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 == 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐵𝑃) × 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 × (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) 
Table 3.5. Construction of oil rents  
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3.4.3 Data treatment and limitations 
 
All key variables with the exception of 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐—expressed as a %—are used in natural 
logarithm form.8 One important limitation of Wood Mackenzie's GEM data was its 
coverage. The database was structured based on concessions and exploration license 
areas. To get an idea of the whole country’s petroleum industry, we aggregated the 
granular data points. In some cases, however, Wood Mackenzie’s coverage of the 
country’s production was limited to certain areas only. This posed a problem for the oil 
rents variable, since the underlying assumption of our calculation shown in section 3.4.2 
is that the cost ratio is applicable to the whole country. This may not hold if the GEM 
database’s coverage of the country is quite limited. To resolve this, we impose a 
restriction that an oil rents observation is used only if WM’s field-by-field cost 
estimations cover at least 10% of the country’s production as listed by BP. This 
procedure discards observations where the WM data is less likely to be representative of 
the country as a whole. As far as we know, the gaps in Wood Mackenzie's data are 
basically random9 with respect to the relationship that we are esimating, as they have 
arisen from the histories of the various data sets which were collected or acquired by 
Wood Mackenzie around the world at different times; the gaps are largest in the first 
years in which WM has data on a country, but this is not necessarily when the country 
began production. Thus dropping these observations should not bias our results. Figures 
                                                 
8 In a small number of year and country combinations, per capita oil rents were observed to be negative. 
These tend to occur in countries with relatively small economies and in years just after a discovery when 
substantial upstream investment is taking place within the petroleum industry such that total costs exceed 
gross revenue (examples include Australia, in 1970-71, Brunei in 1970-1973, etc). The negative numbers 
posed a data treatment issue while transforming the variable with the natural log function. To preserve 
symmetry during the transformation, we used the negative log of the absolute values of negative entries.  
There are of course a variety of approaches when dealing with negative observations in the context of a 
logarthmic transformations (dropping the observations, Winsorizing, adding a constant, etc.) but: (i) these 
approaches generally did not preserve symmetry, and (ii) the choice of transformation does not appear to 
affect any of the main qualitative findings anyhow.  
9 The 10% threshold affects 8 out of 42 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Columbia, Ecuador, 
India and Romania) in at least one year, and 71 out of 1261 observations overall. The years affected span 
the whole range from 1960s to the 1990s, with the average year of a dropped observation being 1982 
relative to the whole sample average of 1993.  
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3.1 and 3.2 below facilitate visualisation of the resulting series for all the countries in 
the dataset in two selected years – 2000 and 2009, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.1. Natural logarithm of oil rents per capita in 2000 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Natural logarithm of oil rents per capita in 2009 
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3.4.4 Country coverage and subsamples 
 
Since we expect to observe a stronger evidence for our hypothesis in oil-dependent 
countries, we focus on subsamples of countries: OPEC countries and those in which oil 
rents exceed 10% of GDP in 2008 – referred to as “D10” countries (these categories are 
obviously not exclusive). Table 3.4 above shows which countries OPEC and D10 
categories consist of and table 3.6 below summarises the key variables for each 
subsample. 
Oil rents per capita in OPEC and D10 countries are considerably higher than in the rest 
of the world – the mean oil rents (in 2005 US$) per capita for OPEC and D10 countries 
are about $2800 and $2200 per capita, respectively, whereas that for the rest of the 
countries is $150 per capita. Note here that OPEC is a subset of D10 countries and that 
not all OPEC countries are covered by our dataset. It should be noted that Indonesia 
wasn’t included into OPEC countries because it was often a marginal member due to 
relatively low exports – it originally joined in 1962, but left in 2009 after being a net 
importer for some years, then re-joined in 2016 and finally suspended its membership 
by the end of the year. 
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OPEC 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 2821 4252 -114 32066 
ln(oil rents per capita) 6.88 1.84 -4.74 10.38 
Real exchange rate 1.67 1.11 0.21 7.76 
ln(real exchange rate) 0.35 0.61 -1.54 2.05 
Real GDP per capita 16161 21983 976 118771 
ln(real GDP per capita) 8.90 1.24 6.88 11.68 
Openness to trade 85.59 48.72 23.61 354.11 
N / n 10 / 275 
          
 
D10 
  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 2206 4090 -20389 39331 
ln(oil rents per capita) 5.94 3.26 -9.92 10.58 
Real exchange rate 1.83 1.16 0.21 15.00 
ln(real exchange rate) 0.46 0.53 -1.54 2.71 
Real GDP per capita 14467 18992 612 118771 
ln(real GDP per capita) 8.86 1.20 6.42 11.68 
Openness to trade 87.30 42.41 14.77 354.11 
N / n 26 / 738 
          
  World (excl. D10) 
  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 151 233 -237 1534 
ln(oil rents per capita) 3.47 2.73 -5.47 7.34 
Real exchange rate 1.62 0.69 0.64 4.88 
ln(real exchange rate) 0.40 0.41 -0.45 1.58 
Real GDP per capita 13948 11185 712 40820 
ln(real GDP per capita) 9.15 0.96 6.57 10.62 
Openness to trade 52.24 23.02 14.68 151.71 
N / n 16 / 452 
          
  World 
  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Oil rents per capita 1426 3374 -20389 39331 
ln(oil rents per capita) 5.00 3.29 -9.92 10.58 
Real exchange rate 1.75 1.01 0.21 15.00 
ln(real exchange rate) 0.44 0.49 -1.54 2.71 
Real GDP per capita 14270 16465 612 118771 
ln(real GDP per capita) 8.97 1.12 6.42 11.68 
Openness to trade 73.98 40.07 14.68 354.11 
N / n 42 / 1190 
Table 3.6. Descriptive statistics by subsample  
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To get a better understanding of how the key variables behave, we refer to the following 
figures.  
 
Figure 3.3. Natural log of real exchange rate across time 
 
Figure 3.4. Natural log of real exchange rate across time in OPEC 
countries 
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 show the distribution and evolution over time of the real exchange 
rate in OPEC countries and the rest of the world. With the exception of the early years 
in the dataset, OPEC countries’ real exchange rates behave similarly to the rest of the 
world.  
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Figure 3.5. Natural log of oil rents per capita 
 
Figure 3.6. Natural log of oil rents per capita in OPEC countries 
In figures 3.5 and 3.6, we turn to our main explanatory variable, oil rents per capita. 
Unsurprisingly and as previously observed, OPEC countries have higher per capita oil 
rents than the rest of the world.  
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 below (GDP figures) show that although mean GDP for OPEC 
countries is very similar to the global average (see table 3.6), the series behaves 
differently across time. For instance, global GDP appears to have a positive time trend, 
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whereas this is much less pronounced in OPEC countries. This is partially due to the 
fluctuations in oil prices or oil production in some years, since oil rents constitute a 
relatively large portion of these countries’ GDPs.  
 
Figure 3.7. Natural log of real GDP per capita over time  
 
Figure 3.8. Natural log of real GDP per capita over time in OPEC 
countries 
Finally, figures 3.9 and 3.10 below combine the key variables in question. Casual 
inspection reveals a negative relationship between real exchange rate and oil rents per 
capita. This is along the lines of what theory predicts and will be discussed in detail in 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
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the rest of the chapter. Interestingly, the OPEC subsample has a clearer and more 
negative relationship based on figure 13.10. This provides preliminary evidence for B-S 
hypothesis and will be investigated further.  
 
Figure 3.9. Real exchange rate versus oil rents per capita 
 
Figure 3.10. Real exchange rate versus oil rents in OPEC countries  
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3.4.5 Individual country statistics and plots 
 
This section aims to provide further clarity on individual countries in our dataset by 
summarising and graphing key variables. Generally, we observe a negative relationship 
between the logarithm of real exchange rates, 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟, and the main explanatory variable, 
which is the logarithm of per capita oil rents, 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐. The simple correlation 
coefficient between the two variables using the whole dataset is −0.26. 10 This 
coefficient is −0.32 when the sample is restricted to D10 countries. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that we observe this relationship in most of the countries in the dataset. 
Angola and Norway are shown below as examples.  
 
 
Figure 3.11. Real exchange rates and oil rents per capita in Angola  
                                                 
10 
Recall that the exchange rate here is defined as national currency per US dollar, so that an increase in 
the variable represents a depreciation. Thus the -0.26 correlation implies that a rise in oil rents is 
associated with an appreciation (i.e. a decrease in lrer). 
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Figure 3.12. Real exchange rates and oil rents per capita in Norway 
Unsurprisingly, not all countries follow this pattern. An example is Australia, where the 
real exchange rate fluctuates while per capita oil rents have been fairly stable. The 
Australian real exchange rate is mainly driven by other factors – the mean oil rents in 
Australia are 1.3% of GDP and they have never exceeded 4% of GDP.  
 
Figure 3.13. Real exchange rates versus oil rents per capita in 
Australia 
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3.5 Unit root tests. 
 
The first step of the analysis is to test whether the variables are stationary or non-
stationary, since this will determine the appropriate estimation technique to be used 
later.   
One of the early panel unit root tests is the Levin and Lin test, which was first 
introduced in 1992. Nowadays, the most commonly used tests in applied research are 
LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu (2002)), IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)), Hadri (2000) and 
the Fisher-type tests (1932). Preference is generally given to tests that can be applied to 
unbalanced panels, that is tests that do not assume a common unit root process (like 
LLC and Hadri) or require the same number of observations in all the panels (like IPS). 
To overcome these problems we use the Fisher-type test, proposed by Maddala and Wu 
(1999), which carries out individual independent unit root tests and then combines the 
p-values. The test doesn’t restrict panels to have the same number of observations or the 
same number of lags.  Another useful property of the test is that it can combine 
significance levels from different individual unit root tests. In order to potentially 
improve on the size and power properties, another option would be to restrict the 
samples to have the same number of observations to perform other panel unit root tests. 
However Madala and Wu (1999) showed that the Fisher test performs better in the 
Monte-Carlo studies compared to LLC or IPS, so given the trade-off introduced by the 
loss of some observations, the Fisher-type test would seem to be the best choice here. 
Also, Pesaran (2012) notes that there is no theoretical basis for the homogeneous AR 
structure in the context of testing the PPP hypothesis, which makes LLC and Hadri tests 
even less attractive for this analysis. Davidson and Mackinon (2004) compared the ADF 
to the PP test and found the ADF test to exhibit better power properties in finite 
samples.  
The nature of the data in principle would assume N (number of panel units) is fixed and 
T (number of time periods) tends to infinity, which is reasonable for some panels. 
However, we have an unbalanced panel and N is larger than an average number of 
observations per country. 
Table 3.7 below reports the results of the Fisher-type test that utilises individual ADF 
regressions. The number of lags varies from zero to two, and all tests are performed 
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with and without a trend. The null hypothesis states that all the panels contain unit root. 
The default significance level is chosen to be 5%. 
Variable Trend Number 
of lags 
Test 
statistic 
Probability Stationary or not  
lrer No 0 82.53       0.525 All panels are non-stationary 
No 1 139.81        0.000 At least some panels are stationary 
No 2 122.10      0.004 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 0 84.29        0.471 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 1 181.74        0.000 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 2 135.01        0.000 At least some panels are stationary 
loilrents_pc No 0 229.41        0.000 At least some panels are stationary 
No 1 206.76        0.000 At least some panels are stationary 
No 2 135.83        0.000 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 0 189.61        0.000 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 1 201.63        0.000 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 2 129.34        0.001 At least some panels are stationary 
lrgdpch No 0 67.58        0.905 All panels are non-stationary 
No 1 80.99        0.573 All panels are non-stationary 
No 2 81.70        0.551 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 0   70.87         0.846 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 1 130.73        0.001 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 2 71.73        0.828 All panels are non-stationary 
openc No 0 159.09        0.000 At least some panels are stationary 
No 1 132.40        0.001 At least some panels are stationary 
No 2 98.88        0.128 All panels are non-stationary 
Yes 0 132.85        0.001 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 1 124.98        0.002 At least some panels are stationary 
Yes 2 64.61        0.943 All panels are non-stationary 
 
Table 3.7. Panel unit root tests. 
It can be seen from table 3.7 that 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟 appears to be non-stationary if no lags are 
included, but when at least one lag is included we reject the null of non-stationarity of 
all the panels. 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐 exhibits somewhat opposite behaviour  - when two lags are 
included we can’t reject the null of non-stationarity of all the panels. The Fisher test 
strongly suggests that 𝑙𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ is non-stationary – the results hold for five out of six 
specifications. However, inclusion of a trend combined with 1 lag rejects the null. For 
𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 the null is always rejected. 
The Fisher-type tests have a significant drawback – the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity implies all panels are non-stationary against the alternative that some are 
stationary which isn’t a particularly interesting or useful question to answer. Combined 
with low power properties when the number of observations is small, the test is 
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informative, but ultimately looking at the individual unit root tests can be more practical 
as it is unlikely that variables in all the panels will exhibit the same order of integration, 
especially given the number of observation differs by country. The individual ADF test 
results are presented in tables A.1-A.4 of the Appendix and summarised results are 
presented in table 3.8. 
Variable Trend Number 
of lags 
Number of countries (out of 
42) for which the null 
hypothesis11 is rejected at 
the 5% s.l. 
Fraction of countries 
for which the null 
hypothesis is not 
rejected 
loilrents_pc No 0 10 76% 
loilrents_pc No 1 6 86% 
loilrents_pc No 2 5 88% 
loilrents_pc Yes 0 8 81% 
loilrents_pc Yes 1 8 81% 
loilrents_pc Yes 2 6 86% 
lrer No 0 3 93% 
lrer No 1 8 81% 
lrer No 2 5 88% 
lrer Yes 0 4 91% 
lrer Yes 1 7 83% 
lrer Yes 2 6 86% 
lrgdpch No 0 2 95% 
lrgdpch No 1 2 95% 
lrgdpch No 2 4 91% 
lrgdpch Yes 0 1 98% 
lrgdpch Yes 1 5 88% 
lrgdpch Yes 2 2 95% 
openc No 0 4 91% 
openc No 1 5 88% 
openc No 2 2 95% 
openc Yes 0 5 88% 
openc Yes 1 5 88% 
openc Yes 2 0 100% 
 
Table 3.8. Country-by-country ADF tests summarised. 
 
𝑙𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 was tested using  Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) (ERS) DF-GLS test, 
which is a more powerful modification of the ADF test. The lag length is chosen 
according to MAIC, the modified Akaike information criterion (Ng and Perron (2001)), 
and set to 1, however the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 10 % significance level 
for up to 9 lags, which confirms that 𝑙𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is non-stationary around a linear trend. 45 
                                                 
11 The null hypothesis is that the unit root is present 
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observations are utilised, which corresponds to the maximum number of observations in 
the dataset.  
 
Variable Trend Number 
of lags 
Test 
statistic 
Rejection Stationary or not  
lbrent No 1 -1.41 Do not reject at 10% s.l. Series is non-stationary 
lbrent Yes 1 -1.82 Do not reject at 10% s.l. Series is non-stationary 
 
Table 3.9.  Log of Brent oil price unit root test results. 
 
Table 3.8 suggests that for all five variables most panels are non-stationary – according 
to a combination of Schwert (1989) criterion, which determines the maximum lag 
length, and MAIC the optimal lag length varies from 1 to 2 lags for all tests, so for at 
least 80% of all panels the null of non-stationarity cannot be rejected. We will proceed 
the analysis treating all variables as non-stationary. 
 
3.6 Methodology and estimations.  
 
3.6.1 Testing for cointegration 
Having just established the non-stationarity properties of the variables, the next step is 
to test for the existence of the cointegrating relationship between lrer and oilrentc_pc 
and potentially other determinants of the real exchange rate. If the variables prove to 
have a long-run relationship, then the dynamic ordinary least squares estimator (DOLS) 
introduced by Stock and Watson (1993), the mean-group estimator (MG) of Pesaran and 
Smith (1995) and the pooled mean-group estimator (PMG) of Pesaran et al. (1999) will 
be used to evaluate the magnitude of the coefficients in the long-run equation. The 
short-run dynamics will also be discussed. The DOLS estimator has been frequently 
used in the literature in the context of the B-S hypothesis, for example MacDonald and 
Ricci (2007) and Chong et al. (2012), but the MG and PMG estimators are not yet 
prevalent in the B-S literature, despite some analyses along these lines, such as 
Camarero (2008).  
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OLS estimation of the cointegrated non-stationary variables also produces consistent 
estimates, but they generally do not follow a Gaussian distribution, so the conventional 
test statistics are meaningless. Stock and Watson’s (1993) DOLS was suggested as a 
solution to this problem. The estimator is asymptotically efficient and normally 
distributed - this is achieved by the inclusion of the leads and lags of the differenced 
explanatory variables, which orthogonalizes the error term with respect to the 
innovations in the regressors. This has the added advantage of eliminating potential 
endogeneity between the error term and the stationary component of the non-stationary 
variables. The asymptotically valid standard errors can be computed using a HAC 
estimator; Newey-West standard errors will be used for these purposes. According to 
Kao and Chiang (2001) DOLS outperforms panel OLS and fully modified least squares 
estimator (FMOLS) by having smaller bias and smaller finite sample size distortions. 
The DOLS equation has the following form: 
                           𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ ∆
𝑏
𝑘=−𝑎 𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡                                   (3.1) 
where 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the real exchange rate of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 measured in natural 
logarithm, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of explanatory variables, 𝛽 is the vector of the long-run 
DOLS coefficients, 𝛼𝑖 are the country fixed effects, 𝜃 is a vector of the coefficients on 
the lags and leads of the first-differenced explanatory variables, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the error 
term. Maximum lag and lead lengths are shown by 𝑎 and 𝑏, respectively.  
To test for the presence of cointegration in the context of panel data, Pedroni (1999, 
2004) suggested seven test-statistics in the Engle-Granger tradition. The null hypothesis 
of the tests is no cointegration. Four statistics are panel, three are group. Panel statistics 
assume homogeneity of the panels and pool the data across the within dimension, 
constraining the coefficients to be the same. Group statistics allow for heterogeneity of 
the panels and calculate averages for the statistics from individual time-series 
estimations. The latter are more relevant for our estimation, because it would be 
reasonable to assume that coefficients could vary across countries. The residuals for the 
Pedroni test are obtained from the long-run DOLS equation that has the following form: 
              𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ ∆
1
𝑘=−1 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡           (3.2) 
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The results for the Pedroni tests are presented in table 3.10.  In all specifications for this 
test and for the subsequent DOLS estimation, one lead and one lag are used in order to 
avoid constraining the number of observations, particularly in the case of countries with 
reduced number of years - a larger lag length would only be feasible if some countries 
are dropped.  Furthermore, our main findings are robust to an increased number of leads 
and lags in constrained datasets. The table indicates that four out of seven tests reject the 
null of no-cointegration at the 10% significance level for the whole sample and even 
more strongly for the D10 countries. However, there seems to be no cointegrating 
relationship found in countries – none of the seven statistics is significantly different 
from zero (the test statistic has standard normal distribution under the null). The result is 
somewhat unexpected; it suggests that the productivity bias hypothesis doesn’t explain 
movements in the real exchange rate through the productivity of the oil sector in the 
countries where the oil sector accounts for a large fraction of tradable exports.  
 
Test statistic (1) (2) (3) 
Panel 
v-statistic 2.823*** 1.906** 0.463 
rho-statistic -2.021** -2.109** -0.963 
t-statistic -1.611 -2.203** -1.370 
ADF-statistic -1.016 -1.508 -0.785 
Group 
rho-statistic 0.136 -0.822 0.619 
t-statistic -1.876* -3.180*** -0.532 
ADF-statistic -1.915* -0.530 -0.045 
Subsample World D10 OPEC 
N 42 26 10 
Lags 1 1 1 
 
Table 3.10 Pedroni (1999, 2004) cointegration test results. 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
As the Pedroni test results don’t appear to be conclusive for the whole sample and D10 
countries, we conduct Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests, which unlike the Pedroni 
tests can be made robust to cross-sectional dependence. The tests are based on 
estimating an ECM-type equation (equation 3.3) and testing whether the panels are 
error-correcting. The original test has four test statistics – all four share a common null 
hypothesis, but they have different alternative hypotheses. The tests are: Gt, Ga, Pt and 
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Pa. Gt and Ga test the null of no cointegration (𝜑𝑖 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖) against the alternative 
that at least one panel contains cointegration (𝜑𝑖 < 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖). Pt and Pa 
also have a null hypothesis of no cointegration (𝜑𝑖 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖), but the alternative is 
stated as all panels exhibit cointegration (𝜑𝑖 < 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖). We will focus on Pt and Pa 
because some panels have very small numbers of observations and Gt and Ga are more 
likely to suffer from low power, which is exacerbated by the inclusion of the lags and 
leads into the ECM used to estimate the residuals – even fewer degrees of freedom are 
left for the test. The lag length is again set to one to preserve the sample, however, if the 
sample is restricted to countries with larger number of observations and the optimal leg 
length is selected according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) the results remain 
unchanged.  
∆𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖(𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 −  𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1)  + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ ∆
𝑝
𝑘=1 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝛿𝑖 +
                                                   ∑ ∆𝑝𝑘=0 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝜃𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡                                    (3.3) 
where  𝜑𝑖 is a speed of adjustment coefficient, 𝛿𝑖 is a (px1) vector of coefficients on the 
lagged first-differenced dependent variable and 𝜃𝑖 is a ((p+1)x1) vector of coefficients 
on the lagged first-differenced regressor, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 denotes the error term.  
The results of the Westerlund cointegration test are presented in table 3.11. It can be 
seen in columns (1) and (2) that for both the whole sample and D10 countries, the Pt 
statistic suggests that the null of no cointegration should be rejected, whereas Pa cannot 
reject the null at any conventional significance level.  Column (3), similarly to Pedroni 
test results, provides strong evidence against any cointegrating relationship in OPEC 
countries. Columns (4) and (5) retest the hypothesis for the whole world and D10 
countries with OPEC countries being excluded from the samples and the results 
strongly indicate cointegration for the remaining countries – all four test statistics are 
rejected at the 1% significance level. 
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Test statistic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pt 
z-value -2.518*** -1.893** -0.532 -3.732*** -2.915*** 
p-value 0.006 0.029 0.297 0.000 0.002 
Pa 
z-value -1.183 -0.568 0.518 -3.843*** -2.758*** 
p-value 0.118 0.285 0.698 0.000 0.003 
       Subsample   World D10 OPEC World-OPEC D10-OPEC 
N 42 26 10 32 16 
Lags 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 3.11. Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests. 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Cointegration tests have also been performed using other explanatory variables - oil 
price and real per capita GDP instead of the oil sector productivity. The results suggest 
that the real exchange rate both for the whole sample and for D10 countries (excluding 
OPEC countries) is cointegrated with the oil price, while no cointegration is found in 
OPEC countries. Real GDP per capita doesn’t exhibit any long-run relationship with the 
real exchange rate in the whole sample or in D10 countries, but there is weak evidence 
of potential relationship in OPEC countries (see table A.5 of the Appendix for the 
results). 
Summing up, the cointegration tests carried out have strongly suggested that there is a 
long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and the productivity of the oil 
sector in most oil-exporting countries in our sample, but this relationship does not exist 
in OPEC countries. However, OPEC countries are kept in the sample for the future 
analyses, so the results that follow below have to be interpreted with this caveat. 
Possible explanations for the failure of the B-S hypothesis in OPEC countries are 
discussed in section 3.6.4.   
 
3.6.2 Dynamic OLS Results 
 
As previously discussed, DOLS estimations are used as a robust alternative to Panel 
OLS. The number of observations for some panel units are limited and pooling the data 
can improve the power of our results. The main interest lies in the long-run relationship 
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between the real exchange rate and the main explanatory variable, oil rents per capita. A 
panel cointegration model using DOLS is implemented to treat the non-stationarity of 
our variables appropriately. As noted earlier, this approach has been used extensively 
within the B-S literature. Similarly to section 3.6.1, one lag and one lead are used such 
that 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 1, and our main findings are robust to an increased number of leads and 
lags. Time fixed effects are excluded in our model, as these were observed to have little 
effect on our results. Furthermore, unlike in Gubler and Sax (2011), where time fixed 
effects were critical, our dependent variable is calculated relative to the US dollar.  
Having established the existence of panel cointegration in non-OPEC countries in 
section 3.6.1, we interpret 𝛽 in equation 3.1 as the long-run coefficient. In addition to 
estimating this long-run relationship, we include an error correction specification to 
capture the short-run dynamic adjustment of the real exchange rate towards equilibrium. 
The error correction model (ECM) has the following form:  
Δ𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜑𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ Δ𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑗𝜙𝑗
𝑗=1
+ ∑ Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗𝜔𝑗
1
𝑗=0
+  𝜈𝑖𝑡 (3.4) 
where  
𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 −  𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 − 𝛼𝑖 − ∑ Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃
1
𝑘=−1
 (3.5) 
and 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 is estimated as the residuals of equation 3.1,  
The empirical results are shown in table 3.12 below. Columns (1) through (4) use the 
whole sample excluding OPEC countries, whereas columns (5) through (8) restrict it to 
D10 countries excluding OPEC, and (9) through (12) to OPEC countries only. In each 
of these cases, the model specification becomes increasingly more general such that 
columns (1), (5), and (9) are based a DOLS regression of real exchange rate on oil rents 
per capita. In turn, columns (2), (6), and (10) come from regressions with oil rents per 
capita and oil price per barrel as explanatory variables, etc. 
In almost all specifications and subsamples, we find a negative coefficient that is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level on the per capita oil rents variable. A 
larger coefficient, in absolute value, is observed in the case of OPEC countries. This 
result corroborates the B-S hypothesis in our sample and suggests that the impact of oil 
rents per capita on real exchange rate is greater in OPEC countries than the rest of the 
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world. Since these long-run coefficients have an elasticity interpretation, a 10% increase 
in oil rents per capita in D10 countries leads to a 0.2% appreciation of the currency 
based on column (8). In the case of OPEC countries, column (12) implies that a 10% 
increase in per capita oil rents implies approximately 2% appreciation of the currency. 
However, results for OPEC countries could be spurious as we failed to establish 
cointegration in the earlier section. 
3.6.3 Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group Results 
 
In addition to the DOLS approach, we re-estimate the ECM using Mean Group and 
Pooled Mean Group estimators. Although not very common within the B-S literature, 
these estimators exploit the large-N, large-T panel structure effectively. The general 
model has the following form:  
𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜂′𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0
+ 𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.6) 
 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a (kx1) vector of explanatory variables for group 𝑖, 𝜇𝑖 represent fixed 
effects, 𝜆𝑖𝑗 are scalar coefficients, and 𝜂𝑖𝑗 is a kx1 vector of coefficients to be estimated. 
𝜇𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denote country fixed effects and the error term, respectively. Assuming 𝑝 =
𝑞 = 1, this general model can then be re-parametrised into the ECM form as follows:  
Δ𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖(𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖
′𝑋𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗
∗ Δ𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜂𝑖𝑗
′∗Δ𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞−1
𝑗=0 +
                                                                  𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                         (3.7) 
 
where 𝜑𝑖 = −(1 − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1 , 𝛽𝑖 = ∑ 𝜂𝑖𝑗/(1 − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑘)𝑘 = − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=𝑗+1
𝑞
𝑗=0 , with 𝑗 =
1, 2, … , 𝑝 − 1, and 𝜂𝑖𝑗
∗ = − ∑ 𝜂𝑖𝑚
𝑞
𝑚=𝑗+1 , with 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑞 − 1. 
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Table 3.12. Dynamic OLS results. 
 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
loilrents_pc 
-0.023*** -0.013** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.008 -0.027*** -0.022** -0.250*** -0.277* -0.229* -0.217 
(0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.377) (0.003) (0.01) (0.001) (0.077) (0.088) (0.100) 
lbrent — 
-0.106*** -0.114*** -0.131*** 
— 
-0.162*** -0.167*** -0.166*** 
— 
0.021 0.136 0.112 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.931) (0.543) (0.608) 
lrgdpch — — 
0.247*** 0.125*** 
— — 
0.316*** 0.215*** 
— — 
-0.752** -0.598* 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.044) (0.078) 
openc — — — 
0.004*** 
— — — 
0.004*** 
— — — 
-0.003 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.193) 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.225*** -0.228*** -0.236*** -0.231*** -0.235*** -0.251*** -0.260*** -0.258*** -0.116*** -0.114*** -0.079 -0.080 
Half 
Lifetime 
(years) 
2.72 2.67 2.57 2.64 2.59 2.39 2.30 2.33 5.62 5.75 8.48 8.36 
Subsample World excl. OPEC D10 excl. OPEC OPEC 
N 32 16 10 
Number of 
observations 
819 415 245 
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In most cases, including ours, the parameter of interest is 𝜑𝑖, which represents the speed 
of adjustment of the real exchange rate towards the long-run equilibrium. As in all ECM 
parameterisations, if the long-run relationship exists among the variables, the speed of 
adjustment is expected to be negative and significant. The parameter vector 𝛽𝑖
′ contains 
the long-run coefficients and has an important interpretation in our context.  
As noted by Blackburne and Frank (2007) when 𝑁 and 𝑇 are large, equation 3.7 can be 
estimated by a few methods; the spectrum of estimators runs from a fixed effects 
estimation to Pesaran and Smith’s (1995) Mean Group estimator. If the former is 
implemented, the intercepts are allowed to vary across panel units, but not the slope 
coefficients. However, FE is consistent only if the slope parameters are homogeneous. 
If they are not, the MG estimator, which is on the other end of the spectrum from the 
FE, should be used. MG estimates a separate set of coefficients for each panel unit and 
then calculates the arithmetic average, which allows all the parameters to vary across 
countries, including error variances. In our context, this approach has an a priori 
advantage, since the countries in our dataset have some heterogeneous characteristics. A 
hybrid approach between these two estimators is Pesaran, Shin, and Smith’s (1999) 
Pooled Mean Group estimator, which pools the long-run coeffeicients accross panels, 
while averaging intercepts, short-run coefficinets and errror variances. In order to select 
the appropriate approach between MG and PMG estimator, we use a traditional 
Hausman test. As usual, if the null hypothesis that the two sets of coefficients are not 
systematically different is not rejected, PMG is preferred as a more efficient estimator. 
Otherwise, MG is more appropriate. Table 3.13 shows the results from the models that 
have been selected by the test. 
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Dependent variable: 
Δlrer 
            
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Hausman (MG vs 
PMG) 
PMG PMG DOLS DOLS PMG PMG DOLS DOLS PMG PMG DOLS DOLS 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.195*** -0.247*** -0.225*** -0.228*** -0.214*** -0.272*** -0.235*** -0.251*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.116*** -0.114*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) 
Long-run 
Coefficients 
                        
loilrents_pc 
-0.068*** -0.043*** -0.023*** -0.013** -0.065*** -0.008 -0.023*** -0.008 -1.950*** -2.053*** -0.250*** -0.277* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.200) (0.004) (0.377) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.077) 
lbrent — 
-0.215*** 
— 
- 
0.106*** — 
-0.528*** 
— 
-0.162*** 
— 
-0.062 
— 
0.021 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.953) (0.931) 
Half Lifetime 
(years) 
3.2 2.4 2.72 2.67 2.9 2.2 2.59 2.39 20.3 21.4 5.62 5.75 
Subsample World excl. OPEC D10 excl. OPEC OPEC 
N 32 16 10 
N x T 883 819 447 415 265 245 
Log likelihood 817.5 847.0 437.5 439.1 376.4 394.1 431.4 431.7 191.9 197.8 415.8 427.7 
 
Table 3.13. ECM estimation results. 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Focussing on columns (1) through (4), we observe negative and statistically significant 
speed of adjustment coefficients across all specifications and estimation techniques. 
These point to the existence of a cointegrating relationship in each specification and 
provide a robustness check to the cointegration tests discussed and presented in section 
3.6.1. Columns (1) and (2) show PMG results, since Hausman tests that MG and PMG 
results are not systematically different failed to reject the null hypothesis. The estimated 
long-run coefficients on oil rents per capita and oil price variables are also statistically 
significant. Using column (2) as an example, we find that a 10% increase in oil rents per 
capita leads to a 0.4% appreciation of the currency. This provides evidence for the B-S 
hypothesis in our dataset, but the effect is economically small. Similarly, a 10% 
increase in the per barrel oil price implies a 2% appreciation of the currency. 
 Half-life is calculated as ln(0.5) / ln (1 + 𝜑), which in this specification gives 
approximately 2.4 years. This implies that we would expect the currency to close half of 
the gaps between its current level and the long-run equilibrium in about 2.4 years. 
DOLS results reproduced here are a subset of those presented in table 3.12 and are 
shown for ease of comparison. Relative to PMG results, DOLS estimates of the long-
run parameters are smaller in absolute value. However, the speed of adjustment as well 
as half-life figures are similar in magnitude. This pattern holds for our smaller D10 
subsample, whose results are shown in columns (5) through (8). PMG estimates for D10 
countries excluding OPEC members generally show a slightly quicker speed of 
adjustment: half-lives are calculated as 3.2 and 2.9 years in columns (1) and (5), 
respectively. This is in agreement with DOLS results, where we observe the same 
pattern in columns (3) and (7) as well as (4) and (8).  
It should be noted that when the oil price is included in the specification for D10 
countries, the oil rents per capita variable loses significance – the estimated coefficient 
becomes closer to zero and the standard error increases dramatically. This implies the 
existence of a relationship between real exchange rate and the oil price only. Moreover, 
the long-run coefficients on oil price are fairly large in absolute terms – when PMG is 
used in (6), the coefficient on the oil price assumes a 5% increase in the value of the 
currency in response to a 10% increase in the oil price. Furthermore, negative and 
significant speed of adjustment coefficients point to a cointegrating relationship 
between real exchange rate and the oil price but not oil rents per capita. This contradicts 
our findings in columns (5) and (7) as well as columns (1) through (4). Estimating the 
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coefficients in question for the whole sample excluding D10 countries reveals a 
surprising result: oil rents per capita have a more robust impact on the real exchange 
rate in countries where oil rents account for less than 10% of GDP in 2008. To see this, 
table 3.14 shows the results of DOLS regressions for this subsample.  
Variables (13) (14) (15) (16) 
loilrents_pc 
-0.024*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
lbrent — 
-0.057* -0.058* -0.108*** 
(0.051) (0.055) (0.000) 
lrgdpch — — 
0.116* -0.123 
(0.056) (0.101) 
openc — — — 
0.008 
(0.157) 
Speed of adjustment -0.207*** -0.200*** -0.188*** -0.164*** 
Half Lifetime (years) 2.99 3.11 3.32 3.87 
Subsample World excl. D10 
N 16 
Number of observations 404 
 
Table 3.14. ECM estimation results for World excluding D10 countries. 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
We see here that inclusion of control variables, such as oil price, real GDP per capita, 
and openness to trade does not have a substantial impact on the coefficient on and 
statistical significance of oil rents per capita – unlike in the case of D10 countries 
excluding OPEC.  
Lastly, we move on to OPEC output shown in columns (9) through (12) of table 3.13. 
We interpret these coefficients cautiously, keeping in mind our discussion of OPEC 
countries in section 3.6.1 on cointegration testing. Firstly, we note that the highly 
significant speed of adjustment coefficients contradicts our earlier findings using panel 
cointegration tests: both PMG and DOLS ECM estimations point to the existence of a 
cointegrating relationship. However, the speed of adjustment coefficients are smaller 
than in the rest of the sample and imply a half-life of about 6 years when using DOLS 
  
97 
and more than 20 years when using PMG. Given that the data is annual and panels on 
average have 28 observations, these results are meaningless despite a highly significant 
speed of adjustment estimate in the regression, which is consistent with the results of 
the Pedroni and Westerlund cointegration tests conducted earlier. Secondly, despite a 
smaller – in absolute value – speed of adjustment coefficient, we observe a larger – 
again in absolute value – long-run coefficient on per capita oil rents. PMG results imply 
elastic long-run coefficients, which suggest that a 10% increase in oil rents per capita 
leads to approximately 20% appreciation of the currency. Although much smaller, 
DOLS estimates of long-run coefficients are larger, in absolute value, than DOLS 
estimates for other subsamples. These coefficients imply a 2.5% appreciation of the 
currency as a result of a 10% increase in oil rents per capita. Thirdly, and finally, we do 
not see the pattern we commented on earlier in columns (6) and (8) of the same table. 
More specifically, adding the per barrel oil price as an additional explanatory variable 
does not have a notable impact on the coefficient for 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐, which is again 
consistent with the Westerlund cointegration test results in section 3.6.1. As a final 
comment, we note the number of panels is small for both OPEC and D10 excluding 
OPEC subsamples. Given the asymptotic properties of PMG estimator and the 
requirement for both 𝑁 and 𝑇 → ∞, we acknowledge the unreliability of these estimates 
and put more weight on DOLS results. We include PMG results as a robustness check 
as opposed to a conclusive estimate.  
In the output table 3.13 above, we have opted for a smaller model specifications 
consisting of per capita oil rents and oil price. This is mainly due to the behaviour of the 
GDP variable and the correlation between the variables. To see this, we turn to table 
3.15 below, which summarises the MG and PMG models estimated using our largest 
subsample.  
Although we observe a negative and statistically significant speed of adjustment 
coefficient across all specifications, long-run coefficients behave unexpectedly with 
larger model specifications. Specifically, comparing columns (2) and (3), we observe 
that the Hausman test null hypothesis is rejected when GDP per capita is included as an 
explanatory variable. This suggests that the long-run coefficient on GDP per capita is 
heterogeneous across countries unlike oil rents per capita and oil price. Estimating a 
simple specification with GDP per capita as the only explanatory variable confirmed 
this observation. Furthermore, the link between oil rents per capita, oil price, and GDP 
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per capita leads to inverted signs on the coefficients of 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 and 𝑙𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ. 
Even though none of these long-run coefficients are statistically significant, this finding 
is surprising. Based on Balassa’s (1964) original work and our findings elsewhere in 
this chapter, we would expect a negative and significant coefficient. Given that the 
speed of adjustment coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero, this 
behaviour could be attributed to the correlation between the three explanatory variables 
in specification (3). Calculating a simple correlation matrix shows that the correlation 
between 𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑝𝑐 and 𝑙𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑐ℎ is approximately 0.3, which appears to be 
sufficiently high to cause misleading results. Due to these observations, we have opted 
for smaller model specifications.  
 
Dependent variable: Δlrer 
   Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hausman (MG vs PMG) PMG PMG MG MG 
Speed of adjustment 
-0.195*** -0.247*** -0.418*** -0.484*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Long-run Coefficients         
loilrents_pc 
-0.068*** -0.043*** 0.088 0.506 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.415) (0.318) 
lbrent — 
-0.215*** -0.207 -1.048 
(0.000) (0.192) (0.223) 
lrgdpch — — 
0.047 0.093 
(0.920) (0.834) 
openc — — — 
0.014** 
(0.019) 
Half Lifetime (years) 3.2 2.4 1.3 1.0 
Subsample World excl. OPEC 
N 32 
N x T 883 
Log likelihood 817.5118 846.9928 1114.142 — 
 
Table 3.15. Comparison of the MG and PMG estimation results. 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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3.6.4 Further investigation of OPEC countries. 
 
The real exchange rates in OPEC countries appear to behave differently from the rest of 
the sample – they didn’t exhibit any cointegrating relationship with oil rents per capita.  
In order to explain the lack of a long-run relationship, a country-by-country 
cointegration tests have been performed. We opted for the traditional Engle and Granger 
(1987) cointegration test, which applies an ADF test to the residuals from a static 
regression of the real exchange rate on the oil rents per capita. The critical values differ 
from the standard ADF test and are provided by Mackinnon (2010). The optimal lag 
length for the test was chosen according to Ng and Perron (1995), but it should be noted 
that the outcomes are robust to the lag length selection. The results are presented in 
table 3.16. As shown in the table, no cointegrating relationship was found for any of 
OPEC countries. Further investigations revealed that real exchange rate and the oil price 
are not cointegrated either (the only exception being Ecuador). If all three variables (oil 
price, oil rents, and the real exchange rate) are used in the same long-run equation, there 
is no cointegration found for any OPEC country. 
Country 
 
Optimal 
lag length 
Test 
statistic 
1% 
cr.value 
5% 
cr.value 
10% 
cr.value 
Number of 
observations 
Angola 0 -1.911 -4.415 -3.615 -3.234 23 
Algeria 0 -1.85 -4.157 -3.479 -3.142 44 
Ecuador 1 -2.19 -4.966 -3.893 -3.417 11 
Iraq 0 -1.508 -4.192 -3.497 -3.155 39 
Libya 0 -1.738 -4.415 -3.615 -3.234 23 
Nigeria 0 -2.338 -4.228 -3.516 -3.168 35 
Qatar 4 -2.779 -4.415 -3.615 -3.234 19 
Saudi Arabia 2 -1.209 -4.415 -3.615 -3.234 21 
UAE 5 -2.169 -4.415 -3.615 -3.234 18 
Venezuela 0 -0.518 -4.5 -3.659 -3.263 20 
 
Table 3.16. Individual countries (OPEC) cointegration tests 
One potential explanation for the difference in the behaviour of OPEC countries from 
the rest of the oil exporters in the sample could be linked to countries’ currency 
regimes. Appreciation of the real exchange rate can happen if either the nominal 
exchange appreciates or the price level increases. The latter change, when caused by an 
increase in productivity of tradables, is the mechanism behind the B-S hypothesis. 
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Devereux (2014) notes that the nominal exchange rate fluctuations introduce noise into 
the estimation of the B-S effect as they tend to change more rapidly compared to the 
price level. In practice, most OPEC countries don’t have free floating currency regimes. 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates all peg their currencies to the US 
dollar and have done so throughout the estimation period. Venezuela pegged their 
currency to the US dollar in 2003. Ecuador has adopted the US dollar as an official 
currency in 2000 after almost two decades of a crawling peg. Iraq’s currency regime is a 
managed float, however the official rate has been pegged to the US dollar at various 
times.  Libya’s currency is pegged to a composite exchange rate anchor.  If a currency is 
pegged it should be easier to separate changes in the real exchange rate attributable to 
the adjustments in the price level compared to the adjustments of the nominal exchange 
rate as the numerator of the real exchange rate stays fixed. It is possible that the long-
run relationship found in D10-OPEC countries is driven by the nominal exchange rate 
rather than the price level adjustments, so the absence of the B-S mechanism is just 
more prominent in OPEC countries. This is exacerbated by the fact that the nominal 
exchange rate in some oil-exporting countries (for example, Russia) will be highly 
responsive to the oil price fluctuations. This phenomenon will be most evident in 
countries where oil represents large fraction of the export share. For example, 83% of 
Sudan’s 2009 exports (Sudan is one of the countries with cointegrating relationship 
between oil rents and the real exchange rate) consisted of crude oil and another 2% of 
refined petroleum oil according to "The Atlas of Economic Complexity". So it is 
possible that the relationship detected earlier is not driven by the B-S mechanism, but is 
driven by the nominal appreciation of the currency in response to the appreciation of its 
exports, demand for which is inelastic. 
In order to test the proposition above Westerlund cointegration tests (described in 
section 3.6.1) have been conducted using log of nominal exchange rate (lxrat) and log 
of PPP price level (lppp) as dependent variables and oil rents per capita as an 
independent variable. The results, presented in table 3.17, negate the proposition – there 
is strong evidence that in non-OPEC countries unlike OPEC countries, both, nominal 
exchange rate and price level are cointegrated with the oil sector productivity, while 
neither of the two are cointegrated with the per capita oil rents in OPEC countries. 
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Dependent 
variable Test statistic (1) (2) (3) 
lxrat 
Pt 
z-value -1.345* -16.5*** -30.8*** 
p-value 0.089 0.000 0.000 
lxrat 
Pa 
z-value 1.2 -8.2*** -10.4*** 
p-value 0.885 0.000 0.000 
lppp 
Pt 
z-value -0.5 -21.0*** -42.8*** 
p-value 0.310 0.000 0.000 
lppp 
Pa 
z-value 1.315 -12.7*** -18.9*** 
p-value 0.906 0.000 0.000 
      
   Subsample OPEC World-OPEC D10-OPEC 
N 10 32 16 
Lags 1 1 1 
    
Table 3.17. Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests. 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Another potential explanation is that some assumptions of the B-S hypothesis are failing 
in the context of OPEC countries. It can be seen in figure 3.14 that most OPEC 
countries appear to have lower price level compared to other countries with similar per 
capita incomes, which suggests that the price level is not adjusting normally as 
productivity in tradables increases. In particular, note Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and 
Libya – all four countries have lower-than-expected price levels, and all four countries 
are characterised by migration policies which admit large numbers of low-wage 
temporary workers.12 These migrants act to depress both wages and productivity in the 
non-tradable sector relative to a country like Norway. Effectively, these countries 
undermine assumption of the B-S hypothesis that the workers can freely move between 
tradable and non-tradable sector, so wages in the non-tradable sector simply do not 
adjust or don’t fully adjust to wages in tradable sector and the overall price level stays 
low.  
                                                 
12 For Libya, we are of course referring to the pre-civil war era contained in our data set. "Migrant workers 
make up the majority of the population in Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (and more than 
80 per cent of the population in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates); while in construction and domestic work 
in Gulf States, migrant workers make up over 95 per cent of the work force." (Labour Migration (Arab States), 
International Labor Organization, Accessed 08/04/2017, http://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/labour-
migration/lang--en/index.htm)). 
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Figure 3.14. Log of per capita income and PPP ratio in OPEC vs. non-OPEC countries 
in 2009 
The behaviour described above combined with low power properties of individual 
cointegration tests means that it is in principle hard to reject the null of no cointegration 
for an individual country even when behaviour does follow the B-S effect and when 
countries exhibit different behaviour we reject OPEC as a whole panel. 
 
3.7 Conclusion. 
 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to identify whether changes in oil sector 
productivity can explain real exchange rate volatility in oil-exporting countries, which 
in turn could explain whether the countries are affected by the Dutch disease or not. The 
analysis was based on the unique dataset that allowed us to calculate profits made in the 
oil sectors in several countries over time and separate the effect of an increase in 
productivity of the oil sector as opposed to the traditional use of GDP as a proxy for 
productivity of the tradables in the context of the B-S hypothesis. If the effect is 
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identified, it carries importance for policy-making, especially in developed countries as 
noted by Chen and Rogoff (2002). 
We found that the B-S mechanism holds in some oil-exporting countries, but doesn’t in 
the others. The relationship was the strongest in oil-exporting countries where oil sector 
productivity constitutes small fraction of the country’s GDP (World-D10 countries) and 
was highly significant for most specifications for the D10-OPEC countries. For all 
countries that are not members of the OPEC, the relationship has been found to be 
significant and the sign is always as expected, however, the magnitude of the effect is 
tiny. The largest observed effect is a 0.7% increase in the real exchange rate in response 
to a 10% in the oil sector productivity.  At the same time, the effect of the oil price 
changes on the real exchange rates is up to 8 times larger than the effect caused by 
changes in productivity.  
In OPEC countries no evidence was found for the B-S mechanism – an increase in oil 
sector productivity doesn’t appear to have any effect on either the nominal exchange 
rate (it has to be noted that most countries have a nominal exchange rate peg) nor on the 
price level. Moreover, unlike Korhonnen and Juurikkala (2009), the real oil price 
proved to have no effect on the real exchange rates of the OPEC countries either. In 
section 3.6.4 we have discussed a potential explanation for this unexpected result – at 
least one of the assumptions of the B-S hypothesis, free movement of labour between 
tradable and non-tradable sector, appears to be failing in some OPEC countries.  
Our overall conclusion is that the B-S hypothesis is likely to hold in most oil-exporting 
countries, however, the magnitude of the effect appears to be very small. This suggests 
that other potential explanations of the resource curse should be considered. Our results 
are consistent with Van der Ploeg (2011), who found that even though the B-S 
mechanism is responsible for the resource curse to a certain extent, the main 
contributors are corruption, low quality of institutions, and underdeveloped financial 
systems that fail to mitigate the high volatility of commodity prices. Also, if the 
deviations from PPP are modelled, it wouldn’t help much to use oil productivity to 
explain the deviations. Future work might revisit this question using data with more 
observations and/or higher frequency.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Does economic growth lead to increased energy consumption? Does increased energy 
consumption lead to economic growth? There are four possibilities: causality is bi-
directional (known as the feedback hypothesis), i.e. energy consumption and GDP drive 
each other; it is unidirectional with energy consumption driving economic growth (the 
growth hypothesis); or vice versa (the conservation hypothesis); and the last one 
assumes no relationship between the two (neutrality hypothesis).  
 
 GDP ⇒ Consumption GDP ⇏ Consumption 
Consumption ⇒ GDP Feedback hypothesis Growth hypothesis 
Consumption ⇏ GDP Conservation hypothesis Neutrality hypothesis 
 
Table 4.1. Four possible causal relationships for energy consumption and GDP 
 
These four hypotheses have been widely tested in the literature in order to identify the 
nature of the relationship, but there has been little consensus. The answer to the 
question, however, has important policy implications. In setting climate policy to deal 
with carbon emissions, for example, it is important to know how much of an effect 
reduced energy consumption might have on economic growth, if indeed there is any 
effect at all. Or consider energy shocks: what is the effect on the economy of a sudden 
change in energy consumption, as might happen after a natural disaster (e.g. Japan’s 
2011 Fukushima earthquake and tsunami, leading to a national shutdown of nuclear 
power stations), or a political crisis (e.g. any of various Middle Eastern wars and civil 
wars over the past 40 years)? 
Earlier studies in the field approached this issue using individual country-level time 
series regressions, which produced conflicting results. Those early studies relied on the 
datasets that spanned short time periods and were likely to suffer from small sample 
problems and produce deceptive results, so in more recent years panel econometric 
methods gained popularity as they could potentially enhance the individual time series 
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approaches by pooling data across countries to improve efficiency of estimations, which 
in turn would improve power properties of many tests involved in the analysis. 
However, little emphasis is given to how we should interpret the results of these panel 
estimations and whether these more efficient estimations are actually meaningful.  
In this chapter I re-investigate the relationship between energy consumption, economic 
growth and energy prices using a recent dataset (1978-2013) of 28 OECD countries and 
up-to-date econometric methods (details below) suitable for this analysis. I also focus 
on how we should think about panel estimations in the context of energy-GDP 
cointegration as it appears that most studies adopt panel estimations without questioning 
the underlying assumptions that are made when moving from country level analysis to 
panel estimations, which might or might not be true. I argue that first, cross sectional 
dependence is very likely to be present in macro panels, so it has to be accounted for 
properly, and I also show that panels are likely to be heterogeneous in terms of the 
relationship between energy consumption and GDP, which should also be taken into 
account.  
The contributions of the present work to the literature are several: 1. I use a longer time 
series that incorporates the most recent financial crisis (1978-2013). 2. I investigate the 
relationship in all 28 OECD countries (typically a smaller subset of the OECD countries 
is used for the analysis).  3. I use a new framework for unit root testing developed by 
Bai and Ng (2004, 2010) that is robust to cross-sectional dependence. 4. I employ 
Westerlund’s (2007) cointegration test that accounts for cross-sectional dependence by 
bootstrapping standard errors. 5. I estimate the relationship and the direction of 
causality using Mean Group (MG) (Pesaran and Smith, 1995), Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) (Pesaran et al., 1999) and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG) 
(Pesaran, 2006) estimations, compare the results, and make suggestions for the future 
panel-based research of the energy-growth nexus.   
Based on the methods mentioned above, I find evidence mainly for the conservation 
hypothesis - economic growth drives energy consumption in the long run, but not the 
other way around, which suggests that modest energy conservation policies should not 
affect economic growth adversely. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 provides a brief 
overview of the previous studies, section 4.3 describes the data, econometric methods 
and explains the results of the estimations, and section 4.4 concludes the analysis. 
 
4.2 An overview of the literature and a summary of recent developments 
 
The pioneer study that investigated the relationship between energy consumption and 
economic growth was Kraft and Kraft (1978), which also found support for the 
conservation hypothesis; the authors concluded that GNP drove energy consumption in 
the post-war period in the US, but they did not find evidence that energy consumption 
drove GNP. Subsequently, many studies have re-examined the relationship using 
different methods or different time periods and found conflicting results. For example, 
Akarca and Long (1980) and Eden and Hwang (1984) concluded in favour of the 
neutrality hypothesis that there is no causal relationship in either direction; Stern (2000) 
reported that in most specifications he considered for US data, he found support for the 
growth hypothesis of unidirectional causality from energy consumption to GDP, while 
Lee (2006) found support for the feedback hypothesis of mutual casualty between 
energy consumption and the economy at large. So not only have all four possibilities 
found empirical support in the literature, but all four possibilities have found support 
when considering exclusively US data, which is perhaps surprising. 
Given that all four possibilities have found support in US time series data, the reader 
may not be surprised to discover that the findings from time series data in an 
international context are also somewhat varied. Masih and Masih (1997) found support 
for the bidirectional feedback hypothesis in Taiwan and South Korea. Asafu-Adjaye 
(2000) established long-run unidirectional causality from energy and the consumer price 
index to economic growth (the growth hypothesis) in India and Indonesia, but found 
support for the feedback hypothesis for Thailand and the Philippines. Soytas and Sari 
(2003) concluded in favour of the neutrality hypothesis for the UK, US and Canada. 
More recent studies have used applied panel methods to analyse the GDP-energy 
relationship. Al-Iriani (2006) considered the energy and economic growth relationship 
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for the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries13 from 1971–2002 using panel methods 
to test for cointegration and the direction of causality and found that the causality runs 
from GDP to energy consumption, but not conversely (i.e. the conservation hypothesis). 
Huang et al. (2008) conducted a comprehensive study of 82 countries in the period from 
1972 to 2002 – they split the countries into low, middle and high income countries and 
concluded that GDP was positively related to energy consumption in middle income 
countries, while high income countries exhibit a negative relationship. No relationship 
was found for the low income countries. Apergis and Payne published several studies 
(including 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2012) that analysed different groups of countries (11 ex-
Soviet countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the first two studies, 
nine South American countries in the third, and 80 countries in the fourth) using similar 
econometric methods – first the Pedroni panel cointegration tests are used to establish 
the presence of a long-run relationship between the variables, and then a panel error 
correction model (ECM) is used to determine the direction of causality. These methods 
have been widely used in the literature (for example, Ozturk et al. (2010), or 
Streimikiene and Kasperowicz (2016)). I will argue in Section 3 below that both 
Pedroni, which only deals with simple cross-sectional dependence, and panel ECM, 
which assumes homogeneity of parameters across panels, may not be appropriate 
methods in the context of energy – GDP relationship analysis. 
For a broader view of this literature, both Ozturk (2010) and Coers and Sanders (2013) 
provide excellent overviews. Coers and Sanders (2013) also explain the historical 
development of the methods. They split all the existing studies into five generations, 
with traditional vector autoregressive model (VAR) analysis being the first generation, 
bi-variate ECM being second, multivariate cointegration analysis (Johansen’s method) 
being third, then panel cointegration analysis with few panel units are fourth, and the 
fifth and final generation are studies that use a wide range of countries in the context of 
panel estimation. 
There are a couple of additional studies worth highlighting. Belke et al. (2011) analyse 
the relationship between energy consumption, income and energy prices for a panel of 
countries by decomposing each variables into common and idiosyncratic factors by 
means of principal component analysis (PCA). The interpretation of the common 
                                                 
13 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
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factors in their study corresponds to the variation in the data, which is common across 
countries, while the idiosyncratic components correspond to country-specific factors. So 
for example the common component for GDP would correspond to something like the 
global business cycle, while the idiosyncratic factor would represent a country-level 
deviation from global trends. Belke et al. conclude that the common factors are 
cointegrated, while idiosyncratic factors are stationary. This means that the 
idiosyncratic factors cannot participate in the long-run cointegrating relationship. The 
findings support the feedback hypothesis of mutual causality between energy and GDP. 
They also suggest that country-level energy policies cannot have significant effects, as 
the relationship is driven by the common international trends. One shortcoming of this 
study concerns the estimators which were used to evaluate the long-run relationship and 
the direction of causality – dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) (Mark and Sul, 
2003) and the Arellano Bond (1991) estimator. Neither estimator allows for 
heterogeneity across panels, whereas it is hard to imagine the same parameters 
characterising Norway and Greece. 
Another study that takes advantage of newly developed panel methods is Damette and 
Seghir (2013). They use the Westerlund (2007) cointegration test to test for the presence 
of a long-run relationship between energy consumption and GDP, and use the pooled 
mean group estimator (PMG) of Pesaran et al. (1999) to determine the direction of 
causality. Damette and Seghir (2013) analysed 12 oil exporting countries and 
established that in the short run, energy affects income, but in the long run it’s economic 
growth that drives energy consumption. They do not, however, test whether the PMG 
estimator is likely to be consistent in the context of their analysis. 
In contrast to these two studies, I will show that when a longer period is considered, not 
only common factors, but also idiosyncratic factors are non-stationary, so country-level 
policies could be influential. I will also show that assuming homogeneity of parameters 
across panels is restrictive, and not supported by the data.  
4.3 Data, methodology an empirical results 
 
4.3.1 Data 
GDP per capita (gdp_pc) is measured in 2005 PPP USD, total final energy consumption 
per capita (tfc_pc) is measured in tonnes of oil equivalent, and energy prices are 
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measured with an index of the real end-use energy price for industry and households 
(ritotal), which is normalised to a 100 in 2010 for each country. All data come from the 
International Energy Agency’s (IEA) – gdp_pc and tfc_pc are taken from the IEA’s 
World Energy Balances, while the price index data comes from the IEA’s quarterly 
edition on Energy prices and taxes. All variables are converted to natural logs. 
The data consist of a blanced panel of 28 OECD countries covering the years from 1978 
to 2013 inclusive. The countries consist of : Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. Other 
OECD countries - Chile, Estonia, Latvia, Iceland, Israel, Slovenia and Turkey - have 
been excluded as data are partially absent and their inclusion would unbalance the 
panel. I also consider separately the results for the G7 countries: Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. OECD sample of countries (see text for full list). 
 
All variables are illustrated in figures A.1-A.3 of the Appendix. 
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4.3.2 Common and idiosyncratic factors 
 
Bai and Ng (2004) developed a general framework (referred to as PANIC – Panel 
Analysis of Non-stationarity in Idiosyncratic and Common components) to test for unit 
roots in large-N large-T panel data with potential cross-sectional dependence, which is 
likely to be present in macro panels. When not dealt with properly, cross-sectional 
dependence results in deceptive inference both when the unit root tests are performed 
for panels as a whole and also when the individual series are tested and then individual 
statistics are pooled (Reese and Westerlund, 2015). Bai and Ng’s (2004) approach 
hinges on the idea that the series under examination can be split into common trends, 
i.e. co-movements of the data in all panel units over time and idiosyncratic factors, 
movements in the data that are specific to individual panel units. It is based on the 
application of principal component analysis (PCA) to the original data, which separates 
common and idiosyncratic trends in the data and tests them separately. After the 
common factors have been separated from the variables, the remaining data should only 
exhibit low levels of cross-sectional dependence. If both common and idiosyncratic 
components are found to be I(0), the original series is considered to be I(0), but if either 
or both of the common and idiosyncratic factors are found to be I(1), the original series 
necessarily has to be I(1). Another benefit of this method is that it doesn’t require pre-
testing data for the order of integration and can deal with all possibilities i.e. both 
common factors and idiosyncratic factors are I(1), both are I(0), either is I(1) while the 
second one is I(0). The method works by differencing the original series before 
applying the PCA and then restoring the integration properties of the series by 
recumulating the differenced factors. In addition to solving problems arising from cross-
sectional dependence, the decomposition has an economic meaning - it allows 
researchers to analyse international trends separately from country-specific movements 
and variation.  
Here, I opt for correlation-based PCA, where variances of all variables are normalized 
before the decomposition. The effect of this choice is to put similar weights on the 
variation in variables in richer and poorer countries. But the choice is not likely to make 
much difference in any case as all the variables are already natural logs. The results of 
the PCA decomposition, presented in table 4.2, suggest that all three variables are well 
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explained by the first two principal components and they account for at least 78% of 
variation in the panel data.  
The Johansen (1988) cointegration test is used to investigate whether the common 
components are cointegrated. Due to small number of observations the lag length is 
chosen by examining properties of unrestricted VARs14 with one and two lags and a one 
lag specification is chosen based on satisfactory post estimation analysis – the residuals 
appear to be normal and, despite small evidence of autocorrelation at lag one, it 
disappears at all subsequent lags. The vector error correction model (VECM) is then 
estimated, based on the underlying VAR with one lag, and the maximum eigenvalue 
and the trace statistic are used to determine the number of cointegrating relations. 
 
Variable Component Eigenvalue 
Proportion of 
variation explained 
Cumulative 
proportion of 
variation 
gdp_pc 
Comp1 26.0 0.93 0.93 
Comp2 1.3 0.05 0.97 
Comp3 0.3 0.01 0.98 
tfc_pc 
Comp1 15.9 0.57 0.57 
Comp2 5.8 0.21 0.78 
Comp3 2.0 0.07 0.85 
ritotal 
Comp1 18.9 0.67 0.67 
Comp2 5.8 0.21 0.88 
Comp3 1.3 0.05 0.93 
 
Table 4.2. Principal component analysis of GDP per capita, energy consumption per 
capita and the real price index. 
 
All six principal components are tested for stationarity using Elliot, Rothenberg and 
Stock’s (1996) (ERS) DF-GLS test, which is a more powerful modification of the ADF 
test. The lag length is determined based on the MAIC, the modified Akaike information 
criterion (Ng and Perron, 2000). It can be seen in table 4.3 that all the common 
components are non-stationary around a linear trend, but their first differences are 
stationary, so the original common components are I(1). 
                                                 
14 Small sample degree of freedom adjustments are made 
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Variable 
 
№ of 
obs. 
Lags Trend Test 
statistic 
Rejection Stationary or 
not 
 pca_gdp_pc_1 34 1 Yes -2.056 Do not reject at 10% s.l. Non-stationary 
 pca_gdp_pc_2 34 1 Yes -1.439 Do not reject at 10% s.l. Non-stationary 
pca_tfc_pc_1 33 2 Yes -1.281 Do not reject at 10% s.l. Non-stationary 
pca_tfc_pc_2 34 1 Yes -2.284 Do not reject at 10% s.l. Non-stationary 
pca_ritotal_1 34 1 Yes -1.584 Do not reject at 10% s.l. Non-stationary 
pca_ritotal_2 34 1 Yes -1.238 Do not reject at 10% s.l. Non-stationary 
d. pca_gdp_pc_1 31 2 No -2.039 Reject at 5% s.l. Stationary 
d. pca_gdp_pc_2 32 1 No -1.714 Reject at 10% s.l. Stationary 
d.pca_tfc_pc_1 32 2 No -1.671 Reject at 10% s.l. Stationary 
d.pca_tfc_pc_2 32 2 No -3.765 Reject at 1% s.l. Stationary 
d.pca_ritotal_1 32 2 No -2.768 Reject at 1% s.l. Stationary 
d.pca_ritotal_2 33 1 No -2.921 Reject at 1% s.l. Stationary 
 
Table 4.3. First two principal components of GDP per capita, energy consumption per 
capita and the real price index and their first differences unit root test results 
The maximum eigenvalue statistic rejects the null hypothesis of ‘no cointegration’ in 
favour of one cointegrating relation. The trace statistic, on the other hand, suggests that 
there are four cointegrating relations among the common factors.  The results are 
presented in table 4.4. The disagreement between these two results is not investigated 
further as the main point at this stage is to determine whether common factors are 
cointegrated or not, and it appears that they are. 
Maximum 
rank 
Trace 
statistic 
5% critical 
value 
Maximum-
eigenvalue 
statistic 
5% critical 
value 
0 145.10 94.15 55.40** 39.37 
1 89.69 68.52 31.56 33.46 
2 58.13 47.21 26.58 27.07 
3 31.55** 29.68 16.91 20.97 
4 14.63 15.41 12.50 14.07 
5 2.14 3.76 2.14 3.76 
 
Table 4.4. Cointegration test of the common factors 
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Having established a cointegrating relationship in the levels of the common factors of 
all three variables, we move to testing idiosyncratic errors for stationarity. If the 
idiosyncratic errors are stationary, this would suggest that the long-run relationship 
between the variables exists and is driven by the common movement across panels. The 
idiosyncratic components are constructed as a residual from a regression of the 
differenced variables on their differenced first two common factors. The residuals are 
then cumulated up to reconstruct the initial order of integration of the data in levels. I 
opt for the Pa, Pb and PMBS tests developed by Bai and Ng (2004, 2011) specifically 
for PANIC residuals and are shown to have good finite sample properties. All tests have 
a null of a unit root in all panels and the critical values are derived using Monte Carlo 
simulations (Bai and Ng, 2011). The results, shown in table 4.5, suggest that the 
idiosyncratic components of GDP per capita, energy consumption per capita and energy 
prices are non-stationary as for none of the test statistics the null can be rejected at 5% 
significance level. This result were supported by standard panel unit root tests – Levin, 
Lin and Chu (2002) and Harris and Tzavlis (1999). 
 
Test 
Idiosyncratic component 
of GDP per capita 
Idiosyncratic component 
of energy consumption 
per capita 
Idiosyncratic component 
of energy price index 
Test 
statistic 
p-value 
Test 
statistic 
p-value 
Test 
statistic 
p-value 
Pa -1.254* 0.10 0.902 0.82 -1.269* 0.10 
Pb -0.856 0.20 0.982 0.84 -1.146 0.13 
PMSB -1.545* 0.06 0.908 0.82 -0.528 0.30 
 
Table 4.5. Unit root tests of the idiosyncratic components 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
The results conflict with Belke et al. (2011), who found all idiosyncratic components to 
be I(0) and concluded that the cointegrating relationship between GDP, energy 
consumption and energy prices must be driven by the relationship in the common trend 
of OECD counties, which resulted in a position that the efficacy of national policies is 
overshadowed by international factors.  
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The next step is testing the original variables for cointegration. I established earlier that 
common factors are I(1) and cointegrated; however, idiosyncratic factors were also 
found to be non-stationary, so it is necessary to test whether the long-run relationship 
exists when both common and idiosyncratic trends are taken into account. 
 
4.3.3 Testing for panel cointegration 
 
Most studies use the Pedroni (1999, 2004) residual based cointegration test to check for 
panel cointegration in the context of the relationship between energy and economic 
growth (e.g. Al-Iriani (2006), Apergis and Payne (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2012) 
Streimikiene and Kasperowicz (2016), etc.). But the Pedroni test assumes errors are 
uncorrelated across panels, which is very likely to be violated here, and can account 
only for simple cross-sectional dependence by including time dummies into the 
estimated equations. I opt instead for Westerlund’s (2007) cointegration test with 
bootstrapped standard errors which make the test robust to cross-sectional dependence. 
The test estimates the ECM-type equation and checks whether the panels are error-
correcting towards the long-run equilibrium. One caveat with this test is that the results 
based on the ECM will vary depending on which variable is chosen as a dependent 
variable. Up to this point, all the tests considered in this analysis didn’t require an 
imposition of the direction of causality, which itself is one of the questions under 
investigation. To allow for the various causal relationships, it is necessary to perform 
the test three times, using each possible variable as the dependent variable in turn 
(equations 4.1-4.3). For example, if equation 4.1 is estimated with GDP per capita as the 
dependent variable, a significant speed of adjustment coefficient 𝜑1 would imply that 
GDP is adjusting towards a long-run equilibrium among the three variables. If, on the 
other hand, 𝜑1 is not found to be statistically significant, this does not imply that there 
is no long-run relationship; it merely implies that GDP is not the variable which is 
adjusting towards the long-run relationship. The long-run equilibrium relationship may 
or may not exist, but if it does exist, it is one or both of the other variables (in this case, 
energy consumption or prices) which are adjusting themselves to equilibrium.   
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The equations are as follows: 
∆𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑1𝑖(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 −  𝛽11𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑐𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1
− 𝛽12𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1)  + 𝛼1𝑖 +
∑ ∆𝑝𝑘=0 𝑡𝑓𝑐𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝜃11𝑖 + 
∑ ∆𝑝𝑘=0 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝜃12𝑖 + ∑ ∆
𝑝
𝑘=1 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝜃13𝑖 +  𝑣1𝑖𝑡                                                
(4.1) 
∆𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑2𝑖(𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽21𝑖𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽22𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1)  + 𝛼2𝑖 +
∑ ∆𝑝𝑘=0 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝜃21𝑖 + ∑ ∆
𝑝
𝑘=0 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝜃22𝑖 + ∑ ∆
𝑝
𝑘=1 𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝜃23𝑖 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑡                                               
(4.2)    
∆𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑3𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽31𝑖𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽32𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1)  + 𝛼3𝑖 +
∑ ∆𝑝𝑘=0 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝜃21𝑖 + ∑ ∆
𝑝
𝑘=0 𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−𝑘𝜃22𝑖 + ∑ ∆
𝑝
𝑘=1 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝜃23𝑖 + 𝑣3𝑖𝑡                                               
(4.3)            
where 𝑖 subscripts denote countries, 𝑡 subscripts denote years,  𝜑𝑖 represents the speed 
of adjustment coefficients in country 𝑖, 𝛼𝑖s denotes the country fixed effects, 𝜃3𝑖 are 
(𝑝 × 1) vectors of coefficients on the lagged first-differenced dependent variable and 
𝜃1𝑖 and 𝜃2𝑖 are ((𝑝 + 1) × 1) vectors of coefficients on the lagged first-differenced 
regressors. The error terms are denoted as 𝑣𝑖𝑡.  
 
Dependent 
variable 
Lags and 
leads 
Test statistic Gt Ga Pt Pa 
gdp_pc 3 z-value 0.025 3.559 -0.398*** 0.915** 
robust p-value 0.37 0.24 0 0.02 
tfc_pc 2 z-value -2.093** 0.974 -2.002* -0.224 
robust p-value 0.047 0.453 0.053 0.247 
ritotal 2 z-value -3.428** 1.042 -2.23** -0.735 
robust p-value 0.02 0.433 0.033 0.253 
 
Table 4.6. Westerlund’s (2007) cointegration test results 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Westerlund’s (2007) cointegration test consists of four test statistics - Gt, Ga, Pt and Pa. 
Gt and Ga are based on a weighted average of 𝜑𝑖 obtained from different panel 
estimations, while Pt and Pa pool the data across panels to obtain an estimate of  𝜑 for 
the whole panel. All test statistics have a null of no cointegration with the alternatives of 
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“at least one panel contains cointegration” (if Gt and Ga are used) or the alternative of 
“all panels contain cointegration” (Pa and Pt statistics). The optimal leg length is 
selected according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC). To account for potential 
cross-sectional dependences bootstrapped critical values are used and robust  p-values 
are reported. The results of the test, presented in table 4.6, are ambiguous. For each 
dependent variable, two of the test statistics reject the null of no cointegration at the 
10% level, while the other two do not reject the null. The ambiguity could be attributed 
to a small number of observations per panel – as an ECM-based test, the Westerlund 
test suffers when the number of time periods is small, especially if the number of lags 
and leads is non-zero. However, as half of the test statistics indicate cointegration, I will 
assume that the long-run relationship exists and will further explore this issue in the 
next section. 
 
4.3.4 Long-run relationship (DOLS). 
 
The results in the previous section indicate that GDP per capita, energy consumption 
per capita and the real energy price index appear to share a common stochastic trend, so 
the next step is to estimate the relationship – evaluate magnitudes of the coefficients, 
test which variables are adjusting towards the long-run relationship and how quickly 
they do so. I will start with a panel version of Stock and Watson’s (1993) dynamic 
ordinary least squares estimator (DOLS), which is a consistent and asymptotically 
efficient estimator of the cointegrating vector and, as noted by Kao and Chiang (2001) 
and Mark and Sul (2003), outperforms panel OLS and fully modified least squares 
estimator (FMOLS) by having a smaller bias and smaller finite sample size distortions. 
The estimator requires inclusion of leads and lags of the differenced regressors into the 
estimated equation in order to make the error term orthogonal to stochastic shocks in the 
regressors. To obtain asymptotically valid standard errors, a heteoskedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-robust (Newey-West) estimator will be used.  
The DOLS equations have the following form: 
𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1𝑖 + 𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝛽11 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝛽12 + ∑ ∆
𝑏
𝑘=−𝑎 𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃11 +
 ∑ ∆𝑏𝑘=−𝑎 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃12 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                        (4.4) 
  
118 
𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2𝑖 + 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝛽21 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝛽22 + ∑ ∆
𝑏
𝑘=−𝑎 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃21 +
 ∑ ∆𝑏𝑘=−𝑎 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃22 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                          (4.5)  
𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼3𝑖 + 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝛽31 + 𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡𝛽32 + ∑ ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡+𝑘
𝑏
𝑘=−𝑎 𝜃31 +
 ∑ ∆𝑏𝑘=−𝑎 𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃32 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡                         (4.6)      
 
where 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the per capita GDP of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑡𝑓𝑐_𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the per capita 
energy consumption of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the energy price index of country 
𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝛽 represents the long-run DOLS coefficients, 𝜃 represents vectors of 
coefficients on the lags and leads of the first-differenced explanatory variables, 𝛼𝑖 
denotes the country fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝜖𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡  denote the various error terms. 
Maximum lag and lead lengths are shown by 𝑎 and 𝑏, respectively. 
Choosing the optimal lag and lead lengths involves the trade-off of increased precision 
vs. bias reduction. The standard method for making this choice for the DOLS estimation 
is based on minimising the Akaike information criterion. For equation 4.4, with gdp_pc 
as a dependent variable, this suggests six lags and leads. However, it turns out that the 
sixth lag makes no real difference to the estimation – after checking the robustness of 
the results to the lag and lead length, both the point estimates of the coefficients of 
interest and their standard errors barely change when going from five to six lags and 
leads. This suggests that accounting for more lags and leads does not result in bias 
reduction and therefore I proceed with five lags and leads. Similar analysis is carried out 
for all specifications. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Dependent variable 
gdp_pc tfc_pc ritotal gdp_pc tfc_pc ritotal 
gdp_pc — 0.514*** 0.507*** — 0.122** 0.064 
 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.045) (0.575) 
tfc_pc 0.680*** — -0.709*** 0.208 — -0.675*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.166) 
 
(0.006) 
ritotal 0.788*** -0.467*** — 0.290*** -0.233*** — 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000)   
Lags and leads 5 1 2 5 1 2 
Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.055*** -0.070*** 0.826*** -0.044* -0.080** 0.412*** 
Subsample 28 OECD countries G7 countries 
N 28 7 
Number of 
observations 
700 924 868 175 231 217 
 
Table 4.7. Dynamic OLS results 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
In addition to estimating the long-run coefficients for the whole sample, I also restrict 
the sample to G7 countries. The results are presented in table 4.7. Table 4.7 also 
includes the results from a two-step ECM, where in the first step the DOLS residuals 
have been collected, and in the second step the error correction model is estimated by 
OLS using cluster robust standard errors. The second step equations have the following 
form: 
 
      Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜑𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗𝜙𝑗𝑗=1 + ∑ Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑗𝜔𝑗𝑗=0 +  𝜈𝑖𝑡           
(4.7) 
and 
                         𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 −  𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝛽 − 𝛼𝑖 − ∑ Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝑘𝜃
𝑏
𝑘=−𝑎              (4.8) 
 
where 𝑦 is the dependent variable in the corresponding DOLS equation (4.4-4.6), which 
can be gdp_pc, tfc_pc or ritotal; 𝑋 is a matrix that contains the other two variables; 𝜑 is 
the parameter of interest in the ECM as it indicates whether the dependent variable 
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adjusts to the equilibrium and the magnitude represents the speed of adjustment toward 
the long-run relationship. We expect to find 𝜑 negative and significant if the dependent 
variable in the corresponding equation is error-correcting; 𝜙 and 𝜔 are each vectors of 
coefficients on the lagged first difference of the dependent variable and current and 
lagged differences of the regressors respectively, 𝛾 allows for a constant in the second 
step equation and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
For the whole sample, all long-run coefficients and speed of adjustment terms appear to 
be significantly different from zero at the 1% level. However, the speed of adjustment 
coefficient in the equation where energy prices are used as a dependent variable is 
positive and quite large in magnitude, which might suggest misspecification. In the 
other two equations, with gdp_pc and tfc_pc as dependent variables, speeds of 
adjustment suggest that both variables are error-correcting. The adjustment, however, 
happens very slowly.  
The long-run coefficients suggest that a 1% increase in energy consumption leads to 
0.7% increase in GDP and 1% increase in GDP results in 0.5% increase in energy 
consumption. The elasticity of energy consumption with respect to energy prices is 
negative. A negative and significant speed of adjustment can be interpreted as long-run 
causality, so based on the DOLS results there is bi-directional long-run causality 
between energy and economic growth. 
The situation is different in the case of G7 countries. All speed of adjustment terms 
although similar in magnitudes and statistically significant, are less precisely estimated. 
The speed of adjustment term of energy prices is still positive, which as noted earlier 
might suggest that there are some problems with the model. However, the long-run 
coefficients are notably smaller in magnitude – a 1% increase in GDP predicts a 0.1% 
increase in total energy consumption, which is four times smaller than the effect for the 
whole sample. And total energy consumption doesn’t appear to have any effect on GDP 
(see column 4), which in combination with the speed of adjustment that is only 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level, suggests that there is no long-run 
causality running from energy consumption to GDP. Also, energy consumption is less 
responsive to energy prices in G7 countries – the coefficient is about half of that for the 
whole sample, however the estimate of elasticity is still negative and significantly 
different from zero. 
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In conclusion, in G7 countries, the long-run relationship between the variables is much 
weaker and, unlike the whole sample, where bi-directional causality was found, the 
results suggest that causality goes from GDP to energy consumption, but not the other 
way around.  
 
4.3.5 Long-run relationship (MG and PMG). 
It has to be noted that while DOLS and the ECM based on the DOLS residuals produce 
consistent and efficient estimates, they don’t allow for any heterogeneity in the 
cointegrating equation and impose same long-run and short-run coefficients as well as 
same error variances in all panel units, which is very restrictive for a macro panel. Only 
country-specific fixed effects can vary across panels. 
In contrast to the majority of the papers in the field that use “micro panel” methods -
GMM estimators, such as Arellano and Bond (1991) - to estimate the error correction 
model and the direction of causality, I opt for the Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean 
Group (PMG) estimators by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999) 
respectively, which unlike panel GMM estimators, are more appropriate for the large-T 
and large-N setting. The main justification for Arellano and Bond type estimators is the 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the differenced error term that inflicts 
a bias on the fixed effects estimation of the differenced data. However, the bias is 
considered to be an issue only when T is small, which isn’t the case in this analysis. 
Also, the micro panel methods impose homogenous dynamics on the panels, which is 
too restrictive in the macro setting.  
The PMG estimator allows for different short-run coefficients in the different panel 
units (the different countries, in this case), while constraining the long-run relationship 
to be the same for all panel units. This is in contrast to DOLS, which only allows the 
constants to vary across panels. The MG estimator estimates a different equation for 
each panel and then averages the individual panel estimates. MG is most appropriate if 
the relationship varies sharply between countries and is always consistent. The PMG 
estimates are only consistent if the assumption of a common long-run relationship 
across panels is valid. The assumption can be tested using a Hausman test, and if the 
null of no difference between MG and PMG coefficients is not rejected, then preference 
is generally given to PMG as it is a more efficient estimator. If, on the other hand, the 
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Hausman test does reject the null, MG has to be chosen as it is the only consistent 
estimator in that case. While MG just takes unweighted averages of the estimates for 
each panel unit, the ECM estimated by PMG has the following form:  
 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖) + ∑ Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝜆𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 + ∑ Δ𝑥1𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝜙1𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0 +
∑ Δ𝑥2𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝜙2𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0 +  𝜈𝑖𝑡                       (4.9) 
 
where 𝑦 is the corresponding dependent variable (gdp_pc, tfc_pc or ritotal), 𝛽 
represents the long-run coefficients,  𝜑 denotes the error correction speed of adjustment 
coefficient, 𝑥1and 𝑥2 the other two variables that are treated as regressors in the 
corresponding equation, 𝛼𝑖 once again denotes the country fixed effects, 𝜆 is a (𝑝 × 1) 
vector of parameters on the lagged differenced dependent variable, 𝜙1 and 𝜙2 are 
((𝑞 + 1) × 1) vectors of parameters on the differenced regressors and lagged 
differenced regressors,  𝜈𝑖𝑡 denotes the error term. PMG is estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation. 
The results of the estimations are presented in table 4.8. First, I consider columns (1) 
and (2), where all the observations in the sample are used and GDP per capita is used as 
a dependent variable. The speed of adjustment is similar in magnitude to the DOLS 
estimates and is also negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, 
which suggests slow adjustment of GDP to the equilibrium relationship. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients on tfc_pc vary widely depending on the method of 
estimation. The MG estimate is more than two times larger than the PMG estimate. 
However, the Hausman test statistic rejects only at the 10% significance level, but not at 
5%, which suggests that the difference between the coefficients is on the borderline of 
statistical significance. This result is driven by the fact that the MG estimates have very 
large standard errors. The estimated coefficients of about 2.1 on energy consumption 
and of 0.85 on the energy price index have standard errors of 0.75 and 0.26 respectively, 
so despite being markedly less than half the size of the corresponding PMG estimates 
(0.95 and 0.29), the Hausman test cannot pick up the difference due to imprecision of 
the MG estimation. In fact, almost all MG estimates are associated with large standard 
errors, which is important for this analysis as it suggests that different panels produce 
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very different point estimates when looked at individually, so restricting coefficients to 
be the same across panels will result in inconsistent estimation, even in cases where the 
Hausman test cannot reject the null of no systematic difference in the coefficients. This 
means we have to be very careful interpreting PMG as well as DOLS results, as both 
estimations impose restrictions on the coefficients that are likely not to hold. 
The same can be said about estimates in columns (7) and (8), in which GDP is used as a 
dependent variable for the G7 subsample. The Hausman test doesn’t reject the null 
hypothesis of no systematic difference between the coefficients, but we can see from the 
p-values that the standard errors are very large, so the failure by the Hausman test to 
reject the difference in the coefficients can be attributed to imprecision in the MG 
estimates rather than to the fact that the coefficients are actually close in magnitude. 
Does this mean that using panel estimation to evaluate the relationship between energy 
consumption and GDP is not necessarily the right thing to do, because different 
countries, even within the subset of G7 countries, appear to have very different long-run 
coefficients?  
Not necessarily. Even though we have to be careful interpreting panel estimation 
results, and more so for estimators that do not allow heterogeneity in parameters, there 
are some results that appear to be robust. Consider results in columns (3) and (4), where 
all the observations are used and the total energy consumption is the dependent variable. 
The MG results are precise enough that the Hausman test strongly rejects the restriction 
of the same long-run coefficients even though the coefficients do not appear to be very 
different in magnitude. This implies that GDP and energy prices affect total energy 
consumption similarly in different countries. The same is true in columns (9) and (10), 
where the Hausman test rejects its null and suggests that MG is the appropriate 
estimator. Essentially, what is desired in a setting like this is to find MG estimates with 
relatively small standard errors, which would suggest that relationships across panels 
are similar and, only conditional on this first finding, the PMG estimation would pose a 
good alternative that can provide efficiency gains. However, if MG produces estimates 
with large standard errors, we are better of considering MG estimates even if the 
Hausman test suggests that MG and PMG estimates are not systematically different. 
Consider again the overall results. The MG and PMG estimations suggest that for 28 
OECD countries all the variables adjust towards the long-run relationship, and even 
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energy prices have negative speed of adjustment coefficients, unlike in DOLS 
estimation, which reflects positively on the model. All the coefficients are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level.  However, the speeds with which the variables 
adjust are very different. Results in columns (1) and (3), suggest that energy 
consumption is more responsive to changes in the other two variables and adjusts to the 
equilibrium much faster than GDP per capita. The speed of adjustment coefficients are 
0.096 for gdp_pc and 0.451 for tfc_pc, which suggests that energy consumption closes 
almost half of the disequilibrium gap in one year, while GDP only closes about 10% of 
the gap.  
For G7 countries, GDP does not appear to adjust to the long-run relationship as the 
speed of adjustment term is not significantly different from zero at any conventional 
significance level, while energy consumption appears to be very responsive – the speed 
of adjustment coefficient is equal to 0.504 and is significant at the 1% level. Two things 
here are worth highlighting: 1. The speed of adjustment of GDP per capita (column 1) 
relative to the speed of adjustment of energy consumption (column 3) for the whole 
sample appears to be much slower. 2. The speed of adjustment coefficient in the 
equation with gdp_pc as a dependent variable for G7 countries (column 7) is 
insignificant. Taken together, these two results suggest that GDP, despite its 
participation in the equilibrium relationship, is probably not driven by energy 
consumption, or, if it is, the effect is quite small. This is also supported by the fact that 
long-run coefficients in column (7) are not significant at any conventional level.  
At the same time, there is strong evidence that per capita income drives energy 
consumption as the speed of adjustment coefficients in columns (3) and (9) are 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level and large in magnitudes. They suggest 
that in both samples energy consumption responds strongly to the movements in income 
per capita and energy prices, and closes about 50% of the gap of a disequilibrium in one 
year. Also, the long-run coefficient suggests that a 1% increase in GDP per capita 
increases energy consumption by about 0.5% in the whole sample and by about 0.25% 
in G7 countries. 
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Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG 
Dependent variables 
gdp_pc gdp_pc tfc_pc tfc_pc ritotal ritotal gdp_pc gdp_pc tfc_pc tfc_pc ritotal ritotal 
gdp_pc 
  
0.465*** 0.791*** 1.292** 1.120*** 
  
0.247** 0.805*** 1.373*** 0.771*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) 
  
(0.05) (0.000) (0.01) (0.000) 
tfc_pc 2.142*** 0.950*** 
  
-1.920 -1.097*** 1.291 1.011*** 
  
-0.043 -0.145 
 
(0.004) (0.000) 
  
(0.417) (0.000) (0.698) (0.000) 
  
(0.983) (0.75) 
ritotal 0.853*** 0.292*** -0.500*** -0.687*** 
  
1.229 0.233** -0.331*** -0.362*** 
  
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
  
(0.421) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Speed of 
adjustment 
-0.096*** -0.053*** -0.451*** -0.112*** -0.349*** -0.253*** -0.055 -0.058* -0.504*** -0.108** -0.215*** -0.191*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.103 0.051 (0.000) 0.048 (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsample 28 OECD countries G7 countries 
Lags of first 
differences 
2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 
№ of obs. 924 924 924 952 924 924 238 238 231 231 231 231 
Hausman Test 
statistic 
5.07* 23.11*** 0.12 2.21 23.15*** 1.68 
Hausman Test 
result 
PMG MG PMG PMG MG PMG 
 
Table 4.8. Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group estimation results 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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The last thing to consider here is whether there is any evidence of short-run causality 
among the variables. The short-run Granger causality tests can be performed by testing 
the null hypothesis that 𝜙1𝑗 or 𝜙2𝑗 jointly equal to zero in each equation. For example, 
if gdp_pc is chosen as a dependent variable and tfc_pc is the first regressor, failure to 
reject the null of 𝜙1 being equal to zero would suggest that energy consumption doesn’t 
Granger-cause GDP in the short run.  
 
Source of causation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MG MG MG MG MG MG 
Dependent variables 
gdp_pc tfc_pc ritotal gdp_pc tfc_pc ritotal 
gdp_pc 
 
61.48*** 48.68*** 
 
38.39*** 15.33*** 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.002) 
tfc_pc 31.16*** 
 
4.60 17.78*** 
 
63.92*** 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.204) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
ritotal 14.41*** 14.63*** 
 
11.86*** 9.02** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.03) 
 Subsample 28 OECD countries G7 countries 
Lags of FD 2 2 2 1 2 2 
Number of observations 924 924 924 238 231 231 
 
Table 4.9. Short-run causality tests (based on MG estimation results). 
 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
The results of these tests, presented in table 4.9, suggest that in the short run all three 
variables affect each other. One exception are energy prices, which do not appear to be 
affected by energy consumption in the whole sample. 
 
4.3.6 Testing for cross-sectional dependence and CCEMG estimations. 
In the previous section, I showed that the long-run relationship between income, energy 
consumption and energy prices is heterogeneous across panels, so I concluded that 
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PMG, which imposes the same long-run coefficients in all panels, is not an appropriate 
estimator, and MG should be used instead. However, both MG and PMG do not 
produce consistent results if errors exhibit cross-sectional dependence and the source of 
the common movements in the errors is correlated with the regressors. 
I check for cross-sectional dependence of the errors using Pesaran’s (2015) test. Under 
the null of weak cross-sectional dependence, the test statistic has standard normal 
distribution. The test is applied to the residuals from the MG estimations when the 
whole sample is used. The results are presented in table 4.10. As you can see, the test 
statistics are highly significant and the null of weak dependency is always rejected, 
regardless of which variable is used as a dependent variable. So I conclude that errors 
are strongly cross-sectionally dependent. 
 
 
Dependent variable 
Test statistic gdp_pc tfc_pc ritotal 
CD 25.97*** 10.72*** 41.74*** 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Table 4.10. Results of Pesaran’s (2015) test for weak cross-sectional dependence 
(based on the MG residuals). 
 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Failure to reject weak cross-sectional dependence of the errors suggests that there are 
common unobserved factors across panels, which are not captured by the model. These 
unobserved factors are likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables, which 
would bias the MG estimates of the long-run and short-run coefficients. I re-estimate 
the relationships using Pesaran’s (2006) Common Correlated Effects Mean Group 
(CCEMG) estimator, which adds cross-sectional means of the variables in the model to 
proxy for unobserved common factors. The estimator is consistent in the presence of 
endogeneity induced by the unobserved factors. 
Inclusion of the means increases the number of parameters to be estimated, so in order 
to preserve degrees of freedom I estimate a simpler ECM with only levels of variables 
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and their first-differences. Following Mohammadi and Parvaresh (2014), I add means of 
levels and means of their first differences. 
 
The estimated equation takes the following form: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑥2𝑖𝑡+ 𝜙1𝑖?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝑖?̅?1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙3𝑖?̅?2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆1𝑖Δ𝑥1𝑖𝑡 +
𝜆2𝑖Δ𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙4𝑖∆𝑦̅̅̅̅ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙5𝑖∆𝑥̅̅̅̅ 1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙6𝑖∆𝑥̅̅̅̅ 2𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡                    (4.10) 
 
where 𝑦 is the corresponding dependent variable (gdp_pc, tfc_pc or ritotal), 𝛽 
represents the long-run coefficients, 𝜑 denotes the error correction speed of adjustment 
coefficient, 𝑥1and 𝑥2 the other two variables that are treated as regressors in the 
corresponding equation, 𝛼𝑖 denotes the country fixed effects, 𝜙 represent coefficients on 
the means of levels of variables in their first differences, 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 are parameters on 
the differenced regressors, and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 denotes the error term. 
The results of the estimation, presented in table 4.11, largely support earlier findings. It 
can be seen in column (1) that the effect of energy consumption on income varies 
significantly across countries, which manifests itself in large standard errors and a 95% 
confidence interval that includes zero. The effect of income change on energy 
consumption is much more precisely estimated (see column (2)). It is slightly larger in 
magnitude than the MG estimate (0.629 as opposed to 0.465), but appears to be 
consistent across panels and suggests that in most countries 1% increase in GDP per 
capita causes a 0.6% increase in energy consumption in the long run.  
All speed of adjustment coefficients are negative and significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level, which suggests that all three variables adjust to the equilibrium 
relationship. However, the speed of adjustment coefficients are differ markedly across 
the various dependent variables, and they also differ across countries. The speed of 
adjustment estimate is largest in magnitude in the equation where tfc_pc is used as a 
dependent variable. In that case, the estimates suggest that movements in energy 
consumption close half of the disequilibrium gap in a year, which is very similar to the 
result obtained using the MG estimation. And while there was some suggestion noted 
earlier that the G7 differs from the broader OECD, I am unfortunately not able to 
estimate the relationship for the G7 countries separately, as consistency of CCEMG 
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requires a larger number of panel units. Formally, the number of panel units should tend 
to infinity, but Pesaran (2006) tests the small sample properties of the estimator and 
finds them satisfactory, however these results apply when the number of panel units is 
at least 20, rather than only 7. 
 
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
CCEMG CCEMG CCEMG 
Dependent variables 
gdp_pc tfc_pc ritotal 
gdp_pc 
 
0.629*** -0.657 
  
(0.002) (0.402) 
tfc_pc 0.407 
 
3.275 
 
(0.486) 
 
(0.309) 
ritotal -0.342 -0.180* 
 
 
(0.363) (0.092) 
 Speed of adjustment -0.249*** -0.528*** -0.490*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d.gdp_pc 
 
0.12 0.026 
  
(0.159) 0.873 
d.tfc 0.138*** 
  
 
(0.000) 
  d.ritotal 0.007 0.015 -0.194* 
 
(0.665) (0.680) (-0.053) 
Subsample 28 OECD countries 
Lags of FD 0 0 0 
Number of observations 980 980 980 
 
Table 4.11. Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimation results 
 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
I test the CCEMG residuals for weak cross-sectional dependence using Pesaran’s (2015) 
test. Despite the fact that the null of weak cross-sectional dependence is still rejected for 
the equation with tfc_pc as a dependent variable, all the test statistics are much smaller 
than those calculated based on the MG residuals, which indicates that cross-sectional 
means captured a large fraction of the common unobserved trends.  
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Dependent variable 
Test statistic gdp_pc tfc_pc ritotal 
CD -1.63 -2.38** -1.54 
p-value (0.103) (0.02) (0.123) 
 
Table 4.12. Results of Pesaran’s (2015) test for weak cross-sectional dependence 
(based on the CCEMG residuals). 
 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
One caveat here is that the ECM parameter estimates might be sensitive to the number 
of lags of the first-differenced variables in the model. However, as the number of times 
periods is not very large, it is not possible to incorporate more lags without 
compromising the reliability of estimations – there simply wouldn’t be enough degrees 
of freedom left to obtain any meaningful results if more lags are added to the model. For 
the same reason, I do not test the long-run relationship for the presence of structural 
breaks. I've argued in this chapter that due to parameter heterogeneity across countries, 
the mean group estimators should be chosen. But since they are not as efficient as some 
other estimators (e.g. DOLS or PMG), I am unable to test some parameter-intense 
specifications, such as structural breaks or elaborate lag structures. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
4.4.1 Econometric results 
The contribution of this chapter has been to attempt to clarify the nature of the 
relationship between energy consumption and economic growth using newer 
econometric techniques than had previously been used in the (somewhat conflicting) 
literature. Following Bai and Ng (2004, 2011), I start by decomposing the variables 
(GDP per capita, energy consumption per capita and energy prices) into common 
factors and idiosyncratic factors by the means of PCA and testing common factors and 
idiosyncratic factors for stationarity separately, which controls for potential cross-
sectional dependences in the variables. The results of the tests suggest that both 
common factors and idiosyncratic factors are non-stationary, which, contrary to Belke et 
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al. (2011), suggests that the long-run relationship between the variables is not purely 
driven by common international trends.  
Next, I test for the existence of the long-run cointegrating relationship between the 
variables using the Westerlund cointegration tests with bootstrapped standard errors, 
which are robust to the presence of common factors across panel units. The results are 
conflicting, with two test statistics supporting presence of a long-run relationship and 
two which do not support the presence of this relationship. 
I continue by estimating the long-run relationship and the error-correction model using 
panel DOLS estimation, which suggests there is bi-directional long-run causality 
between energy consumption and economic growth in the sample of 28 OECD 
countries, but among G7 countries, the long-run relationship between the variables is 
much weaker and the causality goes from GDP per capita to energy consumption, but 
not the other way around, which supports the conservation hypothesis.  
In order to test and account for potential heterogeneity of the parameters across panel 
units, I use the MG and PMG estimators to estimate the relationship. The MG estimates 
have large standard errors in the equations that test if income is affected by energy 
consumption, which suggests that the relationship is heterogeneous across panels. 
However, GDP per capita appears to affect energy consumption similarly across 
countries and the effect is much stronger. There is some evidence that income is driven 
by energy consumption in the long run in the whole sample, but the effect is weak. For 
G7 countries, no long-run causality from energy consumption to GDP was found. At the 
same time, the results of the estimations suggest that energy consumption is driven by 
economic growth for the whole sample and for the subset of G7 countries in the long 
run, and in both samples, the degree of responsiveness of energy consumption is quite 
high. In the short run, energy consumption and GDP exhibit mutual causality. The 
elasticity of energy consumption with respect to energy prices is negative for the whole 
sample and for G7 countries, but the magnitude for 28 OECD countries is double of that 
for G7 countries.  
Lastly, I test the MG residuals for weak cross-sectional dependence and reject it in 
favour of strong dependence, which indicates potential bias in the MG estimations. I re-
estimate the relationships using the CCEMG estimator, which is robust to strong cross-
sectional dependence in the errors. The results, although different in magnitude from the 
MG estimation results, lead to similar conclusions – the effect of energy consumption 
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on GDP varies significantly across countries, while the effect of GDP per capita on 
energy consumption is much more homogeneous; the direction of causality is bi-
directional with energy consumption responding faster to disequilibrium.  
The results obtained in this analysis suggest that the conclusions are sensitive to the 
econometric methods used and failure to allow for heterogeneity in parameters might be 
distorting the magnitudes of the effects. However, despite strong evidence in favour of 
heterogeneity of the effect of energy consumption on economic growth, all econometric 
methods employed in the analysis point at the same direction of causality – for the 
whole sample the causality is bi-directional, but for the G7 countries, causality runs one 
way – from economic growth to energy consumption. Why might the results be 
different for the G7 as compared to the rest of the OECD? One possibility is that for a 
country like New Zealand, say, energy prices really are exogenous and when they go 
up, the economy suffers. But for a larger economy like the United States, energy prices 
will in a greater sense be determined by the business cycle – energy prices rise when the 
American economy is doing well. This complicates the causal link between energy 
consumption and GDP and may result in the finding highlighted above. 
Thus the current study suggests that the results are not only sensitive to the methods 
used, but also to the way countries are grouped. Panel econometric methods are useful 
in analysing the relationship between energy consumption and economic growth, 
however, many studies neglect that fact that most panel estimators produce meaningful 
results only if the imposed restriction of homogeneity of parameters is valid. Based on 
the results of my analysis, this restriction is not likely to hold. It will be particularly 
beneficial for the future research in this field to either group countries based on the 
similarity of the long-run relationship relying on past findings, or conduct individual 
country-specific analysis first, and then apply appropriate panel methods to make use of 
increased precision of estimation.   
 
4.4.2 Policy Implications 
World primary energy use is projected to grow by 1.3% per year between 2015 and 
2035, but almost all of this growth is expected to come from the developing world, with 
China and India alone accounting for over half the increase; energy demand in the 
European Union is actually predicted to fall by 0.4% per year over the same period (BP 
(2017)). Given the strong historical relationship between energy use and GDP growth, 
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should GDP growth forecasts be revised downwards when energy use forecasts are 
revised downwards? Is this something that European countries should worry about? 
Taken at face value, the results of the current study do not suggest that there is any 
reason for panic on these grounds. The main finding was that the correlation between 
energy usage and GDP was driven primarily by a one-directional relationship where 
higher levels of economic growth were (Granger) causing higher levels of energy usage. 
There was no strong evidence for higher (or lower) energy usage leading to higher (or 
lower) economic growth. 
Given the increasing shift of global energy use towards the developing world, it would 
be useful if the current results could say something about the relationship between 
energy and GDP in the developing world also. Unfortunately, however, the sample used 
in the present study consisted entirely of OECD countries, so this would push up against 
the limits of external validity. The sample used here begins in 1978, when the poorest 
sample countries (measured in 2005 US$) were: South Korea (GDP per capita: $4,650), 
Mexico ($9,130), and Poland ($9,380). The GDP per capita of China overtook South 
Korea’s 1978 value only recently (around 2011), whereas India remains below half of 
the South Korean 1978 value of GDP per capita even in 2016 (World Bank). It would 
thus be unwise to infer much about a set of developing countries based on data where 
even the poorest sample country (nevermind the average) was so much wealthier. 
Doubly so given the well-known greater importance of more energy-intensive activities 
such as manufacturing or construction to developing countries like China. Further work 
would be needed in this area before any firm statements could be made about whether 
(for example) China’s efforts to meet her commitments to the Paris Climate Accord will 
noticeably impair Chinese economic growth. 
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Concluding chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 135 
This conclusion collects some practical recommendaitons emerging from the three 
substantial chapters of this thesis.  
 
From the second chapter (Should we pre-test instrumental variables? A Monte Carlo 
study.), the strong recommendation to IV practitioners is to rely on prior information 
about the strength of instruments and the degree of endogeneity to inform the decision 
about whether to pre-test results. If the instrument is suspected to be weak and the 
degree of endogeneity is suspected to be high, then a high first-stage F-statistic is likely 
to correspond to a bias in the IV estimation. Researchers should instead consider 
statistics which are robust to weak instruments, such as AR (1949) and Kleibergen’s 
(2002) Lagrange Multiplier statistic. These statistics have distributions that do not 
depend on the value of the concentration parameter. A better alternative is to use split-
sample IV, which eliminates pre-test bias. But this requires a large sample, and if the 
correlation between the instrument and the regressor is low enough, then it will 
significantly impair the estimation of coefficients, so this is yet another case where 
researchers must focus on the bias-variance tradeoff. However all of this is predicated 
on the joint assumption of weak instruments and high endogeneity: if the degree of 
endogeneity is sufficiently low, choosing instruments that exceed a threshold value is 
useful – the MSE is lower for the samples conditioned on the high F-statistic, and the 
corresponding test size distortions are also low. 
 
From the third chapter (Oil Rents and the Real Exchange Rate.), the recommendations 
would be directed more at policy makers or perhaps development economists rather 
than econometric practicioners. In that chapter, we used proprietary data to check 
whether we could find evidence for the Balassa-Samuelson effect (the notion that 
productivity changes in the tradable sector lead to real appreciations of the currency) 
within the oil sector in major oil exporting countries. While we did find evidence that 
productivity in the oil sector has an effect on the real exchange rate in some countries, 
there are two major caveats to the finding: (i) where there was an effect, it was small in 
magnitude compared to the effect of oil prices on the exchange rate, and (ii) there was 
no significant effect in OPEC, which contains the most significant oil exporting 
countries. In practical terms, these caveats suggest that whatever difficulties non-oil 
industries face within major oil exporting countries (e.g. if there is a ‘resource curse’ for 
oil), these difficulties do not seem to stem from the oil sector causing an overvalued 
exchange rate, but from other (institutional?) factors. 
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From the fourth chapter (How Costly is Conservation? The International Energy-GDP 
Relationship Re-examined), the practical takeaways are about the relationship between 
energy and GDP. The main conclusion was that (at least for the G7 countries) causality 
runs from GDP to energy usage, but not vice versa. If correct, this finding would come 
as some relief to policymakers who are targeting lower energy usage and worried about 
the downside potential for economic growth. A more nuanced takeaway for those doing 
applied work in this area is that the degree of heterogeneity in the Energy→GDP 
channel appears to be far greater than in the GDP→Energy channel. This may be 
because economies differ substantially in (e.g.) the degree to which they rely on energy-
intensive industries such as manufacturing as the basis for their economies, but their 
consumers all increase energy usage in response to higher incomes in more-or-less 
similar ways. In practical terms, this means that it may not be wise to try to estimate the 
Energy→GDP effect using panel data, since there may not be a ‘typical’ effect which is 
meaningfully stable across countries or time. 
 
So, a few years’ work in nutshell: use prior information sensibly when estimating, and 
don’t worry so much about Dutch disease or the negative economic consequences of 
scaling back on energy usage.  
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Table A.1  Country-by-country ADF test results (lrer). 
ISO-
code 
0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 
without trend with trend 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
AGO 0.676 23 0.658 22 0.709 21 0.921 23 0.923 22 0.952 21 
ARE 0.902 23 0.826 22 0.873 21 0.595 23 0.314 22 0.417 21 
ARG 0.603 17 0.663 16 0.680 15 0.632 17 0.669 16 0.676 15 
AUS 0.181 39 0.016 38 0.045 37 0.265 39 0.010 38 0.012 37 
AZE 0.987 11 0.539 10 0.854 9 0.331 11 0.243 10 0.091 9 
BRA 0.655 16 0.347 15 0.032 14 0.911 16 0.755 15 0.276 14 
BRN 0.007 39 0.000 38 0.000 37 0.222 39 0.008 38 0.001 37 
CAN 0.677 28 0.060 27 0.176 26 0.934 28 0.179 27 0.475 26 
CHN 0.994 12 0.932 11 0.948 10 0.968 12 0.997 11 1.000 10 
COG 0.371 35 0.172 34 0.218 33 0.804 35 0.595 34 0.578 33 
COL 0.684 23 0.076 22 0.075 21 0.863 23 0.206 22 0.194 21 
DNK 0.424 36 0.048 35 0.184 34 0.674 36 0.117 35 0.319 34 
DZA 0.470 44 0.477 43 0.498 42 0.688 44 0.729 43 0.663 42 
ECU 0.635 12 0.350 11 0.773 10 0.375 12 0.000 11 0.057 10 
EGY 0.463 44 0.159 43 0.309 42 0.549 44 0.053 43 0.131 42 
GAB 0.234 44 0.247 43 0.183 42 0.485 44 0.519 43 0.445 42 
GBR 0.160 40 0.014 39 0.041 38 0.373 40 0.005 39 0.008 38 
GNQ 0.906 17 0.770 16 0.246 15 0.964 17 0.944 16 0.511 15 
IDN 0.425 41 0.463 40 0.567 39 0.566 41 0.624 40 0.692 39 
IND 0.851 10 0.706 9 0.844 8 0.517 10 0.299 9 0.633 8 
IRQ 0.727 39 0.715 38 0.612 37 0.827 39 0.797 38 0.604 37 
ITA 0.618 44 0.371 43 0.480 42 0.346 44 0.063 43 0.108 42 
KAZ 0.847 14 0.767 13 0.762 12 0.899 14 0.442 13 0.315 12 
LBY 0.763 23 0.687 22 0.579 21 0.566 23 0.396 22 0.093 21 
MEX 0.542 15 0.032 14 0.356 13 0.073 15 0.983 14 0.994 13 
MYS 0.715 36 0.624 35 0.743 34 0.522 36 0.089 35 0.356 34 
NGA 0.338 35 0.163 34 0.074 33 0.497 35 0.220 34 0.055 33 
NOR 0.608 31 0.152 30 0.236 29 0.589 31 0.122 30 0.113 29 
OMN 0.000 35 0.003 34 0.021 33 0.004 35 0.005 34 0.012 33 
PER 0.338 29 0.550 28 0.466 27 0.475 29 0.714 28 0.606 27 
QAT 0.792 23 0.956 22 0.292 21 0.734 23 0.977 22 0.794 21 
ROM 0.796 20 0.724 19 0.594 18 0.039 20 0.233 19 0.296 18 
RUS 0.051 19 0.030 18 0.140 17 0.028 19 0.000 18 0.366 17 
SAU 0.857 23 0.769 22 0.958 21 0.593 23 0.232 22 0.599 21 
SDN 0.871 14 0.905 13 0.910 12 0.001 14 0.744 13 0.012 12 
SYR 0.525 35 0.395 34 0.593 33 0.367 35 0.088 34 0.217 33 
THA 0.661 24 0.267 23 0.450 22 0.915 24 0.576 23 0.749 22 
TTO 0.410 34 0.186 33 0.225 32 0.675 34 0.486 33 0.507 32 
TUN 0.186 42 0.146 41 0.066 40 0.314 42 0.231 41 0.069 40 
VEN 0.948 20 0.906 19 0.879 18 0.882 20 0.813 19 0.569 18 
VNM 0.046 19 0.003 18 0.075 17 0.546 19 0.003 18 0.022 17 
YEM 0.659 20 0.288 19 0.330 18 0.942 20 0.506 19 0.787 18 
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Table A.2.  Country-by-country ADF test results (loilrents_pc). 
ISO-
code 
0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 
without trend with trend 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
AGO 0.567 23 0.612 22 0.853 21 0.603 23 0.483 22 0.815 21 
ARE 0.297 23 0.209 22 0.477 21 0.543 23 0.380 22 0.769 21 
ARG 0.647 17 0.422 16 0.613 15 0.038 17 0.001 16 0.180 15 
AUS 0.000 39 0.000 38 0.034 37 0.000 39 0.000 38 0.027 37 
AZE 0.481 11 0.424 10 0.227 9 0.805 11 0.596 10 0.167 9 
BRA 0.038 16 0.193 15 0.017 14 0.060 16 0.397 15 0.002 14 
BRN 0.003 39 0.000 38 0.000 37 0.108 39 0.010 38 0.000 37 
CAN 0.018 28 0.172 27 0.290 26 0.053 28 0.302 27 0.402 26 
CHN 0.669 12 0.346 11 0.739 10 0.034 12 0.422 11 0.879 10 
COG 0.000 35 0.012 34 0.002 33 0.000 35 0.038 34 0.028 33 
COL 0.184 23 0.574 22 0.705 21 0.306 23 0.530 22 0.777 21 
DNK 0.313 36 0.306 35 0.144 34 0.095 36 0.074 35 0.002 34 
DZA 0.000 44 0.171 43 0.305 42 0.000 44 0.513 43 0.674 42 
ECU 0.192 12 0.043 11 0.642 10 0.065 12 0.015 11 0.049 10 
EGY 0.402 44 0.194 43 0.151 42 0.865 44 0.711 43 0.708 42 
GAB 0.072 44 0.133 43 0.111 42 0.145 44 0.428 43 0.411 42 
GBR 0.334 40 0.233 39 0.226 38 0.637 40 0.466 39 0.476 38 
GNQ 0.392 17 0.527 16 0.768 15 0.183 17 0.076 16 0.077 15 
IDN 0.156 41 0.182 40 0.180 39 0.455 41 0.456 40 0.404 39 
IND 0.100 10 0.753 9 0.767 8 0.155 10 0.855 9 0.419 8 
IRQ 0.251 39 0.345 38 0.282 37 0.477 39 0.596 38 0.438 37 
ITA 0.526 44 0.174 43 0.156 42 0.877 44 0.684 43 0.628 42 
KAZ 0.764 14 0.609 13 0.870 12 0.709 14 0.080 13 0.171 12 
LBY 0.540 23 0.436 22 0.723 21 0.645 23 0.470 22 0.851 21 
MEX 0.555 15 0.577 14 0.852 13 0.456 15 0.328 14 0.506 13 
MYS 0.001 36 0.095 35 0.036 34 0.021 36 0.347 35 0.207 34 
NGA 0.255 35 0.355 34 0.482 33 0.557 35 0.603 34 0.856 33 
NOR 0.156 31 0.316 30 0.797 29 0.077 31 0.063 30 0.341 29 
OMN 0.060 35 0.113 34 0.359 33 0.218 35 0.349 34 0.732 33 
PER 0.201 29 0.215 28 0.240 27 0.206 29 0.321 28 0.478 27 
QAT 0.534 23 0.658 22 0.861 21 0.485 23 0.595 22 0.885 21 
ROM 0.912 20 0.899 19 0.909 18 0.695 20 0.260 19 0.527 18 
RUS 0.701 19 0.627 18 0.864 17 0.573 19 0.543 18 0.685 17 
SAU 0.600 23 0.487 22 0.792 21 0.593 23 0.500 22 0.866 21 
SDN 0.680 14 0.689 13 0.742 12 0.451 14 0.352 13 0.633 12 
SYR 0.063 35 0.084 34 0.181 33 0.229 35 0.279 34 0.480 33 
THA 0.901 24 0.927 23 0.986 22 0.240 24 0.745 23 0.814 22 
TTO 0.042 34 0.009 33 0.340 32 0.149 34 0.032 33 0.712 32 
TUN 0.016 42 0.004 41 0.172 40 0.067 42 0.017 41 0.406 40 
VEN 0.086 20 0.277 19 0.635 18 0.138 20 0.303 19 0.671 18 
VNM 0.344 19 0.491 18 0.734 17 0.024 19 0.111 18 0.661 17 
YEM 0.005 20 0.120 19 0.307 18 0.003 20 0.047 19 0.050 18 
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Table A.3.  Country-by-country ADF test results (lrgdpch). 
ISO-
code 
0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 
without trend with trend 
p-value n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
AGO 0.990 23 0.994 22 0.990 21 0.935 23 0.960 22 0.896 21 
ARE 0.123 23 0.064 22 0.319 21 0.063 23 0.004 22 0.352 21 
ARG 0.958 17 0.808 16 0.868 15 0.959 17 0.622 16 0.642 15 
AUS 0.994 39 0.993 38 0.990 37 0.147 39 0.051 38 0.021 37 
AZE 0.987 11 0.960 10 0.973 9 0.882 11 0.025 10 0.677 9 
BRA 0.872 16 0.931 15 0.986 14 0.817 16 0.718 15 0.843 14 
BRN 0.800 39 0.603 38 0.754 37 0.462 39 0.197 38 0.416 37 
CAN 0.865 28 0.210 27 0.709 26 0.757 28 0.347 27 0.648 26 
CHN 0.999 12 0.964 11 0.998 10 0.791 12 0.458 11 0.983 10 
COG 0.494 35 0.096 34 0.033 33 0.846 35 0.451 34 0.187 33 
COL 0.967 23 0.928 22 0.905 21 0.942 23 0.705 22 0.421 21 
DNK 0.684 36 0.440 35 0.291 34 0.914 36 0.773 35 0.884 34 
DZA 0.549 44 0.224 43 0.346 42 0.488 44 0.378 43 0.513 42 
ECU 0.953 12 0.952 11 0.860 10 0.215 12 0.000 11 0.272 10 
EGY 0.985 44 0.958 43 0.948 42 0.541 44 0.555 43 0.627 42 
GAB 0.154 44 0.078 43 0.057 42 0.564 44 0.337 43 0.257 42 
GBR 0.774 40 0.668 39 0.739 38 0.901 40 0.373 39 0.593 38 
GNQ 0.602 17 0.437 16 0.003 15 0.986 17 0.889 16 0.985 15 
IDN 0.090 41 0.310 40 0.320 39 0.479 41 0.281 40 0.367 39 
IND 0.996 10 0.990 9 0.596 8 0.243 10 0.437 9 0.625 8 
IRQ 0.161 39 0.164 38 0.246 37 0.431 39 0.435 38 0.547 37 
ITA 0.000 44 0.009 43 0.009 42 0.980 44 0.982 43 0.991 42 
KAZ 0.992 14 0.808 13 0.531 12 0.314 14 0.176 13 0.020 12 
LBY 0.247 23 0.055 22 0.035 21 0.353 23 0.247 22 0.167 21 
MEX 0.706 15 0.027 14 0.304 13 0.372 15 0.785 14 0.853 13 
MYS 0.604 36 0.716 35 0.429 34 0.872 36 0.775 35 0.692 34 
NGA 0.589 35 0.454 34 0.406 33 0.948 35 0.894 34 0.976 33 
NOR 0.459 31 0.624 30 0.702 29 0.977 31 0.516 30 0.861 29 
OMN 0.019 35 0.515 34 0.422 33 0.000 35 0.071 34 0.069 33 
PER 0.947 29 0.575 28 0.825 27 0.938 29 0.515 28 0.791 27 
QAT 0.998 23 0.995 22 0.992 21 0.948 23 0.961 22 0.910 21 
ROM 0.986 20 0.664 19 0.833 18 0.130 20 0.008 19 0.699 18 
RUS 0.939 19 0.401 18 0.642 17 0.107 19 0.014 18 0.179 17 
SAU 0.695 23 0.298 22 0.404 21 0.488 23 0.447 22 0.231 21 
SDN 0.988 14 0.966 13 0.979 12 0.200 14 0.460 13 0.231 12 
SYR 0.369 35 0.739 34 0.862 33 0.273 35 0.573 34 0.673 33 
THA 0.126 24 0.129 23 0.141 22 0.848 24 0.346 23 0.219 22 
TTO 0.990 34 0.954 33 0.884 32 0.995 34 0.988 33 0.974 32 
TUN 0.275 42 0.251 41 0.241 40 0.264 42 0.368 41 0.176 40 
VEN 0.265 20 0.064 19 0.343 18 0.591 20 0.228 19 0.668 18 
VNM 0.944 19 0.894 18 0.971 17 0.677 19 0.081 18 0.469 17 
YEM 0.484 20 0.769 19 0.269 18 0.859 20 0.834 19 0.816 18 
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Table A.4  Country-by-country ADF test results (openc). 
ISO-
code 
0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 0 lags 1 lags 2 lags 
without trend with trend 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
p-
value 
n 
AGO 0.175 23 0.373 22 0.318 21 0.581 23 0.913 22 0.877 21 
ARE 0.398 23 0.237 22 0.205 21 0.760 23 0.564 22 0.530 21 
ARG 0.632 17 0.697 16 0.649 15 0.737 17 0.862 16 0.684 15 
AUS 0.588 39 0.591 38 0.616 37 0.038 39 0.062 38 0.118 37 
AZE 0.781 11 0.176 10 0.238 9 0.992 11 0.973 10 0.911 9 
BRA 0.731 16 0.669 15 0.261 14 0.965 16 0.976 15 0.888 14 
BRN 0.049 39 0.042 38 0.221 37 0.168 39 0.149 38 0.524 37 
CAN 0.749 28 0.437 27 0.401 26 0.996 28 0.993 27 0.986 26 
CHN 0.664 12 0.201 11 0.409 10 1.000 12 0.996 11 0.996 10 
COG 0.548 35 0.490 34 0.720 33 0.368 35 0.382 34 0.678 33 
COL 0.690 23 0.745 22 0.668 21 0.192 23 0.720 22 0.835 21 
DNK 0.720 36 0.757 35 0.648 34 0.493 36 0.255 35 0.348 34 
DZA 0.505 44 0.152 43 0.345 42 0.763 44 0.350 43 0.661 42 
ECU 0.325 12 0.198 11 0.422 10 0.475 12 0.362 11 0.377 10 
EGY 0.312 44 0.178 43 0.123 42 0.524 44 0.362 43 0.305 42 
GAB 0.005 44 0.037 43 0.101 42 0.001 44 0.004 43 0.076 42 
GBR 0.055 40 0.074 39 0.048 38 0.087 40 0.115 39 0.094 38 
GNQ 0.322 17 0.396 16 0.120 15 0.593 17 0.499 16 0.108 15 
IDN 0.058 41 0.184 40 0.279 39 0.019 41 0.286 40 0.539 39 
IND 0.729 10 0.976 9 0.872 8 0.067 10 0.532 9 0.392 8 
IRQ 0.232 39 0.266 38 0.163 37 0.543 39 0.588 38 0.435 37 
ITA 0.306 44 0.320 43 0.307 42 0.517 44 0.511 43 0.509 42 
KAZ 0.427 14 0.421 13 0.437 12 0.870 14 0.938 13 0.963 12 
LBY 0.885 23 0.830 22 0.719 21 0.846 23 0.811 22 0.756 21 
MEX 0.000 15 0.287 14 0.448 13 0.000 15 0.555 14 0.757 13 
MYS 0.545 36 0.710 35 0.589 34 0.988 36 0.900 35 0.968 34 
NGA 0.154 35 0.479 34 0.445 33 0.068 35 0.405 34 0.313 33 
NOR 0.139 31 0.014 30 0.219 29 0.179 31 0.011 30 0.361 29 
OMN 0.131 35 0.013 34 0.889 33 0.296 35 0.001 34 0.714 33 
PER 0.241 29 0.357 28 0.311 27 0.387 29 0.583 28 0.538 27 
QAT 0.282 23 0.280 22 0.123 21 0.388 23 0.148 22 0.200 21 
ROM 0.301 20 0.344 19 0.111 18 0.522 20 0.907 19 0.960 18 
RUS 0.000 19 0.000 18 0.007 17 0.003 19 0.000 18 0.104 17 
SAU 0.912 23 0.755 22 0.833 21 0.935 23 0.773 22 0.917 21 
SDN 0.173 14 0.263 13 0.497 12 0.624 14 0.939 13 0.898 12 
SYR 0.467 35 0.670 34 0.617 33 0.365 35 0.632 34 0.604 33 
THA 0.541 24 0.502 23 0.567 22 0.430 24 0.743 23 0.804 22 
TTO 0.115 34 0.232 33 0.189 32 0.260 34 0.298 33 0.271 32 
TUN 0.335 42 0.133 41 0.198 40 0.202 42 0.026 41 0.100 40 
VEN 0.533 20 0.389 19 0.355 18 0.739 20 0.663 19 0.601 18 
VNM 0.745 19 0.823 18 0.989 17 0.139 19 0.065 18 0.375 17 
YEM 0.330 20 0.106 19 0.340 18 0.940 20 0.916 19 0.972 18 
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Table A.5 Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests for lrer with lbrent and lrgdpch. 
 
Dependent 
variable: lrer Test statistic (1) (2) (3) 
lbrent 
Pt 
z-value 0.553 -5.751*** -5.773*** 
p-value 0.710 0.000 0.000 
lbrent 
Pa 
z-value 1.216 -5.133*** -4.601*** 
p-value 0.888 0.000 0.000 
lrgdpch 
Pt 
z-value -2.031 2.091 0.839 
p-value 0.021** 0.982 0.799 
lrgdpch 
Pa 
z-value -0.487 3.159 1.676 
p-value 0.313 0.999 0.953 
            
Subsample OPEC World-OPEC D10-OPEC 
N 10 32 16 
Lags 1 1 1 
 
    
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Figure A.1. GDP per capita PPP in constant 2005 USD by country 
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Figure A.2. Total final energy consumption per capita (in tonnes of oil equivalent) 
by country 
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Figure A.3. Real end-use energy price index for industry and households  
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